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Abstract 
With the Information Age fully in place and still experiencing rapid development, 
users expect to have global, seamless, ubiquitous, secure, and efficient communications 
that provide access to real-time applications and collaboration.  The United States 
Department of Defense’s (DoD) Network-Centric Enterprise Services initiative, along 
with the notion of pushing the “power to the edge,” will provide end-users with 
maximum situational awareness, a comprehensive view of the battlespace, all within a 
secure networking environment. 
This research develops a novel security framework architecture to provide 
efficient and scalable secure multicasting in the low earth orbit satellite network 
environment.  This security framework architecture combines several key aspects of other 
secure group communications architectures in a way that increases efficiency and 
scalability, while maintaining the overall system security level.  This security architecture 
in a deployed environment with heterogeneous communications users will reduce re-
keying.  Less frequent re-keying means more resources are available for user data rather 
 v 
than security overhead.  This translates to greater performance for the end user; it will 
seem as if they have a “larger pipe” for their network links. 
This research develops and analyzes multiple mobile communication environment 
scenarios to demonstrate the superior re-keying offered by the novel “Hubenko Security 
Framework Architecture” compared to traditional and clustered multicast security 
architectures.  For example, in the scenario containing a heterogeneous mix of user types 
(Stationary, Ground, Sea, and Air), the Hubenko Architecture achieves a minimum ten-
fold reduction in total keys distributed compared to other known architectures.  For 
another scenario, the Hubenko Architecture operates at 6% capacity while other 
architectures consumed 98% of capacity.  With 80% user mobility for 40% Air users, re-
keying in other architectures increased 900%, whereas the Hubenko Architecture only 
increased 65%.  By reducing overall system re-keying, the Hubenko Architecture 
increases system efficiency and scalability. 
This new architecture is extensible to numerous secure group communications 
environments beyond the low earth orbit satellite network environment, including 
unmanned aerial vehicle swarms, wireless sensor networks, and mobile ad hoc networks.  
At the time of publication, the Hubenko Architecture was the basis for several current 
Master’s level research efforts in the aforementioned areas. 
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 1 
A SECURE AND EFFICIENT COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE FOR 
GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID USERS VIA COOPERATING SPACE ASSETS 
 
I. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The Information Age is in a stage of rapid growth.  As soon as new technologies 
are introduced, users expect even more capability, more speed, and greater flexibility.  
Rarely does any new technology exist as a stand-alone entity.  Rather, society advances 
together, through sharing of knowledge, techniques, and technology.  At the heart of this 
information sharing society is a communications network that always seems to be one 
step behind the needs of its users.  Physical communications technologies, whether in the 
form of terrestrial or satellite systems, are also rapidly advancing in capacity and 
capabilities to meet the needs of bandwidth-hungry users.  From the users’ perspective, 
however, it seems “more” is never enough. 
One way of addressing the problem of insufficient communications capacity is to 
focus on the actual data generation and usage of communications.  At the dawn of the 
Information Age, the relatively small numbers of users were able to communicate in a 
point-to-point (P2P) fashion between local areas.  Today, users need more capabilities 
than P2P systems can provide.  Users expect to communicate in a one-to-many and even 
many-to-many fashion. 
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) recognizes the need to change 
the data-sharing paradigm from a “stove-piped” point-to-point fashion to more of a group 
data sharing environment: 
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“Across the DoD, broad leadership goals are transforming the way 
information is managed to accelerate decision-making, improve joint 
warfighting, and create intelligence advantages… 
Net-centricity compels a shift to a “many-to-many” exchange of 
data, enabling many users and applications to leverage the same data—
extending beyond the previous focus on standardized, predefined, point-
to-point interfaces.” [Ste03] 
 -John P. Stenbit, Former DoD Chief Information Officer 
The enabling infrastructure that will deliver this “network-centric” environment 
for the DoD is the Global Information Grid (GIG).  The GIG is “The globally 
interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and 
personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on 
demand to war-fighters, policy makers, and support personnel.  The GIG includes all 
owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software 
(including applications), data, security services and other associated services necessary to 
achieve Information Superiority.”  [DoD02].  As noted in [AlH03], the GIG enables the 
aforementioned change in mindset, termed “power to the edge,” that delivers vast 
computing power to all DoD entities, regardless of their physical location, so long as they 
are “net-ready, meaning connected to the GIG.” 
Satellites are an indispensable component of the GIG’s approach to connecting 
every warfighter with the information they need to make rapid, well-informed decisions.  
As is the case in all communications systems, secure, efficient, and effective methods for 
transferring information are essential.  Multicasting in a satellite environment can provide 
the necessary performance and security while improving the efficient use of critical 
bandwidth. 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
Throughout the GIG, as well as the Internet in general, communications 
predominantly flow in a point-to-point fashion, which is inefficient when large groups of 
users are accessing or sharing the same information.  Additionally, secure group 
communications architectures face several issues, including limited scalability for very 
large groups of users, and excessive time and processing overhead to achieve a secure 
system.  A secure group communications environment that must accommodate highly 
mobile users exacerbates these issues.  Finally, users in the field, whether they are 
terrestrial or airborne, typically need bulky equipment to access limited, low-rate 
connectivity.  Those users should not have to worry about excessive security overhead 
further hindering their communications as well.  Proposals in the research literature 
address some of the issues.  However, a solution that meets both the security and 
scalability needs of highly mobile users has yet to be proposed. 
1.3 Research Goal 
This research develops a novel security architecture, dubbed the “Hubenko 
Security Framework Architecture,” (Hubenko Architecture for short) to secure group 
communications (namely, multicast) in the low earth orbit satellite network environment 
more efficiently than currently proposed architectures.  To achieve this goal, the Hubenko 
Architecture combines key aspects of different secure group communications 
architectures in a way that increases efficiency and scalability. 
Implementing the Hubenko Architecture in a deployed environment with 
heterogeneous communications users will reduce the frequency of re-keying.  Less 
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frequent re-keying equates to more resources available for data throughput versus 
security overhead.  This translates to performance to the end user; it will seem as if they 
have a “larger pipe” for their network links. 
1.4 Research Contributions 
1.4.1 Coherent, Secure, and Efficient Architecture for LEOSat Environment 
The primary objective of this research is to develop a coherent security 
framework architecture that improves the scalability of secure group communications for 
highly mobile users.  This framework architecture is then applied to the LEO satellite 
network environment. 
This research results in a scalable system security architecture capable of handling 
large groups of users (e.g., ten thousand or more) without loss of efficiency or 
significantly affecting data throughput.  The architecture allows the system to handle at 
least an order of magnitude more highly mobile users while providing superior re-keying 
performance over the traditional and clustered architectures. 
Multiple mobile communication environment scenarios are developed and 
analyzed to demonstrate the superior re-keying advantage offered by the Hubenko 
Architecture over traditional and clustered multicast security architectures.  The first 
scenario compares the performance for different levels of user mobility.  The second 
scenario compares the performance for different levels of user persistence in a multicast 
group.  The third scenario compares the performance for increasing the number of aircraft 
flying over stationary users.  The final scenario compares the performance of varied 
numbers of aircraft in a heterogeneous user environment.  A sampling of the results 
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includes the following.  In the scenario containing a heterogeneous mix of user types 
(Stationary, Ground, Sea, and Air), the Hubenko Architecture achieved a minimum ten-
fold reduction in total keys distributed compared to the Cluster and Baseline 
architectures.  In the “Increasing Aircraft over Stationary Users” scenario, the Hubenko 
Architecture operated at 6% capacity while the Cluster and Baseline architectures 
operated at 98% capacity.  In the 80% overall mobility experiment with 40% Air users, 
the Cluster and Baseline architecture re-keying increased 900% over the Stationary case, 
whereas the Hubenko Architecture only increased 65%.  A relative performance example 
for each of the scenarios is plotted in Figure 1 for illustrative purposes.  The amount of 
re-keying was independently normalized for each scenario (i.e., the amount of re-keying 
in scenario one does not directly correlate to the amount of re-keying in scenario two).  In 
each scenario, the Hubenko Architecture required less re-keying than the Cluster 
Architecture, as illustrated in the figure by the lower amount of relative re-keying. 
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Figure 1 - Relative Re-keying Performance 
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1.4.2 Extension of Hubenko Architecture to Other Highly Mobile Environments 
The unique topological and environmental challenges of the LEO satellite 
network originally motivated the development of the Hubenko Architecture.  Once the 
benefits of the research materialized, it became obvious that the topology could be 
collapsed to a single terrestrial plane (versus a hybrid satellite-terrestrial topology), and 
the architecture could be extended to accommodate a variety of environments. 
The Hubenko Architecture can easily adapt to multicast protocols and security 
architectures in numerous operational and deployed environments.  Other research in the 
design stages is adapting the Hubenko Architecture for use in secure multicast 
communications of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarms.  Additionally, the 
architecture could be used in mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), wireless sensor 
networks (WSN), and other heterogeneous mobile communications environments. 
1.5 Assumptions/Limitations 
The Hubenko Architecture’s advantage is limited in environments where the 
communicating users are predominantly stationary, or where the users’ movements are 
localized within a single area (i.e., a single cluster).  In these environments, the Hubenko 
Architecture has the same performance as the clustered environment, but has extra 
overhead from an access control awareness feature implementation.  Therefore, in a 
homogenous wireless sensor network where the sensors are immobile and extremely 
limited in battery and processing power, an implementation of the Hubenko Architecture 
for this environment would be detrimental.  The overhead would unnecessarily decrease 
battery life through increased computational and communications cycles required to 
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support the access control awareness functions, which provide no benefit in this case.  
However, in a heterogeneous environment where the wireless sensor network is part of a 
larger network with mobile communications units passing through, and communicating 
with, the wireless sensor network, the reduced re-keying will greatly improve scalability 
and efficiency, and therefore battery life. 
1.6 Dissertation Organization 
This document is divided into five chapters.  Chapter II reviews relevant literature 
for satellite systems, multicasting technologies, and multicasting security.  Chapter III 
discusses the development and the details of the Hubenko Security Framework 
Architecture, along with the motivation for pursuing this architecture.  This chapter also 
discusses the simulations and models that support the performance claims.  Chapter IV 
presents the results and analysis of the numerous simulations performed during the course 
of this research.  Chapter V concludes the document with a brief summary of the 
research, highlights of the contributions this research provides to the network 
communications community, and recommendations for future research. 
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II. Literature Review 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents a literature review covering three broad areas related to: 1) 
communication satellite systems, 2) multicasting technologies, and 3) multicasting 
security.  The first area of research includes: low earth orbit, medium earth orbit, and 
geosynchronous earth orbit (and hybrids thereof) communication satellite systems and 
architectures; and the modeling, simulation, and analysis of such systems.  The second 
area covers multicasting protocols and algorithms suitable for adaptation to satellite 
network environments, along with relevant modeling, simulation, and analysis of the 
protocols and algorithms.  Finally, the third area of review pertains to multicasting 
security. 
2.2 Communication Satellite Systems 
Before discussing communication satellite systems, a brief overview of the four 
main satellite orbits is presented including: the low earth orbit (LEO), the medium earth 
orbit (MEO), the highly elliptical orbit (HEO), and the geosynchronous earth orbit 
(GEO).   
The first orbit, the low earth orbit, places the satellite at an altitude between 200 
to about 2,000 kilometers above the surface of the earth.  Depending on the angle of the 
orbit with respect to the equator, the orbit can be classified as either prograde (0 to 90 
degrees, “with” the rotation of the earth) or retrograde (90 to 180 degrees, “against” the 
rotation of the earth).  LEO satellites that pass over the polar regions of earth are often 
referred to as “polar-orbiting.”  Since LEO satellites orbit relatively closely to the earth, 
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radio frequency propagation round trip times (one link up, and one link down) are about 
1.33 to 13.33 milliseconds, depending on the orbit altitude. 
The medium earth orbit is also known as the intermediate circular orbit (ICO).  
MEOs are typically circular at an altitude of around 10,000 kilometers.  This orbital 
height places the satellites between the two Van Allen radiation belts and therefore leads 
to longer satellite life as compared to an elliptical orbit where satellites pass through the 
radiation belts.  Due to their altitude, MEOs provide coverage to the same ground 
location for several hours, and have a radio frequency propagation round trip time of 
about 67 milliseconds.  One of the best-known examples of a MEO satellite system is the 
United States Navistar Global Positioning System (GPS). 
A highly elliptical orbit’s altitude varies, bringing a satellite relatively close to the 
earth at its perigee, and relatively far from the earth at its apogee.  The HEO typically 
serves a very specialized purpose, as with the Molnya satellite system (which gave the 
name to its specific orbit).  The Molnya system has an orbit that varies from an altitude of 
about 1,000 kilometers to about 40,000 kilometers, and is highly inclined, thus providing 
long periods of coverage to the northern latitudes of Russia. 
Finally, the geosynchronous earth orbit places a satellite in a near-stationary 
position above the earth’s surface.  However, this is a common point of confusion, since a 
geosynchronous satellite technically only requires a rotation in the direction of the earth, 
and need not appear stationary from the ground.  The Geostationary orbit, at an altitude 
of approximately 35,768 kilometers above the surface of the earth, is a subcategory of 
geosynchronous orbits, and is generally used when GEO satellites are referenced.  Based 
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on this altitude, the radio frequency propagation round trip time for a GEO satellite is 
approximately 238.45 milliseconds.  A comprehensive discussion of these orbits can be 
found in [Rod01, Sae03]. 
Existing long haul satellite communications systems primarily use geostationary 
earth orbit (GEO) satellites.  GEO satellite systems allow full earth coverage below ~78 
degrees latitude with as few as three satellites.  Drawbacks to using these systems include 
the long propagation delay and the large propagation loss.  The transmission power 
required to overcome the propagation loss of a 35,768 kilometers path makes GEO user 
handheld terminals impractical compared to LEO user handheld terminals.  Therefore, 
the primary advantages associated with LEO satellites are a lower transmission power, a 
lower propagation delay, and polar coverage. 
One aspect of defining a communications satellite system is its orbit.  From a data 
handling perspective, communications satellite systems typically process data in two 
ways: “bent-pipe” or “store-and-forward.”  When communication satellites operate in a 
bent-pipe fashion, they receive a signal from a terrestrial user and then echo the same 
signal back to the earth for further processing by some other entity.  A store-and-forward 
satellite makes processing decisions on where to send a received signal, either back to the 
same geographical location, or to some other location on another transmitter [BeF99].  
This includes being able to route signals to other satellites in a crosslink manner, where 
supported. 
In addition to categorizing satellite systems based on their orbits and data 
handling characteristics, communication satellite systems can be divided according to the 
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different types of communications services they provide: narrowband, wideband, and 
protected communications services.  To illustrate this, consider the Global Information 
Grid (GIG) and its subsystems as an example of a communications architecture that 
incorporates each of these services in its “layers.” 
2.2.1 Global Information Grid 
The DoD defines the GIG as a “globally interconnected, end-to-end set of 
information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, 
storing, disseminating, and managing information” [GAO04].  Furthermore, the GIG 
incorporates almost all of DoD’s information systems, services, applications, and data 
into a single seamless, reliable, and secure Internet-like network.  The GIG promotes 
interoperability by using standards-based technologies across all platforms.  The GIG will 
integrate most, if not all, of DoD’s weapon systems, command, control, and 
communications systems, as well as business systems.  When complete, the GIG will 
have a new core network consisting of both a Satellite Layer and a Surface Layer.  There 
is also an Aerospace Layer populated with mobile users and weapons systems.  Finally, 
there is a “Near-Space Layer” between the altitudes of air flight and space, which may 
eventually make its way into the final architecture. 
2.2.1.1 The GIG Satellite Layer 
As depicted in Figure 2, the majority of the GIG’s communication assets in the 
Satellite Layer, either operational or in development, are geosynchronous earth orbit 
(GEO) satellites.  The different systems provide the military with narrowband, wideband, 
and protected communications capabilities.  In general, the narrowband capabilities 
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support highly mobile users needing low rate data or voice connectivity.  Wideband 
capabilities are geared towards users that need much higher data rate connectivity and 
have sufficient power and available area to support the larger infrastructure required.  The 
protected capabilities ensure users are able to communicate through various electronic 
warfare attacks, survive nuclear radiation environments, and have a lower probability of 
detection and interception. 
 
Figure 2 - Global Information Grid Layers [SMC06a] 
2.2.1.1.1 Narrowband Satellite Systems 
The needs of the highly mobile warfighter are currently supported by the Ultra 
High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On (UFO) satellite system, soon to be replaced by the 
Next Generation Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) [SPA06].  Tactical field 
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equipment has to be small, light, and rugged to survive the harsh environments faced by 
the typical warfighter.  To support increased mobility, tactical terminals typically have 
much smaller antennas and less processing power than users that are stationary.  Because 
of these constraints, low rate voice or data communications are the usual services 
provided to the warfighter on the move.  Utilizing the UHF spectrum allows signals to 
penetrate buildings, harsh weather, and thick vegetation.  In addition, UHF frequencies 
are well-suited for use in low-power, inexpensive, lightweight, rugged communication 
systems [SMC06b]. 
2.2.1.1.2 Wideband Satellite Systems 
Tactical forces in the field rely upon wideband satellite systems to reach back to 
the surface portions of the GIG.  The Defense Satellite Communications Systems Phase 
III (DSCS III) wideband satellites use a portion of the X-band frequency to provide 
secure voice and high data rate communications for the military’s typical long-haul, high-
capacity communications needs when a high speed, high capacity terrestrial network is 
not available [SMC06b]. 
In the near future, the Wideband Gapfiller Satellite (WGS) system will replace 
DSCS as the next generation of high capacity communications connectivity.  Notionally, 
there will be three to five WGS’s on orbit, depending on the development pace of the 
Transformational Satellite System (TSAT).  WGS will augment and then replace the 
DSCS support in X-band, as well as augment and replace the one-way Ka-band broadcast 
of the Global Broadcast Service Satellite System (GBS).  WGS will also provide a new 
two-way Ka-band communication capability for the warfighter.   
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As the name implies, the Global Broadcast Service provides a high speed, high 
volume “broadcast-from-the-sky” service for the military.  The GBS will augment, as 
well as interface with, other communication services to provide a medium for continuous 
information flow to users.  The GBS platforms are hosted on three of the UFO satellites, 
and will fly on three WGS’s.  Additionally, future requirements for the broadcast service 
will be met by hosting GBS packages on TSAT platforms [SMC06b]. 
TSAT rounds out the capabilities of all the previous DoD wideband 
communication satellite systems and is the ultimate enabler of the Transformational 
Communications Architecture (TCA).  TSAT will provide another source of high data 
rate satellite communications along with services modeled after the Internet.  Notionally, 
five operational satellites will be connected in a ring through laser crosslinks, and will 
provide laser and radio frequency (RF) connections to the Surface layer.  TSAT will 
extend routing capabilities of the previous wideband satellite systems and be able to route 
packets in space rather than provide bent-pipe, point-to-point connections between 
ground users.  The satellite crosslinking reduces the need for packets to make multiple 
ground/satellite hops to reach distant users.  This reduces end-to-end latency, and allows 
for near-real time communications speeds [DTI05]. 
2.2.1.1.3 Protected Satellite Systems 
Protected communications are serviced by a global extremely high frequency 
(EHF) system, composed of the Military Strategic and Tactical Relay Satellite (Milstar) 
system, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency System and Enhanced Polar System.  
Protected communications offer Low Probability of Intercept/Detection (LPI/D), Anti-
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Jam (AJ), and Anti-Scintillation (AS) protection, as well as being encrypted.  The main 
methods of protecting the communication links originate from operating in the Ka-band 
as well as using advanced communications techniques, such as frequency hopping and 
active phased array antennas.  This combination offers resilience against electronic 
warfare and reduces the probability of physical attacks. 
The first in the series of satellite systems to provide protected communications for 
the DoD is the Military Strategic and Tactical Relay Satellite (Milstar).  Launched in 
1994, Milstar provides connectivity to ships, submarines, aircraft, and other terrestrial 
users through five geosynchronous satellites.  Since the satellites are crosslinked and can 
process traffic rather than simply transpond signals between two ground users, Milstar 
satellites establish circuits between themselves and the ground, based on dynamic user 
needs [SMC06b]. 
In the next few years, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) System 
will launch three geosynchronous satellites, continuing and enhancing the protected 
services offered by Milstar.  The AEHF enhancements over Milstar include a 100-times 
capacity increase, as well as enhanced anti-jam and LPI/D capabilities, and advanced 
encryption systems.  Once a single TSAT is operational, DoD will have achieved 
continuous 24-hour communications coverage between the latitudes of +/- 65 degrees 
with the three AEHF satellites and one TSAT. 
To augment the current northern polar coverage gap in Milstar services, the 
Interim Polar EHF system places protected communications packages on three classified 
spacecraft that occupy highly elliptical orbits.  This system provides protected 
 16 
communications services similar to Milstar, but in the northern polar region.  When 
AEHF comes online, the Enhanced Polar System (EPS) will provide protected 
communications that are comparable to AEHF, but will be on a classified spacecraft, just 
like the Interim Polar EHF system.  However, unlike Interim Polar, EPS will have 
crosslink capabilities, enabling cross connections to not only other EPS packages, but to 
AEHF and TSAT as well [SMC06b]. 
There has been a steady progression of capabilities in each of the different types 
of satellite communications systems, as well as a move towards a highly cooperative 
Satellite layer to maximize communications support to the warfighter.  Each piece of the 
Satellite layer contributes directly to achieving the concept of Network Centric 
communications for the DoD user. 
Operating in the realm of the Satellite layer is well understood by the DoD, with 
mature technologies deployed and well-developed operational concepts in place.  To 
follow the intent of the Transformational mantra means taking a fresh look at how best to 
utilize available resources for providing information to the warfighter.  Using lessons 
learned in the Satellite layer and applying them to the Near-Space layer may greatly 
enhance the DoD’s capabilities for a fraction of the cost. 
2.2.1.2 The GIG Near-Space Layer 
Near space begins at an altitude of 22.86 kilometers and ends at the beginning of 
space or at 100.58 kilometers according to the International Aeronautical Federation 
(FAI) [Tom05].  Near-Space is the region between the traditional realms of satellites and 
air-breathing assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and typical airplanes.  
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Though not formally incorporated as a layer in the GIG, research into exploiting the 
Near-Space layer is gaining support within the DoD.  When the Near-Space technologies 
mature, this layer will most likely find a home in the GIG.  Examples of “nearcraft” 
platforms for carrying sensors or communications packages include balloons, gliders, 
special motorized nearcraft, all of which are currently under development. 
There are several key advantages to operating in the Near-Space layer over the 
Satellite layer [Tom05].  The first advantage is significantly reduced developmental and 
operational cost, since the assets do not have to be space hardened and space qualified.  
Another advantage is the reduced component sizes of sensors and communications 
equipment needed to achieve performance levels similar to like systems in the Satellite 
layer since sensors are significantly closer than those placed on satellites.  On the other 
hand, if the same satellite sensors or communications packages are used on platforms in 
the Near-Space layer, large increases (10-20 fold) in image resolution, sensitivity, and 
accuracy can be achieved.  In addition to the cost and component advantages, Near-Space 
atmospheric conditions allow sensors and communications equipment to operate with less 
interference and/or distortion.  For example, “nearcraft” operate at altitudes low enough 
to avoid most space weather effects.  In addition, they are below the wave-refracting or 
blocking ionosphere, which allows better sensor performance, and yet are high enough to 
avoid most atmospheric weather effects, like high winds or rain.  With the development 
of Near-Space vehicles comes the potential to achieve true continuous, persistent 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) or communications coverage of 
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specific tactical areas.  While Near-Space offers unique opportunities, the Aerospace 
layer contains many of the contemporary platforms needed for military operations. 
2.2.1.3 The GIG Aerospace Layer 
The conventional Aerospace layer is by far the most familiar layer above the 
Surface layer.  New technologies and applications are continuously developed to enhance 
and improve capabilities.  This layer is dominated by aircraft such as helicopters, fighters, 
tankers, and cargo jets.  However, the impact of the unmanned aerial vehicles is being felt 
due to increased operational capabilities. 
Familiar equipment using the Aerospace layer includes the Airborne Warning and 
Control System (AWACS) and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (J-
STARS).  These assets are used for long-range surveillance and target acquisition, as well 
as command and control functions for both ground and aerospace assets.  The 
employment of the Aerospace layer goes beyond conventional ISR collection and 
delivery of munitions and supplies.  This layer is emerging to take on new roles in the 
communications arena with the development of the Battlefield Airborne Communications 
Node (BACN).  The BACN will provide communications connections to both legacy 
radio systems as well as advanced Internet Protocol (IP) communications (data as well as 
voice). 
2.2.1.4 The GIG Surface Layer 
Bridging the Aerospace layer and the Surface layer is a new communication 
system called Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) [GAO04].  This software radio system 
will bridge interoperability gaps between current user terminals and new IP terminals for 
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mobile users on the ground, at sea, or in the air, as well as connect those same users to the 
permanent terrestrial network.  In instances when a JTRS is not available, users can 
directly access the Satellite layer systems for their communications needs.  Examples of 
user terminals supported by AEHF include Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical-
Terminal (SMART-T), Single Channel Anti-Jam Man Portable (SCAMP), Family of 
Advanced Beyond Line-of-sight Terminals (FAB-T), and Navy Multiband Terminals 
(NMT). 
As part of the core backbone, the terrestrial networks of the GIG are also being 
enhanced to provide maximum information sharing between entities.  The Defense 
Information Systems Network (DISN) was recently upgraded through an effort known as 
“Global Information Grid-Bandwidth Expansion,” or GIG-BE [GAO04].  GIG-BE 
provides fiber optic connectivity to several key military installations, as well as upgraded 
the network capacity to about 90 DoD installations.   
2.2.1.5 The GIG’s “Missing” Layer 
The Satellite layer is typically associated with GEO satellites.  Because of the 
steadily increasing usage of the GEO belt (to near saturation), new approaches for using 
orbital assets are needed.  Non-GEO orbits were proposed in the early 1990s and fielded 
in the late 1990s.  Particular emphasis was placed on fielding low earth orbit (LEO) 
systems of cooperating assets.  The LEO belt can be considered the GIG’s “Missing” 
layer. 
LEOs typically reside 200 to 2,000 kilometers above the earth’s surface.  Because 
of this orbit, communications between a terrestrial observer and a LEO satellite may last 
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for only 8 to 20 minutes, but with up to 45 times less latency compared to a GEO 
satellite.  Because of the short viewing time, multiple satellites must be placed into 
multiple orbital planes to provide extended viewing coverage.  Perhaps two of the best-
known LEO satellite systems are IRIDIUM® and GlobalStar®.  IRIDIUM® uses 66 
satellites and has store-and-forward capabilities, while GlobalStar® uses 40 satellites and 
operates as a bent-pipe. 
2.2.2 Highlights of the IRIDIUM® LEO Satellite System 
The Air Force Institute of Technology’s (AFIT) initial venture into the realm of 
low earth orbit (LEO) satellite network architectures began with an investigation on the 
packet delays, convergence speeds, and protocol overhead of the Extended Bellman-Ford 
and Darting unicast routing protocols adapted to a satellite network and modeled and 
simulated on the IRIDIUM® and GlobalStar® satellite systems [RaJ97].  Following this 
effort, a higher fidelity model of the IRIDIUM® LEO satellite network was developed 
[FoR98, PrR99].   
The information in this section was derived from [FoR98, Hub97, PrR99, RaJ97, 
Sae03].  The IRIDIUM® system is a worldwide LEO satellite communications system 
designed to support voice, data, facsimile, and paging.  The IRIDIUM® satellite 
constellation has six orbital planes with eleven satellites in each plane.  The satellites are 
in a circular orbit at an altitude of approximately 780 kilometers and an inclination of 
86.4 degrees.  Orbital planes one and six are counter-rotating and separated by 
approximately 22 degrees.  The remaining orbital planes are co-rotating and are separated 
by approximately 31.6 degrees.   
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The velocity of a LEO satellite relative to earth is 26,804-kilometers/hour and 
results in an orbital period of 100.13 minutes.  The minimum inclination angle for a user 
to see a given satellite is 8.2 degrees.  At a fixed location on earth, the average in-view 
time for a satellite is approximately nine minutes and either one or two satellites are 
visible at a time. 
A link is established from an earth station to the satellite with the strongest signal.  
There are 48 spot beams per satellite, with 80 circuits per spot beam.  Each spot beam is 
approximately 30 miles in diameter, depending on the satellite’s current position.  Since 
the satellites are moving much faster than the mobile users, the mobile users are 
considered stationary with respect to the velocity of the satellites, as even a mobile user 
in an airplane is traveling much slower than a satellite.  As the satellites pass overhead, 
the link from user to satellite is handed off from a satellite leaving the users area to one 
entering the user’s area, much like a cellular phone user hands off between cellular phone 
towers when passing from one cell to the next. 
Each IRIDIUM® satellite maintains up to four inter-satellite links (ISL).  Intra-
plane links (crosslinks to satellites in the same orbital plane) are maintained permanently, 
while inter-plane links (crosslinks to satellites in different orbital planes) are dynamically 
established and terminated to avoid excessive overlap near the polar regions.  Satellites 
along the counter-rotating seams do not establish ISLs between each other due to the 
rapid angular change. 
 22 
2.2.3 Other Satellite Communications Systems 
The GIG is an excellent example of multiple systems cooperating to deliver 
services to customers.  The satellite systems within the GIG, however, are but a small 
subset of the total number of worldwide communications satellite systems planned, in the 
development stages, or are currently in operation.  The late 1990s saw a flurry of activity 
from numerous entities to meet the needs projected for satellite users.  As a result, much 
research and development money went into the area of satellite communications.  For 
example, 17 companies filed for EHF spectrum to operate their proposed satellite systems 
[FrH99].  Still others proposed and investigated systems ranging from LEO systems to 
MEO to GEO, and even hybrid systems [BhH02, CaL99, GhS99, JaK99, Yam97].  This 
created extensive development of non-geostationary orbital analysis as well as much-
needed research in intra- and inter-satellite routing techniques, satellite network 
architectures, business models, and user terminal technologies [AkE02, Bar04, WuS05].  
The first known research efforts regarding LEO constellations date back to the early 
1970s [RaD99, Wal70, Wal71]. 
Despite the extensive research and investment, the majority of the 1990s-
proposed satellite systems never launched, while a few systems, like ICO®, were 
successfully placed into orbit, yet did not succeed commercially.  Fortunately, most of the 
research efforts were not in vain.  One technology that is still being developed, and 
fielded is the Digital Video Broadcast – Satellite (DVB-S) [BeH05, BeQ05, CaD04, 
ChK04, ChT03, CoB05, CoM00, CrH05, MoR04, Rei06, RiV04, SkL04, SkV05, SuJ04].  
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However, this technology is not applicable to the focus of this research due to its one-
way, broadcast-type technology. 
Another technology that is gaining interest (at least from a research perspective) is 
the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) [BaL03, KaH04, LoL04, 
NaK04, SuE02].  The main focus of this effort is the deployment of an extensive 
downlink capability from the LEO and GEO satellites (Satellite-Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System, or S-UMTS), with relatively little satellite uplink capability 
except for remote users.  The UMTS uplink will most often be handled by the Terrestrial-
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (T-UMTS) portion of the network.  As 
such, the UMTS system does not fall within the scope and intent of this research. 
2.2.4 Inter-Satellite Links and On-orbit Routing 
From a communications network standpoint, the most critical research areas 
derived from the systems developed in the 1990’s is that of the inter-satellite links (ISLs) 
which enable on-orbit routing capabilities.  Numerous constellations and architectures 
have been analyzed, validating the proposed use of LEO satellite constellations instead of 
GEO satellites in communications networks [FoR98, MoS02, PrR99, RaD99], as well as 
comparing different constellations to minimize the impacts of the non-communicating 
counter-rotating seams of the near-polar star pattern constellations [WeF01].  Other 
issues related to satellite networking are caused by the high mobility of the satellites, and 
their constant, rapidly changing topology.  Fortunately, satellites maintain regular, highly 
predictable, periodic orbits which allow convenient adaptations of terrestrial routing 
algorithms and protocols to a satellite network [HuR06a, RaD99, RaJ97, ThR02, 
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WoC01].  In addition to adapting the routing protocol, there are other methods of using a 
terrestrial protocol in a satellite environment.  For example, dividing the network between 
terrestrial and orbit assets using tunneling, network address translation, or an exterior 
gateway protocol prevents the propagation of too many IP routing table updates from the 
satellite portion of the network from entering the terrestrial network [WoC01]. 
Extensive research has investigated the effects of transmission control protocol 
(TCP) and routing strategies in satellite constellations.  Some focus on improving the 
GEO communications systems with their long latencies rather than improvements for 
LEO systems, but benefits derived for GEO systems can be adapted to make 
improvements in LEO systems [AkJ04, AkM01a, AkM01b, AkX02, BhB01, GoJ01, 
JiA02, KaT04, Kot05, MaP03, Mar01, MiS01, TsO05, WoP01, ZhB02]. 
Since existing long-haul satellite communications systems primarily use GEO 
satellites at altitudes of approximately 35,768 kilometers, GEO satellite systems provide 
full earth coverage below ~78 degrees latitude with as few as three satellites.  However, 
the one-way (ground to satellite or satellite to ground) signal propagation delay is 
approximately 119.23 milliseconds as compared to approximately 0.67 to 6.67 
milliseconds for a LEO.  While the GEO systems in the GIG use crosslinks to route 
traffic from one part of the world to another with end-to-end latencies of at least 238.45 
milliseconds, LEO communications systems can achieve average end-to-end latencies of 
less than 100 milliseconds for intercontinental communications using satellite crosslinks 
[HuR06a].  Thus, LEO communication satellite systems with lower transmission power 
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requirements, shorter propagation delays, and global coverage are worth including in the 
overall GIG architecture. 
If low-latency voice and video communications are important requirements for 
tactical users in the field, the LEO communications system are the better choice.  If 
seconds matter in Network Centric military communications, an extra 138 milliseconds 
latency could mean the difference between meeting or missing an objective.  However, 
realizing these communication capabilities will require efficient transmission strategies. 
2.3 Multicasting Technologies 
Most Internet communication uses a one-to-one (unicast) approach for source-
destination communications.  Unicast requires a node to send an individual message to 
every recipient.  This approach works well until a single message needs to be sent to 
multiple nodes.  In this case, separate copies of the message must be sent.  This approach 
is obviously inefficient as it wastes bandwidth and resources.  It would be especially 
inefficient in a multi-layered, long-haul communications environment such as the GIG.  
An approach that improves efficiency and alleviates possibly significant traffic on long-
haul links is multicast routing to groups of users that are receiving the same data.  This 
concept was first proposed by Stephen Deering [DeC90, Dee91]. 
2.3.1 Multicast Overview 
Multicast routing fits in between unicast routing and broadcast routing.  Broadcast 
routing sends one message to each node in the entire broadcast domain (similar to a bent-
pipe satellite operation).  While this is a very effective method of ensuring all users on 
the network receive an important message, it is quite wasteful, especially if the message 
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is actually intended for a small subset of the available users.  Multicast routing, as 
compared to unicast routing, sends a single message per link instead of sending a copy 
for each node accessing the information on the link.  This single copy is reproduced 
across multiple links as close to the individual receiving nodes as possible.  In this way, 
multicasting enables a large amount of information to be efficiently distributed between a 
large group of interested users.  Satellites, because of their large coverage areas, are an 
ideal means of implementing multicast.  
There are several dozen different multicasting protocols proposed in the literature, 
some of which warrant further investigation.  When selecting a multicasting protocol, 
desirable properties are: low cost; low end-to-end delay; scalability; ability to support 
dynamic group membership; survivable in terms of network, link, or node outages; and 
some level of fairness to all members [SaM00].  In addition to these properties, it is also 
important to ensure a high level of efficiency (maximum data transmitted for the least 
overhead) and a high level of effectiveness (maximum received-to-sent ratio), indicating 
few lost packets throughout the system [HuR06a, ThR02].  A final consideration is the 
viability of the protocol either in the commercial world or as a developing or established 
standard.  Before exploring the various multicasting protocols, two major types of unicast 
routing protocols in use today are examined. 
2.3.2 Link State and Distance Vector Routing Algorithms Overview 
When a host sends a packet to a user on another host, the packet is sent down the 
protocol stack to the physical network, where it is carried to its intended destination.  
Several key tasks must be performed to ensure this happens correctly.  One such task is 
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obtaining the destination’s address.  The other is to direct the packet towards that address.  
Assuming the address is already known (by some unspecified means), network routers 
communicate among themselves to determine the best path to the destination node.  The 
two most prevalent routing algorithm categories used throughout the Internet are Link 
State and Distance Vector.  Both algorithms provide a means to route packets towards 
intended destinations using Dijkstra's algorithm [Dij59] to determine the shortest paths.  
Both algorithms use routing tables stored in the routers, and they both share at least some 
of their routing tables with other routers in the network.  Distance Vector algorithms are 
well-suited for small, simple networks, and Link State algorithms are better at handling 
larger, more complex networks. 
Link State-based algorithms include Open Shortest Path First (OSPF), 
Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS), Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), 
and Novell's NLSP (NetWare Link State Protocol).  The best known Distance Vector 
algorithm is the Bellman-Ford algorithm, which is used in many routing protocols such as 
Routing Information Protocol (RIP v1 and v2), Interior Gateway Routing Protocol 
(IGRP), Internet BGP, Novell IPX, and the original ARPAnet.  Enhanced IGRP (EIGRP) 
is a well-known Cisco proprietary routing protocol that integrates the capabilities of link-
state protocols into distance vector protocols. 
One of the most obvious differences between the Link State (LS) and Distance 
Vector (DV) routing algorithms is the way information is shared between routers in the 
respective networks.  Each LS router periodically floods the entire network with the state 
of its own local connections.  From this flooding, each LS router calculates routes for the 
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entire network because it has knowledge of all connectivity and link costs.  In this 
respect, LS algorithms have a “global view” of the network, i.e., the routers exchange 
information to make informed decisions on the best routes for the entire network.  
Ideally, all routers would have identical routing tables.   
Distance Vector routing algorithms share much more information (possibly their 
entire routing tables instead of only their local connections) than LS algorithms, but the 
routers only share this information with their neighbors.  While LS algorithms share the 
information with a regular period, DV algorithms send the information only when there 
are changes.  Once the network reaches a steady state, the routers will no longer share 
data if there are no more changes.  To build a complete routing table, DV routers 
iteratively build the tables as they receive information.  Router tables store which router 
is the next hop in the route and what the trip cost will be.  Unlike the LS algorithm, the 
DV routing tables do not have complete route information for every link in the route. 
Assuming there are n nodes and L links in the network, the worst case 
computational complexity of a LS network is O(n2), with approximately O(nL) messages 
sent to achieve full network convergence.  DV networks converge at varying rates, 
depending on the topology of the network.  When a link cost is reduced, that information 
flows quickly throughout the network.  On the other hand, when a cost is increased, the 
information travels much slower through the network, and a phenomenon known as the 
“count to infinity problem” could arise.  Count to infinity occurs when two nodes 
iteratively increase their cost information based on their direct neighbor, resulting in an 
inaccurately increasing cost.  This is similar to what occurs if a clockmaker adjusts his 
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clocks based on the town clock tower, and the keeper of the clock tower sets his time 
based on the clockmaker’s clocks. 
DV algorithms converge slower than LS algorithms, and are likely to have routing 
loops while converging.  LS algorithms, because they converge more quickly, are 
somewhat less prone to routing loops than distance vector algorithms.  DVs typically do 
not experience route oscillation, whereas LS algorithms are likely to oscillate on occasion 
because they respond so quickly to routing changes. 
Link-state algorithms require more CPU power and memory than distance vector 
algorithms.  LS algorithms, therefore, can be more expensive to implement and support.  
LS protocols are generally more scalable than distance vector protocols.   
LS networks are continually refreshed with the latest information, so failure 
notification spreads quickly throughout a large network, whereas a failure in a large DV 
network may take a relatively long time to propagate to all routers.  Again, this comes at 
the cost of more message traffic overhead from the frequent flooding of connectivity 
data.  Since LS algorithms only flood their own connection information, this reduces the 
effect of errors propagating throughout the network.  Should a link state router fail, or 
have its routing table corrupted and send out incorrect link information, only the local 
area and traffic destined for that specific location is jeopardized.  In the case of DV 
algorithms, a corrupted link status would propagate throughout the whole network since 
routers depend on data from each other to gather the network connectivity beyond their 
neighborhood.  Incorrect information passed from one router to the next will eventually 
make its way throughout the network.   
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The Link State and Distance Vector routing algorithms are not only used in 
unicast routing; the design concepts are used in multicasting protocols as well.  For 
example, Multicast Open Shortest Path First (MOSPF) [Moy94] is a link-state algorithm, 
while Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol (DVMRP) [FiD01, Pus04, ThR02], 
On-demand Distance Multicast Routing Protocol (ODMRP) [YiS03], and Multicast 
extension to Ad hoc On demand Distance Vector routing protocol (MAODV) [RoP00] 
are distance vector algorithms.  Since Protocol Independent Multicast – Dense Mode 
(PIM-DM) [AdN05, DeE96, HuR06a, Sae03] and Protocol Independent Multicast – 
Sparse Mode (PIM-SM) [FeH06] are “protocol independent” as their names indicate, 
they inherit the underlying routing tables and are neither link-state nor distance vector 
algorithms.  Aside from the LS or DV categorization, multicasting protocols can be 
classified as Dense or Sparse. 
2.3.3 Dense and Sparse Types of Multicast 
Multicast protocols support two modes of operation: dense mode and sparse 
mode.  Dense Mode protocols perform best when the topology is densely populated with 
group members.  Routers assume there are group members downstream, and continue to 
forward packets unless a prune message (indicating no members exist or remain in the 
group) is received.  Dense Mode protocols, also known as broadcast-and-prune protocols, 
are typically source-based, meaning the root of the multicast tree starts at the source.  
Examples of Dense Mode protocols include DVMRP, Group Membership Near First 
DVMRP (GMNF-DVMRP) [LaD98], and Protocol Independent Multicast – Dense Mode 
(PIM-DM).  ODMRP is a mesh-type protocol that provides maximum connectivity and 
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robustness for highly mobile networks.  While not specifically classified as a dense 
protocol, the broadcasting characteristic of ODMRP safely places it in this category. 
Sparse Mode protocols work more efficiently with a small, widely distributed 
group membership.  Members are expected to explicitly join groups by way of a core 
router that is typically located in a central portion of the network.  Source members 
communicate with the core router as a “meeting place,” and build the multicast tree from 
there.  Examples include Protocol Independent Multicast – Sparse Mode (PIM-SM), and 
Core Based Trees (CBT) [Bal97].  MAODV is a hybrid of dense and sparse modes.  An 
MAODV user broadcasts to find the multicast trees, and joins the nearest tree discovered.  
MAODV multicast groups also establish group leaders to initiate and maintain group 
sequence numbers. 
2.3.4 Some Options for Multicast Networks 
To support the aforementioned multicast protocols, a network must have 
multicast-aware routers in the network.  The obvious way to achieve this is to deploy an 
entire network of routers that are multicast-aware.  However, that may be impractical for 
numerous reasons, such as fiscal limitations or not having control of the entire network.  
A solution for the first requirement is to deploy virtual private networks (VPNs) across 
the Internet, and even departmentalized VPNs within a corporate network [KaK01].  In 
March 1992, the Multicast Backbone (MBone) network became the first operational 
multicasting network, using IP-encapsulated tunnels to multicast (via DVMRP) video 
conferencing between 20 geographically separated sites through the Internet [Alm00].  
Aside from tunneling across domains to connect multicast domains, a host can contact a 
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“multicast reflector” or participate in an “overlay multicast” group [ElR03].  If a host 
only has access to unicast capabilities, that host can contact another host on the edge of 
its unicast domain and the desired multicast domain.  The reflector host acts as a proxy 
for the first host.  This concept is similar to tunneling, except the tunnels are not 
permanent as they are in MBone.  In the overlay case, the end systems take control of the 
multicasting functionalities such as group membership and packet handling.  Directed 
virtual graphs connect each of the participating nodes, thus masking the actual physical 
connection information.  To achieve this, the overlay multicast group needs complete 
control of the network.  This contrasts with traditional multicasting where the core routers 
handle the routing, replication, membership; manage the physical connections; and retain 
control of the network across the various domains [ElR03]. 
The new 802.1a(x) standards groups are carrier-grade Ethernet adaptations to 
allow Internet Service Providers the ability to offer widespread Layer 3 multicast and 
broadcast services to their customers across a shared medium [Ela05].  This differs from 
Layer 3 multicast and broadcast technologies that ultimately rely on point-to-point 
connections between users and not a shared medium.  While some of the ideas for 
enhancing efficiency in the shared multicast arena have some benefit to the proposed 
research topic, the standards groups are only in their first drafts, and are mostly forward-
looking.  The scope of the 802.1a(x) research does not specifically include multicasting 
on shared access medium such as Ethernet or ad hoc sensor networks, although the 
findings may support adaptation to these technologies. 
 33 
Besides being able to connect to other multicast routers, the various multicast 
groups must be managed.  Currently, two Internet standards address this requirement, and 
they are discussed in the next section. 
2.3.5 Group Management Protocols 
Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) [CaD02, Fen02] and Multicast 
Listener Discovery (MLD) [DeF99, Hab03, ViC04] are protocols that assist the 
multicasting protocol users in managing groups.  IGMP was developed primarily for use 
in IPv4 multicast systems, while MLD was developed for IPv6 multicast systems.  Since 
the two are closely related, several other standards documents address their common 
functionalities [FeH04, HaM03, HoC04]. 
IGMP is an asymmetric protocol that handles group members and multicast 
routers separately within the same specification [CaD02].  IPv4 systems use IGMP to 
share local IP multicast group membership information with their neighbor multicast 
routers along with other IP multicast management functions.  Joins, Leaves, Queries and 
Reports are all provided by IGMP [CaD02, Fen02, Sae03].   
IPv6 routers use MLD to maintain a list of multicast listeners attached to its local 
interfaces, as well as communicate with neighboring multicast routers to share those 
multicast addresses of interest to each other [ViC04].  Much like IGMP, MLD is also an 
asymmetric protocol, specifying separate behaviors for multicast address listeners and 
multicast routers. 
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Having covered the basics of multicasting, the next section discusses multicasting 
systems that have either been proposed or implemented in a satellite network 
environment. 
2.3.6 Multicast Satellite Networks: Architectures and Multicast Protocols 
There are several communications satellite architectures with varying 
constellation designs across the LEO, MEO, and GEO realms.  The first relevant satellite 
architecture has a LEO and a MEO layer of satellites [LeK00, LeL00].  LEO-only 
architectures with numerous satellites (72, 288, and 1,152) in the constellation suffered 
significant delays due to large numbers of hops when traversing the LEO network.  To 
preclude this, the MEO layer is added as well as the Hierarchical Satellite Routing 
Protocol (HSRP).  This protocol minimizes hop counts for long distance routes by 
sending traffic from the LEO layer up to the MEO layer that has a smaller node count, 
and then back to the LEO layer down instead of traversing through the extensive LEO 
layer with its large node count.  HSRP simulation results show a 75 milliseconds delay 
and are on par with those found in [HuR06a]. 
The fundamental shortcomings of typical connectionless routing schemes in 
satellite networks are due to path metric calculations that do not properly account for the 
total delay [ChE02].  The Satellite Grouping and Routing Protocol (SGRP) evaluates the 
overall path delays, to include processing, transmission, and propagation in a LEO/MEO 
satellite architecture.  The MEO’s main function is to perform the route and delay 
calculations for the LEOs, thereby offsetting significant amounts of processing and power 
utilization on the LEOs.  MEOs can also perform routing if necessary.  Metrics have been 
 35 
reported on Path Optimality, Link Congestion, and Satellite Failures, but the end-to-end 
performance of this new protocol has not been evaluated [ChE02]. 
The “Multi-Layered Satellite Routing” Algorithm, or MLSR, assumes a satellite 
network with LEO, MEO, and GEO satellite layers [AkE02].  The bulk of the routing is 
handled by the LEO layer, while the GEO layer is used primarily for handling the routing 
protocol calculations.  The GEO routers use route aggregation from one layer to the next, 
and make routing decisions based on link delays and the status of the total topology.  The 
GEO layer does not route data traffic.  Simulation studies in [AkE02] compare the 
performance of MLSR to a network using only LEO satellites and found when the LEO 
layer ISL utilization approached roughly 96%, a significant decrease in end-to-end delay 
was achieved by sending the data traffic up to the MEO layer to route using a different 
path.  Once stabilized, the end-to-end (EtE) delay was estimated to be about 130 
milliseconds between 105° W, 45° N (Montana/Wyoming border) and 15° W, 15° N 
(Senegal, Africa).  For comparison, the estimated EtE delay for similar distances was 
approximately 86 milliseconds using only a LEO network, under different loading 
conditions [HuR06a]. 
Using the same satellite constellation, an enhancement to the MLSR protocol was 
adapted to the network [YuE02].  The GEO layer manages groups as well as constructs 
trees for the LEO and MEO layers.  Multicasting using shortest path trees (rooted at the 
source node on the ground) resulted in a slightly increased delay to gain higher 
bandwidth efficiency.  Using the nearest LEO as the core node for a core based tree 
multicast, the network and algorithm had worse delay performance and increased link 
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cost over a non-uniform distribution of members compared to a uniform distribution.  
However, without further details on the densities and layout of the member nodes, it is 
difficult to determine if the poor performance is due to the Sparse Mode protocol when a 
Dense Mode protocol would be more effective, or if the proposed multicasting protocol 
has a deficiency. 
It has been claimed that none of the proposed terrestrial multicast protocols (such 
as MOSPF, DVMRP, CBT, and the two PIM protocols) are well-suited for use in satellite 
networks [EkA02].  The main reason is the limited ability for the satellites to establish or 
maintain the multicast trees in the rapidly changing satellite environment.  To the 
contrary, [HuR06a, Sae03] indicates that with few changes to the protocol, PIM-DM can 
be adapted to a LEO satellite environment with relatively good performance. 
2.3.7 Issues Surrounding Multicast Communications 
The two previous sections reflect the results from a significant number of on-
going research efforts in the area of satellite communications architectures and 
multicasting technologies.  However, there are still several areas that impede the 
extensive deployment of multicast throughout the Internet.  There are many reasons why 
multicasting has been slow to develop. 
2.3.7.1 Scalability 
The first issue is high scalability [SaM00].  The network must be able to support a 
large number of users, but without causing excessive delays due to resource limitations or 
excessively large tree structures (either shared or source-rooted).  The overhead of 
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multiple membership groups, plus multiple trees should not overburden the routing 
infrastructure. 
2.3.7.2 Dynamic Multicast Groups 
Multicast protocols should allow members to join and leave groups as necessary, 
as well as allow members to participate in more than one group at a time.  The joining 
and leaving processes should not burden the existing multicast tree or group members by 
increasing cost, delays, since the groups can be highly dynamic with numerous joins and 
leaves occurring throughout a session [SaM00]. 
2.3.7.3 Survivability 
Survivability of a routing protocol is its ability to re-establish connectivity in the 
event of link or node failures [SaM00].  If the multicasting protocol has its own unicast 
routing mechanism to establish connectivity, the multicast protocol is as survivable as its 
unicast counterpart.  For multicast protocols that are independent of the unicast routing, 
such as the PIM protocols, they must implement their own means of protection or 
restoration in the event of failures. 
2.3.7.4 Fairness and Jitter 
Depending on the user or customer base of the implemented network, fairness is 
an issue that has to be addressed [SaM00].  In most cases, each user should receive the 
same basic quality of service (such as consistent delays), as well access to data at roughly 
the same time.  These can be accomplished by finding delay- and delay-variation-
bounded trees for the multicast network.  Algorithms that compute the Delay-Bounded 
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Steiner Tree (DBST) and the Delay-Variation-Bounded Multicast Tree (DVBMT) are 
beyond the scope of this research [MaG04]. 
Delay variation is also known as jitter.  One cause of jitter is found within the 
LEO satellite architecture itself [LoL04].  Depending on the instantaneous configuration 
of satellites, the available routes for a single session may change numerous times, with a 
different number of hops for each topology change.  TCP applications may not be able to 
tolerate these changes in delays and therefore might timeout or drop connections.   
2.3.7.5 Other Related Issues 
Still several other issues need to be addressed in multicast protocols.  Examples 
include:  IGMP Feedback Implosion, where the multicast receivers send back so many 
ACKs for the received packets such that memory and processor capacity are exhausted 
[AkH04, FiD01, SuH03]; asymmetric multicast paths due to terrestrial based-uplinks, 
where users do not directly uplink to the serving satellite thereby increasing response 
time [SuH03]; unreliable satellite links due to high bit error rates [AkH04, SuH03]; and 
flow/congestion control (similar to terrestrial TCP networks).  There are numerous 
research efforts that address TCP flow and congestion control performance in both LEO 
and GEO satellite network environments [AkJ04, AkM01a, AkM01b, AkX02, BhB01, 
CrH01, GoJ01, JiA02, KaT04, MaP03, Mar01, MiS01, TsO05, WoP01, ZhB02]. 
2.4 Multicasting Security 
In the early development of multicast, the goals were to provide a means of open 
communications for a group of interested users that was more efficient than broadcasting.  
Ease of access and openness were critical to its development [Alm00, DeC90, Dee91].  
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Ideally, any user could join a multicast group given the multicast address.  The user could 
forward a message with this address to multicast routers that would delivery it to the 
proper group.  Therefore, groups can receive messages from anyone, at anytime, without 
knowing who sent the messages since registration was not a requirement.  Supporting 
users that joined and left at will gave multicast great flexibility as a means of group 
communications, but also left it vulnerable to attack. 
There has been significant improvement in network security since the early 
1990’s, much of which has benefited multicast communications.  Germane to this 
discussion are scalability enhancements for security measures.  Key management 
received much attention in the literature, as there are numerous methods of efficiently re-
keying a large group, all with benefits and drawbacks depending on the usage model and 
system requirements [RaH03].  Keying, however, is only one aspect of the multicast 
system that affects efficiency and scalability.  Design of the network topography, both 
logical and physical, can enhance the overall system security performance of a multicast 
network. 
This subsection discusses the different services required; issues related to 
scalability for secure multicasting; issues related to Group Membership; and finally 
relevant secure group communications architectures found in the literature. 
2.4.1 General Security Services 
Throughout the literature [AgC01, AlE03, AmN05, AvL04, BaB02, BrR02, 
CaG99, CaW98, DiL00, ElR03, JuA03, KeR05, Kru98, Mit97, PaK98, ShG99, SuH03, 
XiP05, YaF01], there is general agreement that common network security services are 
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essential to multicast security including:  Confidentiality, Integrity, Access Control, Non-
repudiation, Authentication, Traffic Forward Secrecy, Traffic Backward Secrecy, 
Anonymity, Group Key Management, Group Access Control, and Group Policy.  These 
services can apply to both unicast and multicast networks.   
• Confidentiality:  only the intended parties may read the data.  Typically, this is 
enforced by using one of the many encryption schemes available. 
• Integrity or Data Authentication:  ensures the data that is sent is the same as that 
which is received (i.e., not altered during transmission).  Encrypted checksums or 
hash functions or keyed hash functions can provide this service. 
• Access control:  only authorized parties may join multicast groups, send messages to 
multicast groups, or receive data from multicast groups.  Methods to control access to 
the established groups include access control lists and digital signatures. 
• Non-repudiation:  this is the ability of the recipient to prove the sender sent a message 
even if the sender denies sending it.  The typical method used for non-repudiation is a 
public key infrastructure cryptography, where the sender signs each of the messages 
with their own private key. 
• Authentication:  ensures that the source of the received message truly is who they 
claim to be. 
• Key Independence: ensures that if an outsider can get a set of group keys, he does not 
have enough information to create either a past or a future key. 
• Traffic Forward Secrecy:  when members leave a group, they should no longer have 
access to any future group communications. 
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• Traffic Backward Secrecy:  when joining a group, a member should not have access 
to messages that were sent prior to joining the group. 
• Anonymity:  protects both the individual members from knowing who the other 
members of the group are, as well as preventing outsiders from discovering who the 
multicast group members are.  This, however, conflicts with non-repudiation. 
• Group Key Management:  This is a topic of great interest throughout the literature, 
since this can greatly affect the scalability and performance of the system.  There are 
numerous proposals for different methods of generating and managing keys [ChB04, 
HaB01, HaC00, HeS05, HoI04, HuM03, JuL06, JuY06, NgZ05, PaO06, RaH03, 
RoB01, ScL02, ShG99, WeS03, YaS01, Yuh03]. 
• Group Access Control:  This is another area that can affect the scalability and overall 
performance of the multicast protocol.  Group Access Control permits or denies 
membership into multicast groups according to the particular architecture designs. 
• Group Policy:  this establishes which users have access to which functions, such as 
signing certificates, key generation and distribution, and maintenance of access 
control lists. 
2.4.2 Issues Surrounding Multicast Security 
Some of the issues discussed in Section 2.3.7 are directly affected by the level of 
security implemented in the multicast system.  Two of the main concerns that need to be 
managed are maintaining scalability, and maintaining dynamic group membership in 
multicasting. 
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2.4.2.1 Issues Relating to Multicast Scalability 
Many issues hinder widespread scalability of secure multicast systems.  Limited 
end node capabilities such as processing power and available storage capacity are one 
contributor.  Another is the Group Key Management protocol, which can consume a lot 
of bandwidth in a large system. 
2.4.2.1.1 Satellite On-board Processing Capabilities 
Typical constraints of on-board processing capabilities of many satellite systems 
are limited memory (for processing and storing), as well as limited processing power 
[SuH03]. 
As a related concern, the end users may face a similar limitation on processing 
and storage capabilities.  Any enhancements to the system that benefit the satellite 
segment should translate to benefits for the end users as well.  The terrestrial routers are 
less constrained than either the satellite or the user nodes.  Again, any benefits will apply 
to the terrestrial routers as well. 
2.4.2.1.2 Group Key Management 
Perhaps the most critical issue that limits widespread scalability is the group key 
management scheme used in the system [AgC01, AmN05, JuA02, JuA03, Mit97, 
ShG99].  Public key infrastructure digital signatures are a secure way of protecting a 
system; however, they are also computationally expensive.  MACs (Message 
Authentication Codes) with secret keys are less expensive computationally, but are less 
secure. 
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If secret keys are loaded onto a satellite before launch, there must be sufficient 
storage available to have enough keys on board to last the expected lifetime of the 
satellite.  If keys are loaded once a satellite is on orbit, a system of securely re-keying 
over the air must be implemented. 
2.4.2.1.3 Group Key Distribution 
To secure a group of users, some type of encryption is generally used.  Encryption 
schemes require key generation and distribution.  An overview of several different 
methods are presented here, adapted from [Kru98]: 
• Manual Key Distribution:  In a manual key distribution scheme, a communications 
security custodian receives, distributes, stores, and loads keys for all of the 
cryptographic equipment in a given unit.  Since keys are manually distributed, key 
requirements must be set far in advance, with a sufficient supply requested for a given 
period of time.  A major benefit of this system is that this grade of cryptographic 
equipment typically operates at line speeds, and hence there is no overhead or delay 
for using a robust encryption system.  The obvious drawback is the labor required to 
distribute and re-key the equipment.  As such, the system has limited scalability.  
Another downside to the manual system is a significant delay in issuing new keys in 
the event of compromised keys. 
• Pairwise Keying:  This method of distribution relies on a central entity to generate, 
distribute, and manage unique keys for each end user of the system.  Using public-key 
infrastructure (PKI) cryptography to establish a secure channel for the distribution of 
secret group keys to each of the end users is an example of such a system.  How well 
 44 
this system scales depends on the computational power in the central entity and each 
of the end users that are joining the group.  Unless the work of the central entity is 
distributed to other trusted entities, Pairwise Keying is not efficient enough to scale 
well. 
• Hierarchical Trees:  This method creates a hierarchical tree of key-encryption-keys 
(KEKs) for users in the multicast tree.  Members are leaves in the tree and have their 
own KEK.  This scheme derives its efficiency by dividing the k-ary tree into smaller 
subsections.  The smaller the subsection of the tree that needs to be re-keyed, the less 
computationally intensive the re-key will be.  This means it will scale very well for 
large user groups. 
• Secure Lock:  The secure lock uses multicast properties to distribute the keys to 
interested users.  Using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) [Sti95], a secure lock 
is constructed to “lock” the deciphering group session key.  Those already in the 
secure group can unlock the group session key, while others cannot.  Secure Locks, 
however, are inherently centralized, and do not scale well. 
• Distributed Registration and Key Distribution (DiRK):  This architecture spreads the 
burden of key distribution over several trusted members.  Because the system is 
distributed, it scales well in large networks. 
2.4.2.2 Issues Relating to Group Membership 
Another aspect of group management is determining who the members of the 
group are.  The multicast routing protocol must be aware of group members in the 
network to deliver packets to them [JuA02, JuA03].  The typical mechanism for this is 
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the Internet Group Membership Protocol (IGMP), discussed in Section 2.3.5.  In the 
generic group management model, any host can use IGMP to become a member of any IP 
multicast group, thus exposing the group to eavesdropping or theft of service.  
Information can be protected by encrypting the multicast data and providing decryption 
keys to authorized members.  Despite the use of encryption, unauthorized users could 
receive the encrypted data and determine its contents via traffic analysis and/or 
cryptanalysis.  Furthermore, malicious users could launch denial-of-service attacks by 
either joining several multicast groups and extending the trees, or be filling up the 
network by sending useless data to known multicast groups.  An examination of the 
Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) secure multicast protocol revealed security weaknesses in 
the reliability of the re-keying authentication process [DiC05].  The authors showed that a 
Denial of Service (DoS) attack could result in a session hijack, but proposed a reliable 
key authentication scheme that addresses the weaknesses without resorting to public key 
signatures.  In addition, the use of distillation codes have been proposed to detect and 
resist certain DoS attacks in multicast environments were the end-user devices are 
resource constrained [DiD03]. 
One approach to addressing these problems is either to control access to the 
multicast group, or to control the senders’ ability to send data to the established groups.  
The Gothic architecture provides this type of access control [JuA02].  Gothic’s design 
goals include maintaining or increasing the level of security while providing a scalable 
system with low computation overhead at the routers, low message overhead, and low 
support infrastructure requirements by reducing the security processes based on 
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knowledge of a user’s previous or future ability to obtain group data.  Relative to two 
previously proposed systems, Gothic maintained or increased the level of security while 
increasing scalability.  Gothic will be discussed in the following section. 
A similar concept is called “GAC/GKM” [XiP05].  GAC/GKM increased overall 
system efficiency by approximately five times compared to Gothic.  This was achieved 
by using short host identification numbers and group access control server identification 
numbers instead of digital certificates for authentication and reauthorization.  Since the 
size of the ID numbers is about 40 bits versus the typical 1024 bit digital signatures, the 
GAC/GKM system uses weaker security to achieve better scalability. 
2.4.3 Scalable, Secure Multicast Systems and Architectures 
This subsection presents relevant architectures selected from the literature.  Each 
of these proposed architectures improves system scalability and security in different 
ways. 
2.4.3.1 GOTHIC 
The functions necessary to provide controlled access to a group are [JuA02]: 
1. Group policy specification functions 
2. Access request functions 
3. Access control functions 
The first set of functions is used when a host is designated a group owner.  Once 
designated, that host may set policies for the newly established group.  The second set of 
functions is used to become a member of one or more multicast groups.  The third set of 
functions establishes whether the host can become a member of a particular group. 
 47 
The functions are divided into two systems: the group policy management system 
and the group member authorization system.  Figure 3 shows the Gothic architecture and 
its two subsystems.  The group policy management system contains the first set of 
functions, and the group member authorization system contains the last two sets of 
functions.  Gothic interfaces with the routing system as well as any potential group key 
management systems.  Furthermore, Gothic assumes a public-key infrastructure (PKI) 
complete with a trusted certificate authority is available; however, it can be used without 
PKI if necessary. 
 
 
Figure 3 - The Gothic Architecture [JuA02] 
2.4.3.1.1 Group Member Authorization System 
The group member authorization system (GMAS) controls access to the multicast 
groups [JuA02].  The main subsystem of the GMAS is an access control server (ACS).  
Any host that wishes to join or establish a group is authorized and authenticated based on 
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the host’s credentials, such as host IP address (to confirm the user’s machine), host 
certificate and private key (to confirm the individual user), as well as the host’s right to 
join the desired group [JuA02]. 
2.4.3.1.2 Group Policy Management System 
Once a multicast group is established, the group policy management system 
(GPMS) controls the membership of the established groups based on the group owner’s 
list of authorized users.  To ensure the group owner is not corrupted, two methods of 
determining and authorizing the group owner are proposed: group owner certificates and 
a group ownership service [JuA02].  The “Group Owner Determination and 
Authentication Systems,” GODAS, ensures the correct host retains the overall access 
authority to his or her multicast group. 
2.4.3.1.3 Reducing Group Keying Overhead 
There are literally hundreds of proposals in the literature for various group key 
management (GKM) schemes; Section 2.4.1 references a small subset of the available 
literature.  Group re-keying can be one of the most expensive operations on the network, 
and wastes considerable network resources (like bandwidth and processing power) if the 
groups are dynamic.  Generally, most GKMs are designed to efficiently key and re-key 
large groups of users as their respective groups change either by the addition of new 
users, departures of former users, or expelling users for various reasons.  Depending on 
the security requirements of the groups, a change in group membership calls for either a 
full or a partial group re-key to preserve a desired security level for the group. 
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Some of the burden on the GKM can be alleviated if the system leverages the 
policies imposed by the GAC to reduce the number of times the system has to re-key 
[JuA02]. For example, in a typical GKM system, whenever a user joins or leaves a 
multicast group, the entire system is re-keyed based on the assumption that the new user 
could have gained access to either the old encrypted data prior to arrival, or to new 
encrypted data after departure.  By leveraging the services of the GAC to ensure no 
unwanted users have access to the data prior to their validated join or after their 
departure, the GKM does not have to re-key in either of these situations.  As a result,  
significant overall system efficiency is gained [JuA02]. 
The feature that is unique to Gothic and applicable to a satellite network, is its use 
of the “Group Access Control Aware – Group Key Management” system.  Gothic’s 
GACA-GKM can increase the scalability of the proposed architecture.  Another feature 
that can increase scalability is covered in the following section. 
2.4.3.2 Iolus 
Iolus increases system scalability by breaking up the flat, secure multicast 
architecture, and creating a hierarchy of independent, secure subgroups [Mit97].  The 
hierarchy is dubbed a “secure distribution tree,” and acts like a single virtual secure 
multicast group.  There is a single group security controller (GSC) which manages the 
overall security of the group along with the group security intermediaries (GSI).  
Generally, GSC and the GSIs are referred to as “group security agents” (GSAs).  The 
subgroups, denoted by clouds in Figure 4, are interconnected by the GSIs, which work 
together to bridge the local multicast traffic from each subgroup into all of the other 
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subgroups as needed.  GSAs are responsible for managing the re-keying of the clouds, or 
“clusters,” as needed.  The hierarchy is known before the multicast group is initialized, 
and the GSAs are assigned manually. 
By breaking the multicast domain up into hierarchical groups, each managed 
subgroup can re-key its own subset of the total users, thereby reducing the total overhead 
on the system.  However, a greater amount of trust is placed on the GSAs, which 
weakens the overall system security [BrR02]. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Example of a Secure Distribution Tree [Mit97] 
One concern for implementing security using the Iolus framework was the 
performance penalty incurred by using the GSAs.  To alleviate this concern, a simulation 
was developed to compare the response time of a multicast network with the Iolus GSAs 
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in place, and without them (“NOP”).  After performing several simulations, it was 
determined that the average forwarding penalty was approximately 450 microseconds.  
This is shown in Figure 5, represented by the difference between the NOP and Iolus lines.  
Almost all of that time is attributable to the cryptographic operations. 
 
Figure 5 - GSA Multicast Forwarding Performance [Mit97] 
2.4.3.3 Spatial Clustering 
Iolus increases scalability by using a hierarchical clustering.  An increase in 
multicast scalability is achieved by clustering as well, but the clustering scheme is based 
on spatial boundaries, and not hierarchy [BaB02].  To form the clusters, the protocol 
traverses the multicast member tree from the leaves towards the root, assigning members 
to fixed-size groups as it migrates to the end of the tree.  A fixed-size group means re-
keying costs are bounded and deterministic.  By using spatial clustering, members of the 
same cluster are near each other in the multicast tree.  This proximity allows the re-
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keying scheme to be more efficient.  Like Iolus, each cluster has a cluster leader that 
interfaces with other clusters and manages re-keying for the cluster. 
The differences between Iolus and Spatial Clustering are subtle [BaB02].  In fact, 
Spatial Clustering could be used to model Iolus.  The two main differences between the 
architectures are the way the subgroup leaders are assigned and how subgroups are 
formed.  In Iolus, the GSAs are special nodes assigned upon the establishment of the 
multicast group.  In Spatial Clustering, leaders are dynamically assigned, can easily 
change as the groups change, and are ordinary nodes that happened to be on a cluster 
boundary in the multicast tree.  Regarding the formation of the subgroups, Iolus assigns 
subgroups based on administrative boundaries, while Spatial Clustering groups are 
assigned by proximity on the multicast trees [BaB02]. 
2.4.3.4 Secure Spread 
Secure Spread increases the efficiency and scalability of secure multicast 
[AmN05].  The client-server architecture assigns “heavy-weight” activities to servers, 
and leaves “light-weight” services to the clients.  This architecture is called an “integrated 
architecture,” where computationally intensive security services are implemented in the 
servers.  A “layered architecture,” in contrast, implements such intensive services in the 
clients. 
To increase performance and scalability, the integrated architecture coupled a 
small number of servers to execute the computationally expensive services of the 
distributed protocols, thus removing the burden from the clients.  The group key 
agreement protocols are distributed protocols, and are the most resource intensive of the 
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services.  With a small number of servers in a relatively stable configuration, heavy-
weight re-keying between the servers occurs less frequently than the client re-keying.  
The servers do not need to be re-keyed when a client joins or leaves the group.  Servers 
only re-key if one of the servers leave or join the server group.  Also, the server re-keying 
can be quicker due to needing less keys generated for a small number of servers as 
compared to a large number of keys for numerous clients.   
2.4.4 Deficiencies of Known Scalable, Secure Multicast Systems and Architectures 
Most Group Key Management systems are designed to efficiently key and re-key 
large groups of users as the multicast group membership changes.  Even the most 
efficient GKM, however, will have a fixed cost per user or system to perform the key 
updates.   
Gothic makes use of group membership knowledge and control to reduce re-
keying.  This provides over an order of magnitude less GKM traffic as compared to a 
traditional GKM scheme [JuA02].  However, the GACA-GKM is employed across the 
entire domain, and does not take advantage of physical or logical separation to further 
enhance the scalability. 
Iolus improves re-keying efficiency by dividing the various multicast groups into 
layered, hierarchical subgroups, connected by GSAs.  Spatial Clustering divides the 
multicast groups into spatial clusters based on proximity in the multicast tree to reduce 
join and leave re-keying overhead.  Neither architecture, however, maintains any Group 
Access Control Awareness information to reduce the re-keying in the clusters when a 
previously authenticated and trusted user moves from one cluster to the next.  Both 
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architectures demonstrated improved performance over traditional architectures in fairly 
static environments where the users primarily join or leave, and not where they move 
from cluster to cluster. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter provides an in-depth look at satellite communications systems as 
well as the Global Information Grid architecture.  This is followed by a discussion on 
multicast and group management protocols, along with examples of proposed satellite 
architectures that use multicast.  Finally, multicast security was addressed to include 
required services, group and key management, and architectures germane to the focus of 
this research.  The closing section addresses limitations that the current multicast security 
architectures faced in a highly mobile user environment. 
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III. Methodology 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the methodology for the development of the secure, scalable 
Hubenko Security Framework Architecture for LEO satellite-based (LEOsat) networks.  
The Hubenko Architecture addresses the shortfalls of previous architectures, namely the 
lack of a secure multicast architecture that scales well for very large numbers (10,000 or 
more) of highly mobile users.  Highly Mobile Users change satellite spot beams often, 
and/or very rapidly.  A person walking down the street talking on a satellite telephone 
would not be considered highly mobile, but the same user in an automobile or an airplane 
would.  A Highly Mobile Environment is defined as a group of users in a network that 
collectively change satellite spot beams often.  For example, this could be a large group 
of slow-moving users, or a small group of rapidly moving users.  This chapter begins 
with the motivation for developing the Hubenko Architecture.  The validity of employing 
a LEO satellite communications network is presented, along with the viability of the 
PIM-DM multicasting protocol.  Next, the development of the Hubenko Security 
Framework Architecture is presented followed by a detailed discussion of the modeling 
and simulation environment, along with the descriptions and specific parameters for each 
of the developed scenarios.  The metrics collected and analyzed are defined in this 
chapter as well.  The chapter concludes with the model verification and validation. 
3.2 Hubenko LEOSat Security Framework Architecture Motivation 
A review of current literature indicates relatively few research efforts can secure 
group communications while simultaneously scale to very large groups of users (over 
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10,000 users).  A few of the architectures noted earlier make contributions to an overall 
framework for secure group communications in a multicast network.  None, however, 
specifically addresses a LEOsat network environment, nor do they completely address the 
issues facing a global user base such as that found in the GIG. 
The foundation of any secure group communications is some type of group key 
distribution and management scheme.  As mentioned before, this field is well populated 
with various concepts for different scenarios and applications, with no one solution 
meeting all needs.  From the standpoint of this research, the actual keying architecture 
piece, be it a centralized, decentralized, or distributed keying agreement protocol, is 
transparent to the overall research [ChB04, RaH03].  Therefore, the Hubenko 
Architecture allows the system developers to insert the group key protocol(s) that best fit 
their needs. 
Several secure group communications architectures improve overall system 
performance and scalability by dividing the multicast group in various ways.  However, 
breaking the group into progressively smaller units will ultimately reach a point that will 
begin to negatively affect scalability rather than improve it.  Therefore, small cluster sizes 
alone will not provide sufficient security performance improvement.  The developers of 
the Group Access Control Awareness (GACA) scheme acknowledge that, while capable 
of improving security performance for a system, GACA is suitable as a module to a 
larger system, and not a stand-alone solution to security and scalability on its own.   
Alone, each of the concepts presented solve parts of the complex security 
environment faced in the global environment of the GIG.  The novel Hubenko Security 
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Framework Architecture combines several of the features into a coherent solution, 
presenting a secure architecture adapted to the unique LEOSat environment. 
3.3 LEOSat Network Environment Validation 
This section establishes the LEO satellite architecture as a viable unsecured 
baseline solution for meeting the needs of the DoD user community.  To assess the 
relative performance of PIM-DM versus other multicasting protocols (DVMRP and 
ODMRP), a set of performance metrics are established [Tho01, ThR01, ThR02].  These 
metrics include:  the Data-to-Overhead (DtO) ratio; the Received-to-Sent (RtS) ratio; and 
the End-to-End (EtE) delay.  The Data-to-Overhead ratio indicates how efficiently data is 
transmitted throughout the network.  The higher the ratio, the higher the amount of data 
as compared to overhead information.  The only packet types that contain data are the 
PIM Packet, RIP Probe, and RIP Report; all other packets are counted as overhead.  The 
Received-to-Sent ratio is an indicator of packet loss, either due to an invalid route, time-
to-live expiration, or no next hop available (e.g., a satellite loses communications with 
the ground station and drops the packet).  Packets received compared to total packets 
transmitted (precv/ptot_tx) is a simple means of determining how successfully the multicast 
system performed.  While the sent packet count should always be greater than or equal to 
the number received, an occasional duplicated packet means this ratio could be slightly 
greater than one.  For example, a source sends a single packet that is later duplicated 
during a satellite handoff and instead of one of the duplicated packets being properly 
discarded in the network, both packets are received (which of course the receiver would 
then be able to discard on of the duplicates).  End-to-End delay is a “lower-better” metric, 
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which indicates the average time a packet was in transit from the source to the 
subscribers.  While each multicasting algorithm may use a different route, the most 
efficient route is the shortest route with the least number of hops and minimal network 
congestion along the way. 
The PIM-DM protocol’s effectiveness can be illustrated by comparing the average 
values from the simulations for the three defined metrics to earlier work on DVMRP and 
ODMRP.  All three protocols were implemented using the same satellite network model 
validated in previous work [Tho01, ThR01, ThR02].  However, directly comparing the 
implementations of PIM-DM, DVMRP, and ODMRP is not possible as the protocols 
differed considerably in their implementation and execution.  This comparison can be 
accomplished by examining the metrics ranges and bounds of the protocols at comparable 
loading levels.  Table 1 shows the Data-to-Overhead ratio comparison for the target 
protocols.  All of the PIM-DM simulation experiments were repeated three times and a 
90% confidence level used.  Since the results for DVMRP and ODMRP were gathered 
from previous work, confidence interval overlap analysis was not performed to ascertain 
statistical independence. 
Table 1 - Data-to-Overhead Comparison 
 DtO DVMRP ODMRP PIM-DM
Min 0.291817 0.111433 0.645125
Average 0.561919 0.229997 0.82285
Max 0.766399 0.37276 0.910808  
As is shown by Table 1, the DtO measurements illustrate that PIM-DM has a 16% 
higher DtO ratio than DVMRP, and a 59% higher DtO ratio than ODMRP.  This is the 
expected result and is caused by the separation of the routing protocol from the 
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multicasting protocol.  Both DVMRP and ODMRP have the routing protocol information 
embedded in the multicasting packet.  This increases the overall size of the packet, and 
therefore increases the amount of overhead for the multicasting portion of the protocol.  
Since PIM-DM simply interfaces with the existing routing protocol and does not have the 
routing information embedded in the multicasting packets, there is less overhead from the 
multicasting perspective.  The benefit of separating the routing protocol from the 
multicasting protocol is clear as the DtO ratio increases. 
A second strength of PIM-DM is seen from the RtS ratio.  Using the “orders of 
magnitude” reliability terminology from the telecommunications industry, each decimal 
place in a reliability statistic represents an order of magnitude.  For example, a reliability 
metric of 0.999 is one order of magnitude better than 0.99.  Table 2 shows PIM-DM has 
two orders of magnitude better maximum reliability than ODMRP, and three orders of 
magnitude better maximum reliability than DVMRP.  In addition, the near perfect 
transmission capability exhibited by PIM-DM is ideal when data integrity is crucial.  A 
protocol with higher RtS not only reliably delivers packets, but decreases retransmission 
of missed packets.  PIM-DM had a tighter range for RtS (99.93%-99.99%) than both 
DVMRP and ODMRP, regardless of the loading on the network. 
Table 2 - Received-to-Sent Comparison 
 RtS DVMRP ODMRP PIM-DM
Min 0.845103 0.865764 0.999285
Average 0.8950897 0.956833 0.999853
Max 0.9435325 0.996637 0.999939  
The EtE delay factor was lower for both ODMRP and DVMRP compared to PIM-
DM, as shown in Table 3.  This result is surprising, especially when considering that both 
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DVMRP and PIM-DM build approximately the same length tree structure.  The 
difference can be explained by two factors.  First, the additional layer between PIM and 
RIP introduces a slight delay.  Since PIM does not maintain its own routing tables like 
ODMRP and DVMRP, PIM-DM queries the routing tables to determine the next hop 
before actually sending the packet, rather than performing the lookup in its own tables.  
Second, the 99.98% RtS ratio is achieved by PIM-DM at the price of non-optimal paths 
while the connection between the source and the subscriber was being renegotiated.  To 
avoid dropping packets, an old satellite node would forward packets to the new satellite 
node until the connection was removed.  This forwarding increases the reliability but 
introduces additional hops along the path leading to higher EtE delays.  Therefore, the 
penalty for the DtO and RtS performance of PIM-DM is, on average, a seven millisecond 
increase in EtE delays compared to DVMRP and 12 milliseconds increase compared to 
ODMRP.   
Table 3 - End-to-End Delay Comparison 
 EtE (msec) DVMRP ODMRP PIM-DM
Min 65.9055 56.237 69.488
Avg 69.1706 64.254 76.393
Max 77.326 73.098 86.862  
The EtE delays above are well within the typical real-time voice requirements.  
For example, Nortel research has determined that a delay of 250 milliseconds is the upper 
delay limit for conversations.  If delays exceed that limit, the conversation between two 
people will be disrupted [NOR05].  Additionally, the EuroSkyWay test-bed analyzed 
VoIP performance and determined geostationary satellites are capable of providing good 
quality of service (QoS) in terms of jitter and packet loss, and medium to poor QoS in 
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terms of packet delay [CrS01].  According to a study on one-way Internet delays, 
[CoP02] demonstrated that the average delay value for international routes is 
approximately 110 milliseconds.  Consider the case of a global PIM-DM multicast 
environment, with integrated terrestrial and LEO satellite PIM-DM network segments.  
Given the EtE performance shown in Table 3, the PIM-DM LEO satellite segment would 
be transparent to the users in terms of both delay and operation. 
Overall, the preliminary work shows that the PIM-DM protocol adapts well to a 
satellite network environment.  The modified PIM-DM protocol provides a scalable 
framework in a satellite communications environment.  The protocol scales with load and 
provides equivalent performance characteristics regardless of the load on the system.  
The Data-to-Overhead ratio is on average approximately 80% and increases with a more 
stable network configuration (i.e., the network converges, with few changes during the 
simulation period).  The Received-to-Sent ratio is 99.98% across all loading levels, so 
very few packets are dropped with the majority of packets being delivered successfully.  
Finally, with the End-to-End delay of approximately 76 milliseconds, PIM-DM compares 
well with longer-range terrestrial networks, and is meets quality of service requirements 
for packet-based network communications.  PIM-DM compares favorably to both 
DVMRP and ODMRP and surpasses the performance of both protocols.  The separation 
of routing and multicast data simplifies the network and allows the incorporation of other 
multicast protocols.  PIM-DM gives the user superior transmission capability and 
provides a reliable, scalable network configuration with very little packet loss and 
excellent responsiveness. 
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Multicast protocols adapted to a GlobalStar®-like LEO satellite environment 
concluded that multicasting in a LEOSat network provided upwards of 300% increase in 
efficiency over unicast routing [EkA02]. 
While the GIG GEO systems use crosslinks to route traffic from one part of the 
world to another with delays of 250 milliseconds or more, LEO communications systems 
achieve average end-to-end latencies of less than 100 milliseconds for intercontinental 
communications using satellite crosslinks [HuR06a, Sae03].  This performance indicates 
LEO communication satellite systems should be included in an overall GIG architecture 
to improve end-to-end performance.  
3.4 Continued Viability of PIM-DM 
PIM-DM has a large following in the commercial world as well as an active 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) working group [Sav06].  PIM-DM is an 
excellent choice for adapting to the LEO satellite environment since the protocol is a 
dense mode protocol, and satellites are capable of interfacing with a large group of users 
simultaneously.  Further, the protocol independence of PIM-DM permits an easier 
adaptation to a satellite environment, requiring only the multicast portion of the protocol 
be modified while using the well-established RIP protocol (with minor modifications) for 
the underlying routing support.  From a commercial standpoint, Cisco has incorporated 
PIM-DM in its routers and Internetwork Operating System (IOS) [CIS07], and the 
OPNET Modeler [OPN06] software package now has PIM-DM and SM models 
available.  This is not true for other multicast protocols. 
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Recently, there was a proposal to the IETF to re-classify several of the multicast 
protocols as historic, indicating they are no longer actively developed and supported 
[Sav06].  These protocols include Border Gateway Multicast Protocol (BGMP), Core 
Based Trees (CBT), and Multicast OSPF (MOSPF).  In addition, this same document 
sought to retire the following RFCs: [RFC3913], [RFC2189], [RFC2201], [RFC1584], 
and [RFC1585] and thus was not considered as the basis of new research. 
Despite the fact that PIM-DM is regarded as a protocol that will not work in ISP 
networks, PIM-DM is a good option in dense end-user environments [Sav06].  
Additionally, the comments on the reliance of the complicated Assert timing issues 
causing numerous dropouts and poor routing during satellite handoffs have been 
satisfactorily addressed in [Sae03].  In the satellite network environment, the satellite 
routers frequently transition, or “hand-off,” their users to neighboring satellites as the 
satellites move about their orbits.  Typical terrestrial applications of PIM-DM do not 
experience, and do not account for, the frequent hand-offs encountered in the satellite 
environment.  Therefore, the specified functions of the Assert had to be modified to 
rebuild the links after satellite transitions.  The specification uses the Assert message to 
choose between alternate routes to force a specific route configuration, or to determine 
which node should be the forwarder for the group [AdN05].  The satellite adaptation uses 
the Assert to build a new route since the current route has changed due to satellite 
movement.  Therefore, the Assert is accomplishing the same basic function as the 
specification, but the approach is unique to this satellite network model.  Additionally, 
the RIP Ground message was added to assist with the transition capability.  Without these 
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application-specific modifications, PIM-DM performance in a satellite network would be 
severely degraded, as noted in the literature. 
While not yet obsolete, the use of Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol 
(DVMRP) [RFC1075], first used in the MBone, is on the decline.  Most DVMRP 
applications have been replaced with PIM-SM, leaving DVMRP only in legacy 
applications for the near term [Sav06]. 
MOSPF [RFC1584] was used by several vendors in intra-domain networks.  
Since MOSPF does not scale to the inter-domain case, it is no longer actively deployed. 
BGMP [RFC3913] appears to have been supported only in documents.  No 
known implementations or deployments exist [Sav06]. 
CBT [RFC2201] was an academic project that provided the basis for PIM sparse 
mode shared trees.  As soon as PIM was able to establish the shared tree capability, CBT 
was no longer needed [Sav06] and hence has not been deployed. 
3.5 Hubenko Security Framework Architecture Development 
This effort is comprised of three elements: adapt a flat key multicast security 
architecture to the baseline LEOsat model; enhance this generic architecture by 
progressively adapting relevant portions of three secure group communications 
architectures/frameworks (Iolus, Spatial Clustering, and Gothic) to the model; and 
finally, demonstrate the expected increase in efficiency and overall system scalability 
performance through discrete event simulation and analysis.   
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3.5.1 Baseline Security Architecture for the LEO Satellite Environment 
This section establishes the baseline security architecture from which security 
performance improvements will be measured.  Since there is a plethora of re-keying 
protocols, the final selection is left to the system designers implementing an application 
based on this modular architecture.  This allows the applications to drive the selection 
that best fits the varying power and computational constraints imposed by the system.  
For example, the choices for re-keying protocols would be considerably different in a 
mobile communications environment where battery and computational power are less of 
a concern than in a wireless sensor network environment where every clock cycle must 
be conserved due to the limited on-board battery size.   
Using a generic flat key security system as the basis of a generic security model, 
the original baseline “LEOsat” model [Fos98, Sae03, Tho01] was adapted to include the 
basic security functions of key generation, key storage, key agreement, and group key 
distribution.  All members of a multicast group will use the same group key to encrypt or 
decrypt traffic.  This group key is represented by “A” in Figure 6.  The lines indicate 
communication links, the lettered boxes indicate which key is in use to secure that link, 
and the numbered circles represent the end users.  To simplify the model, the processes of 
encryption and decryption will occur in a fixed unit of time. 
Each time a user joins or leaves a multicast group, the entire system will need to 
re-key with a new group key to maintain the security services such as forward and 
backward secrecy, and group integrity, mentioned earlier.  Re-keying the entire multicast 
group with a new key is the upper bound, worst-case performance for the system.  In 
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terms of the overall number keys, however, this is the simplest case with a single key 
shared by all users.  The simulations collected the metrics (cf. Section 3.8) relevant to 
security performance analysis (cf. Chapter IV).  
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Figure 6 - Baseline LEOsat Security Architecture 
Figure 7 through Figure 11 illustrate an example of the baseline architecture.  The 
colors of the beams represent the multicast key in use.  For the baseline architecture, all 
users share the same key, and therefore all the beams are the same color.  In Figure 7, all 
users are connected with the “red” key, and the two aircraft have not yet joined the 
multicast group. 
Upon authentication and authorization, the aircraft are joined to the multicast 
group in Figure 8.  To protect backward traffic secrecy, the entire group is re-keyed with 
the “magenta” key.   
As the aircraft travel along their route, they leave the first spotbeam, and enter a 
second spot beam, shown in Figure 9.  Since there is no tracking enabled in the system, 
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the entrance into the second spotbeam triggers a new authorization and authentication 
cycle, and therefore new keys are again issued to the multicast group.  For illustration 
purposes, this is the “blue” key. 
Continuing along, the aircraft enter a third spotbeam in Figure 10, and once again 
a new key (“green”) is issued to the multicast group.  Finally, the aircraft depart the 
multicast group in Figure 11.  To protect forward traffic secrecy, the entire remaining 
multicast group is re-keyed, this time with the “yellow” key, and the two aircraft are not 
re-keyed.   
 
Figure 7 - Initialize Baseline Architecture 
Example 
 
Figure 8 - Baseline Example - Two 
 
Figure 9 - Baseline Example - Three 
 
 
Figure 10 - Baseline Example - Four 
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Figure 11 - Baseline Example - Finish
3.5.2 Clusterized Security Architecture 
With a baseline and minimal security features in place, this section describes how 
the LEOsat network security architecture was enhanced by using key features of several 
secure group communications architecture proposals [AmN05, BaB02, JuA02, Mit97].  
The first enhancement applies clustering proposed by [BaB02, Mit97]. 
Iolus, due to its predetermined, static clusters and Group Security Agents (GSA) 
assignment scheme, adapts well to the satellite environment where satellites follow 
predetermined orbits with repeating ground tracks, and deterministically hand off users 
from one satellite to another.  The penultimate leaves of the multicast tree, namely the 
LEO satellites in view of the users, are also static, in a sense, and pre-determined.  
Although the satellites are actually rapidly moving in and out of view overhead, the user 
will always be connected to a single satellite.  This single satellite, regardless of exactly 
which satellite unit it is, will appear constant.  Furthermore, the satellites naturally act as 
GSAs, bridging the traffic between clusters (spot beams) and managing the re-keying for 
each of the clusters. 
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By dividing the network into two distinct hierarchical groups (“satellites” and 
“users”) as proposed in the Iolus system, a leave or join by a user will trigger a re-key in 
the user cluster, but not in the satellite cluster.  Similarly, a leave or join by a satellite will 
trigger a satellite cluster re-key, and not affect the users.  However, it is presumed that a 
leave or join by a satellite is triggered by the need for a satellite’s end-user to leave or 
join a multicast group since satellites generally are not end users as well as intermediary 
routers.  Therefore, satellite joins or departures independent of user joins or departures 
should rarely occur.  The Satellite Cluster group key is represented by “V” in Figure 12.   
To further increase the efficiency of the clustering concept, Spatial Clustering is 
implemented.  Spatial Cluster’s spatial boundaries adapt well to a satellite environment, 
though the concept of clustering is applied in a slightly different manner from the 
perspective of the leaves and their relative proximity.  In Spatial Cluster, the geographic 
distances covered within a single cluster vary greatly since fixed-sized clusters are 
maintained despite variances in user density.  Maintaining a fixed-size cluster in the 
satellite-adapted network, however, is impractical due to the dynamic nature of the 
mobile user environment.  Except in cases with significant spot beam overlap (e.g., in the 
higher latitudes), users could not switch clusters to modify the cluster sizes.  Thus, while 
the satellite environment can still benefit from the Spatial Cluster concept, fixed 
geographical boundaries are used rather than fixed cluster user size.  The ovals in Figure 
12 represent the geographic clustering, with each cluster sharing a user group cluster key, 
lettered “A” through “H.”  This reduces the impact to the system when a new user joins a 
group, or when a group member leaves.  In the initial architecture, the entire system 
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would need to re-key; in the clusterized architecture, only those users in the affected 
cluster will need to re-key.  When a user joins the multicast group, the LEO satellite 
system authenticates the user and grants access to the group assuming the proper 
credentials are presented.  Upon admission and registration to the group, the user is 
assigned to the cluster in which it resides.  Due to overlapping satellite spot beams, it is 
very likely a user may be located within view of several contiguous clusters.  Assume, 
however, that each user is allowed to register in only a single cluster at a time.  With 
seamless, ubiquitous, mobile connectivity on a global scale, each user can be mobile in 
this system.  Some users will be “more mobile” than others; one is walking down the 
street, while another flies overhead in an airplane.  When the users cross cluster 
boundaries, they are transitioned from one cluster to another.  The complexities of 
channel assignments, hand-off management, and satellite operations are beyond the scope 
of this research. 
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Figure 12 - Clusterized Security Architecture 
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Figure 13 through Figure 17 illustrate the same scenario as the Baseline example, 
but with the Clusterized Security Architecture in place.  Figure 13 illustrates the initial 
state of the clusterized multicast group.  All users depicted in this figure are 
communicating in the same multicast group.  Each spotbeam, however, is utilizing a 
different multicast key, represented by a different beam color for illustration purposes.  
All users within each spotbeam share the same key.  The two aircraft are not joined to the 
multicast group. 
When the aircraft join the multicast group and fly into the first spotbeam, only 
that “teal” cluster needs to re-key, as shown in Figure 14 by the spotbeam turning to a 
“dark blue” key.  Note only those users in the single cluster are now affected by the join, 
compared to the entire multicast group in the Baseline example. 
 
Figure 13 - Initialize Cluster Example 
 
Figure 14 - Cluster Example - Two 
When the aircraft fly to the next spotbeam in Figure 15, the old spotbeam changes 
key to “dark green,” and the new cluster changes key to “tan.”  The clusters need to re-
key for the same reason as the Baseline example: there is no tracking enabled in the 
system, the entrance into the second spotbeam triggers a new authorization and 
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authentication cycle, and therefore new keys issued to the gaining and losing clusters.  
The difference in the Cluster Architecture is a reduction in the number of affected users, 
from all of the active multicast group users, to only users in the two affected clusters. 
Moving along to another cluster in Figure 16, the aircraft again trigger changes to 
two clusters.  The “tan” cluster re-keys to the “beige” key, and the “light green” cluster 
re-keys to the “golden” key. 
 
Figure 15 - Cluster Example - Three 
  
Figure 16 - Cluster Example - Four 
Finally, the aircraft leave the multicast group and fly out of the spotbeams.  The 
“golden” keyed cluster re-keys to the “grey” key in Figure 17, completing the example. 
 
Figure 17 - Cluster Example - Finish 
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A further enhancement to this scheme divides the satellites into smaller clusters as 
well.  However, it is assumed that the satellites are controlled by a single, trusted entity 
(in this case the DoD) and there is no need to re-key when a satellite leaves or joins the 
satellite group.   
3.5.3 Hubenko Security Framework Architecture 
With the “clusterizing” of the multicast network established, the following 
enhancement adds the “Group Access Control Aware-Group Key Management” feature 
from Gothic [JuA02].  The satellite environment is an ideal medium capable of centrally 
sharing the group access awareness information, making Gothic readily adaptable. 
When the key functions of Gothic are incorporated into the Hubenko Security 
Framework Architecture, security performance increases (i.e., re-keying decreases).  For 
example, consider a multicast group established in a deployed location consisting of air-, 
sea-, and land-based tactical units.  The occupied locations spread across an area larger 
than 50 kilometers in diameter, and therefore is covered by more than a single satellite 
spot beam.  All of the multicast enabled users join the same multicast group.  Each of the 
sea- or land-based users joins the group, clustered in their respective areas.  The aircraft 
flying sorties throughout the region enter and exit the user clusters at a rate much quicker 
than their ground or sea counterparts.  For example, an aircraft flying at 800 kilometers 
per hour will cross a 50 kilometer spot beam in about three and three quarter minutes at 
its widest point.  During the same period of time, terrestrial users will either appear fixed 
relative to the spot beam, or occasionally cross into a new spot beam. 
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Without clustering, the entire Baseline system would have to re-key when users 
join or leave a group.  With clustering, each cluster is keyed with a separate cluster key.  
Adding a new user to the cluster, even if it is already joined to the same multicast group 
in another cluster, requires a re-keying of that new cluster.  However, with GACA-GKM 
support, if the system can establish that a registered user who moves to a new cluster did 
not have access to data prior to its joining, or will no longer have access after its 
departure, then the cluster would not need to re-key to incorporate the new user or 
remove it from the group.  Instead, either the new user would be issued a new key upon 
entry, or the system would simply continue as before so long as the principles of forward- 
and backward secrecy are maintained. 
Figure 18 depicts the flow of the Hubenko Architecture.  The top section depicts 
the initialization process, which follows from the discussion in Sections 2.4.3.1.1 and 
2.4.3.1.2.  The middle section summarizes the re-keying effects of Joins and Leaves as 
described in the above paragraphs.  The bottom section summarizes the process for re-
keying when a user moves to a new cluster. 
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Check GACA-GKM:
User Still Authorized?
No
Multicast Group Established using GMAS, GPMS Subsystems
Criteria established on who can join group, 
either by explicit list of users, or list of criteria
Users Join Group
In the nearest Cluster
-Authenticated, Validated, Authorized
Re-Key Cluster
Any Users Active and Registered in the
Cluster are Re-keyed due to Join or Leave
Eject User
Yes
Users Leave Group
By own volition or
Are ejected
GACA-GKM
Updated
Accordingly
Established User Moves to New Cluster
Issue User Cluster Key
- Only the User that is New to this Cluster Requires the key
- All Other Users Continue Unaffected, Including Users from Previous Cluster
Group Initialization
Group Membership Changes
Group Member Movement
 
Figure 18 - Hubenko Architecture Flow Chart 
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Figure 19 depicts the key features of the Hubenko Architecture.  The dotted lines 
represent the Satellite Layer sharing global knowledge of active users through the 
GACA-GKM.  As before, multiple users in the same cluster who are participating in the 
same multicast group share the same cluster key. 
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Figure 19 - Hubenko Security Framework Architecture 
Assume a mobile user (e.g., User 4 in Figure 19) is registered in cluster “B” in a 
multicast group, then moves to cluster “C” and joins a different multicast group.  With 
GACA-GKM support, the system would issue the cluster “C” key to User 4 without re-
keying the other users in “C” since the system knows that User 4 did not collect any data 
from the new multicast group in “C” prior to it being granted the “C” key.  Further, the 
system would not need to re-key the users in cluster “B” since User 4 is no longer able to 
receive the “B” data.  For added security, User 4 should destroy the “B” key since it is no 
longer needed.  Since GACA-GKM tracks the locations and group memberships of the 
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users in the system, it knows when users transition from one cluster to another and are 
still registered in the same multicast group.  Therefore, when registered members of a 
multicast group move from cluster to cluster, they are issued the new cluster keys without 
impacting the new or old clusters.  Since the user is already a member of the multicast 
group, and already has the same old data collected in the previous cluster, there is no 
need to re-key the new cluster since Traffic Backward Secrecy is not violated.  Further, 
there is no need to re-key the old cluster since Traffic Forward Secrecy would not be 
violated either. 
Using the previous sample scenario from the Baseline and Cluster examples, 
Figure 20 through Figure 23 illustrate the potential savings in re-keying by employing the 
Hubenko Architecture in a mobile environment.  The Hubenko Architecture effectively 
initializes much like the Cluster Architecture did in Figure 13, with each cluster in Figure 
20 utilizing a different key.  However, when the two aircraft fly into the first spot beam in 
Figure 21 and join the multicast group, the system is able to issue the current “dark 
green” key to the two aircraft, and not have to re-key the whole cluster.  This is because 
the system is able to determine that neither of the two aircraft were previously in a 
location that was covered by the multicast spotbeams, and therefore would not have been 
able to collect data from the past.   
Upon transitioning to the next cluster in Figure 22, the system again tracks the 
whereabouts of the aircraft, and is able to issue the “tan” keys to the aircraft, without 
having to re-key the tan cluster.  In addition, the system does not need to re-key the dark 
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green cluster because the system not only knows that the aircraft are no longer in that 
cluster, but also to which cluster they are currently assigned. 
 
Figure 20 - Initialize Hubenko 
Architecture 
 
Figure 21 - Hubenko Example - Two 
The same situation holds true as the aircraft move into the “grey” cluster in Figure 
23.  The “tan” cluster does not need to re-key, nor does the “grey” cluster.  Finally, as the 
aircraft leave the multicast group and fly out of the “grey” cluster, they deregister from 
the multicast group.  This Leave triggers the “grey” cluster to re-key to protect forward 
traffic secrecy. 
  
Figure 22 - Hubenko Example - Three 
 
Figure 23 - Hubenko Example - Four 
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To ensure the integrity of the system, “physical separation” alone cannot be used 
when a previously unregistered user joins a group due to the broadcast nature of satellite 
communications and the inability to determine if anyone is “listening” to the transmitted 
data.  Despite the use of relatively small spot beams, a large geographical area is still 
contained within view of the satellite.  Therefore, a user may be out of view of any of the 
registered users, but well within view of the data transmissions in the cluster.  This user 
can conceivably collect data, and then join the group.  If the system did not re-key the 
cluster upon this new user’s join, the new user would now be able to decrypt the 
previously collected data with the key it just received.  This violates the Traffic 
Backward Secrecy service provided by the network security system. 
The previous cases do not apply if there is only one multicast group on the 
system.  All of the registered users, while communicating with different cluster keys, 
would be receiving the same multicast data.  Therefore, local transitions from spot beam 
to spot beam without cluster re-keying would be acceptable.  However, in a system 
capable of handling multiple, concurrent, and distinct multicast groups, the former cases 
would most likely apply. 
3.5.4 Demonstrate Improved System Security Performance 
The final element of the research and development of the Hubenko Security 
Framework Architecture demonstrates the overall security performance improvements 
(i.e., less overall re-keying for the individual users and for the system as a whole) of the 
enhanced architecture by way of discrete time simulation using MatLab.  Architecture 
models were developed based on the architectures defined above.  The design of the 
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models are discussed in Section 3.6.  The results and respective analysis of the 
simulations are discussed in Chapter IV. 
3.6 Simulation Environment and Architecture Models 
A discrete time computer simulation was created using MatLab® version R2006b 
[MAT07] to compare the efficiency and scalability performance of three representative 
architectures.  Efficiency is defined as a measure of average re-keying experienced by the 
individual users.  That is, the basis for determining efficiency was the number of times 
each user, on average, had to re-key during a given simulation period.  Scalability is 
defined as the overall system-level key count.  The more keys distributed per simulation, 
the less scalable the architecture.  Since the number of keys, and not actual packet traffic, 
was the focus for determining efficiency and scalability, complex event simulators with 
packet-generation capabilities were not necessary.  Instead, the simulation tracks all of 
the required performance statistics on each of the individual users, and aggregates the 
results to establish system level performance. 
3.6.1 Simulation Environment 
In this model, all multicast groups and active users (those registered in the 
multicast groups) are managed by the satellite infrastructure.  If a user decides to initiate 
a new multicast group, the request is made to the satellite network, and the necessary 
group ownership information is transferred to the satellite layer for group establishment 
and subsequent management.  For the performance results and analysis discussed in 
Chapter IV, however, the simulations focused on the steady-state performance, i.e., users 
joining, leaving, and moving within established multicast groups.  When a user joins a 
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multicast group, it is authenticated through the closest LEO satellite.  It is assumed an 
active user in a multicast group establishes and maintains a connection to the closest LEO 
satellite, whether or not it is actually transmitting data at the time.  Active users require 
current keys to maintain their connections.  When a user leaves (or is forced to leave), the 
user disconnects from the satellite.   
Throughout the rest of this document, the following terms are defined as follows.  
A Simulation refers to a specific MatLab script file to code each of the experiments.  A 
Scenario is a given simulation configuration, with certain parameters that remain constant 
throughout the running of the entire simulation (e.g., the number of time steps to 
simulate), and certain parameters (e.g., number of users) that vary in a predetermined 
way throughout the given simulation.  Each scenario models a certain user environment 
with predetermined demographics and characteristics.  A Time Step is a single unit of 
time, where all events appear to occur simultaneously.  An Iteration is the complete 
execution of a single instance of the scenario, running from time step one through the 
total number of defined time steps.  Within each iteration, the user properties remain 
constant, and are the same for each of the architectures.  This is true because the users are 
defined first, before the simulation loops through the time steps of the given iteration.  
The user data structure utilizes a single parameter set for each user, which each 
architecture references throughout the simulation.  The architecture-specific variables for 
each user are modified by the respective architecture, while the set user parameters are 
not modified within an iteration.  As the simulation executes through the time steps, the 
appropriate actions are taken for each architecture before proceeding to the next time 
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step.  This ensures each architecture is operating in the same system state, with the same 
users modeled for each architecture.  Further model details are discussed throughout this 
section, and in Section 3.10. 
To determine the performance of the Hubenko Architecture across differing user 
environments, simulations were created for several hypothetical scenarios involving 
various types of multicast-enabled users.  The simulations modeled various 
configurations of satellites, spot beams, and other parameters in the different scenarios.  
The values for the scenario parameters were based on analogies to the physical world and 
sound engineering judgment.  In general, the model is capable of simulating any 
configuration of satellites, clusters, and user demographics by simply changing the 
experimental parameters.  Furthermore, the time intervals can be appropriately scaled to 
model different environments to address issues regarding concurrency, race conditions, 
and convergence.  The processes of encryption and decryption are assumed to occur in a 
fixed unit of time.  The System, Scenario, and Iteration Level Parameters and Factors are 
shown in Table 4.  The specific values for the parameters and factors for each scenario 
are presented in Section 4.2.  The only parameters that were held constant throughout all 
simulations are the individual speed settings for each of the Mobility Categories, and the 
Join Time Range.  The speed settings mimic typical speeds encountered by real-life 
mobile users, namely users in automobiles, ships, and airplanes, as well as non-moving 
users.  The Join Time Range was held fixed at 10% of the overall length of time in each 
simulation.  This ensured all users were participating in each simulation.  The System 
Level Factors varied between the different scenarios, but some (noted below) were held 
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constant across all iterations within each specific scenario.  The Scenario Level Factors 
were held constant across all time steps within an iteration, but varied between iterations. 
Table 4 - System, Scenario, and Iteration Level Parameters and Factors 
Scenario Level Factors
(Varied across Iterations)
Iteration Level Parameters 
(Constant across all Time Steps)
Control Group Size
Number of Users
Duration
Scenario Level Parameters 
(Constant across all Iterations)
Number of Satellites
Number of Clusters
Control Group Size
Duration
Join Time Range
Number of Users
Rate of Mobility
Number of Time Steps
Mobility Speeds (per category)
Rates of Mobility
Join Time Range
Number of Satellites
Number of Clusters
Number of Time Steps
Mobility Speeds (per category)
Number of Users
Duration
Rates of Mobility
Join Time Range (10% of avail time) Number of Clusters
Number of Time Steps
Control Group Size
System Level Parameters 
(Constant across all Scenarios)
Mobility Speeds (fixed per category)
System Level Factors
(Varied across Scenarios)
Number of Satellites
 
The basic security functions of key generation, key storage, key agreement, and 
group key distribution were incorporated into the model.  They were implemented 
through structured arrays, pre-allocated in memory to speed up operation.  All of the 
keying statistics are tracked on a per-user basis, and are easily aggregated to report and 
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analyze system-level statistics.  In addition, multiple fields with multi-dimensional arrays 
within each structure represented each user’s parameters, as described below.   
The users are divided into four representative Mobility categories, assigned with 
varying percentages of each as needed to model each scenario (cf. Section 4.2).  The 
categories were chosen to represent the main types of users commonly operating in a 
deployed environment.  “Stationary” (i.e., non-moving) users represent fixed 
infrastructure, such as a command post.  “Sea” users have slow mobility (e.g., movement 
between clusters occurs at a relatively slow pace (e.g., several time steps)), and represent 
ships and amphibious units.  “Ground” users move twice as fast as Sea users, and 
represent vehicles such as tanks, trucks, automobiles.  “Air” users move four times as fast 
as Ground users, and represent airplanes, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs).  The relative speeds of the categories were derived by analogy to real-world 
operators, which were then generalized into four distinct groups for simplicity.  A ship 
typically has top speeds near 45 kilometers per hour.  Smaller craft can move faster, 
while some ships have slower top speeds.  An automobile or truck can easily reach 90 
kilometers per hour, while most tanks cannot.  Additionally, 360 kilometers per hour is 
an easy feat for a jet, but more difficult for UAVs and helicopters to achieve.  Should an 
analysis require a finer granularity of Mobility Categories, each category can easily be 
broken into subcategories (e.g., “Air” can be divided into UAVs, Helicopters, and Jet 
Planes for instance).  Related to the user Mobility categories is a system-level “Rate of 
Mobility” (RoM) parameter.  A “Rate of Mobility” is defined as the overall percentage of 
users that are mobile (i.e., Sea, Ground or Air type) for each iteration.  For example, a 1% 
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RoM means that out of one thousand users, an average of ten users would be assigned 
one of the three mobility categories, with the remaining users assigned a stationary 
category. 
When the simulation initializes an iteration, each user is randomly assigned (using 
a uniform distribution) to an initial Satellite and respective Cluster; a Join Time; a 
Duration; and one of the four Mobility categories.  In most of the scenarios, the uniform 
distribution ensured even loading across all of the factors.  To investigate targeted areas 
of interest, certain scenarios reduced the range of factor values to simulate a more 
concentrated factor loading.  For example, in scenarios with numerous satellites, using 
the uniform distribution allowed level loading across the system, without “overcrowding” 
any one cluster.  Some of the scenarios, however, have only a single satellite for a high 
user density. 
If the node is mobile, it may change to a new cluster during the iteration.  The 
Join Times are uniformly distributed to activate all users within a specified time period, 
typically within the first one-third of the iteration’s time steps.  In general, the Durations 
(length of time the user is active in the multicast group) are uniformly distributed 
between one time step to the time remaining until the end of the simulation.  Certain 
scenarios, however, investigated the performance with specified duration lengths, as 
noted below. 
The distributions used ensure a highly active user group with numerous joins and 
leaves spread throughout the iteration.  Besides the joining and leaving activities, the 
users are able to move between clusters at a rate dependent on their mobility category.  
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Each user’s mobility category is also assigned randomly within the constraint of the 
overall Rate of Mobility for the given scenario.  Once the overall RoM is achieved (e.g., 
10% of all active users are Sea, Ground, or Air types), all subsequent users are assigned 
to the Stationary category.  Each of the scenarios used different RoM to simulate 
different real-life situations.  The RoM were derived from knowledge of typical troop, 
fleet, and squadron sizes found operating within an operational area of responsibility 
(AOR).  For example, a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) typically has between 7,000 
and 20,000 troops deployed to a region.  Along with the troops, the MEF deploys a few 
squadrons of aircraft and several amphibious units.  Additionally, the Marines frequent 
deploy with the Navy, thus increasing the number of sea vessels and aircraft in the AOR.  
Out of the total number of troops, not all are in motion simultaneously.  Hence, the 
scenarios all have less than 100% RoM.  If, on the other hand, a scenario were to focus 
specifically on the efficiency and scalability of a mobile ad hoc network (MANET), it 
would be feasible to have 100% of the users be mobile. 
To model the impact each event has on re-keying, the events are logically 
categorized into two levels.  Joins and leaves are categorized as Level 2 events, and 
movement between clusters is categorized as a Level 1 event.  If multiple events occur 
within a single time step, the highest-level event (i.e., Level 2 > Level 1 > None) takes 
priority, and only one consequence is modeled for the affected cluster or system as 
appropriate.  In typical multicast systems, the only level that is modeled is Level 2 since 
movement was not a design criteria as multicast was being developed.  Therefore, Level 
1 was implemented to account for the movement not seen in other models.  As a generic 
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example, if there are two leaves and a join within the same time step, only one round of 
re-keying is required to account properly for all three changes in the multicast group 
instead of three rounds of keying.  The sizing of the time step will determine the level of 
fidelity of multiple events occurring near-simultaneously within a time step. 
3.6.2 Architecture Models 
3.6.2.1 Baseline Architecture 
The first architecture, referred to as the “Baseline” architecture, is a generic 
multicast network that uses a flat keying system (i.e., all keys shown in Figure 6 are the 
same).  There is no provision for clustering, so a user joining or leaving the network 
requires a new group key be established and distributed to all users in the system.  As a 
user travels from one location to another, it deregisters from one spot beam, and re-
registers in a new one.  This is a new join, and again all users need to be re-keyed. 
In the Baseline architecture, all events are handled the same since a user joining 
the multicast group, leaving the multicast group, or moving between satellite spot beams 
produces the same effect: trigger the multicast group to re-key.  When the multicast 
group re-keys, all active users require a new key, regardless of their spot beam. 
3.6.2.2 Cluster Architecture 
The second architecture, referred to as the “Cluster” architecture, enables 
clustering, where each cluster is keyed with a separate cluster key (as shown in Figure 
12).  Adding a new user to the cluster, even if already joined to the same multicast group 
but in another cluster, required a re-keying of that cluster.  Highly mobile users (e.g., 
aircraft), enter and exit the user clusters at a much greater rate than their terrestrial 
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counterparts.  Therefore, even a single airplane flying into and out of heavily populated 
clusters induces a significant amount of re-keying on the cluster users. 
In the Cluster architecture, all events again produce the same effect of inducing a 
re-key; however, the impacts are limited to the users within the same cluster where the 
event occurs.  Therefore, when a user joins or leaves a multicast group, or moves to a 
new cluster, only that cluster requires the re-key, and not the entire multicast group as in 
the Baseline architecture. 
3.6.2.3 Hubenko Architecture 
The third architecture, referred to as the “Hubenko Architecture,” incorporates the 
GACA-GKM support into the Clustered architecture and is shown in Figure 19.  If the 
system can establish a registered user does not have access to data prior to its joining a 
cluster, or would no longer have access after its departure, the cluster does not need to re-
key.  Instead, either the new user is issued a new key upon entry, or the system simply 
continues as before upon exit.  
It is important to note that this implies a level of trust in the GACA subsystem, as 
well as sufficient trust in the authenticated user.  A user will retain old keys for a certain 
amount of time, and could return to a previous cluster and continue to receive messages.  
If the user is a legitimate member of the multicast group anyway, the impact is minimal 
for returning to an old cluster that has not been re-keyed since that user would have 
collected the same data through another cluster.  As a precaution, however, the whole 
system should establish a policy to re-key periodically, thus ensuring old keys are not 
used longer than the policy dictates.   
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Finally, in the Hubenko Architecture, the Level 1 and Level 2 events affect the 
system differently.  Level 2 events (joins and leaves) have the same impacts as the 
Cluster architecture: the multicast group users in the affected cluster are re-keyed.  Level 
1 events (movement between clusters), however, do not require a re-key since the 
movement is tracked within the Group Access Control Awareness (GACA) subsystem.  
This differs from the Cluster architecture, which does not have the GACA subsystem and 
therefore cannot correlate a leave in one cluster and a join in another cluster as movement 
between the two.  When multiple events occur within the same cluster and time step in 
the Hubenko Architecture, the highest Level event will drive how the cluster responds.  If 
there are multiple joins or leaves within the same time step, the entire cluster will re-key 
once for that time step, and not once per join or leave.  If there is movement into or out of 
the cluster along with a leave or a join in the same time step, then the cluster must re-key 
once to accommodate the new or departed user.  If there are multiple movements that 
meet the criteria for merely issuing keys to the moved user, then no other user (other than 
the one that just arrived) within the cluster is affected for that time step.   
The complete Hubenko Architecture requires that the ownership determination 
functions and the group policy specification functions from the Gothic architecture be 
implemented.  Together, these control access to the established multicast groups.  
However, since the analysis was focused on the long-term, steady-state system, and not 
the initialization, these functions were not explicitly modeled and simulated.  Instead, it 
was assumed that the complete set of functions were in place, and no distinction was 
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made between either a user leaving the multicast group of its own volition, or a user 
being ejected for some other reason. 
The following pages depict the flow of the MatLab simulation code (Figure 24).  
A sample of the complete code is included in Section 6.5.  While the specific iteration 
structure and plotting functions varied between scenarios, the core of the simulation 
remained the same.   
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Establish Scenario Experimental Parameters
ControlGroupSize, MaxNumUsers, numTimeSteps, numSats,
numClusters, Mobility Categories and associated speeds,
DurationFactor, MobilityProfile, JoinTimeSetter,
Confidence Interval Statistics
Pre-Allocate Applicable Multi-dimensional Arrays in Memory
Total Keys Distributed, Control Group Keys Distributed,
Total Average Key Counts, Control Group Average Key Counts,
Confidence Interval Statistics Arrays
Begin Iterations Loop
Repeat Loop numIterations Times
Begin Confidence Interval Loop
Repeat Loop SampleSize Times
Initialize System Status Arrays
ClusterTriggers, ClusterActivity
Pre-Allocate User Structure
Begin User Structure Initialization Loop
Repeat Loop numUsers Times
Is User in
Control Group or
Mobility Group?
Initialize
Mobility
Group
Initialize
Control
Group
(a)
(b)
(c)
 
Figure 24 - Flow Diagram for MatLab Simulation Code 
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Initialize Control Group
Assign Random Satellite, Cluster;
Set: JoinTime=1, Duration=numTimeSteps,
Mobility=Stationary
Initialize Mobility Group
Assign Random Satellite, Cluster,
JoinTime, Duration, Mobility
(Mobility Assigned per RoM)
All users assigned?
Return
To (c)
No
Yes
Begin SimTime Loop
Repeat Loop numTimeSteps Times (d)
Begin User Activity Loop
Repeat Loop numUsers Times (e)
Is User Active?
No Yes
Set ClusterActivity,
User.Active flags
Is this a 
new User?
Set ClusterTrigger,
Initialize Mobility Counter
if User is Mobile
Did User Just
Leave?
No
Set ClusterTrigger
Flag
Yes
Yes
Eject User
Are Credentials
Valid?
No
No
Yes
Is User
Mobile?
Return
To (e)
No
Mobile
User
Update
Yes
 
Figure 24 - Flow Diagram for MatLab Simulation Code (Continued) 
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Mobile User Update
Increment User.Waiting
Did User
Just Move?
No
Yes
Return
To (e)
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
- Reset User.Waiting;
- Set ClusterTrigger to Level 1
Event unless already set to Level 2;
- Update Location;
- Set ClusterTrigger to Level 1
Event unless already set to Level 2
All Users checked
for this Time Step?
Return
To (e)
Was a Cluster
Triggered?
No Return
To (d)
Determine User Re-Keying
Repeat Loop numUsers Times(f)
Is User
Active?
Increment User’s
Baseline Key Counter
Level 2
Event?
All Time Steps
Completed?
No
Yes
 
Figure 24 - Flow Diagram for MatLab Simulation Code (Continued) 
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NoWas User’s Assigned
Cluster Triggered with a
Level 2 Event?
Increment User’s
Cluster Key Counter and
Hubenko Key Counter
Yes
Was User’s Assigned
Cluster Triggered with a
Level 1 Event?
Increment User’s
Cluster Key Counter
No
Yes
Did User just move
to a new Cluster?
Increment User’s
Hubenko Key Counter
No
Yes
No
Yes
All Users checked
for this Time Step?
Return
To (f)
No
Yes
All Time Steps
Completed?
Return
To (d)
Statistics
and
Clean-up
 
Figure 24 - Flow Diagram for MatLab Simulation Code (Continued) 
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Statistics and Clean-up
- Calculate Iteration Statistics
- Clean-up Variables and Multi-
Dimensional Arrays as Applicable
No
Yes
All SampleSize
Iterations Complete?
Return
To (b)
No
Yes
All Iterations Complete?
Return
To (a)
Final Statistics and Data
- Calculate Final Statistics
- Produce Figures
- Export Data  
Figure 24 - Flow Diagram for MatLab Simulation Code (Continued) 
3.6.3 Confidence Interval 
The confidence level for this research is 95%.  When an experiment has a 95% 
confidence level with an interval of plus or minus 10%, there is a 95% probability that 
the actual mean value of the experiment lies within a range 10% above and 10% below 
the experimental mean [Jai91].  The confidence interval is given by  
 
1 1
2 2
,s sx z x z
n nα α− −
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (1) 
where x  is the sample mean, 
1
2
z α−  is the (1 )2
α−  quantile of a unit normal variate (1.960 
for 95% confidence if more than 30 samples are used), s is the standard deviation, and n 
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is the number of samples.  If the means of two experiments fall within the confidence 
intervals of each other, then the two items being compared are statistically not different.  
If the confidence interval does not contain the mean, then the items being compared may 
be statistically different at this confidence level and a t-test would need to be performed. 
The Coefficient of Variation (C.O.V.) [Jai91], is the ratio of the sample standard 
deviation to the sample mean 
 . . . sC OV
x
=  (2) 
A C.O.V. of less than 10% is generally used as the stopping criteria for simulations.  
Results collected for analysis in Section 4.2 indicated three repetitions were sufficient to 
achieve non-overlapping interval bounds for the scenarios with 10,000 users at 95% 
confidence, while five repetitions were necessary for the scenarios with fewer users. 
3.7 Simulation Equipment 
The research and development computer was a XEON workstation with two 
three-gigahertz “Dual-Core” Hyper Threaded XEON CPUs, along with 4 gigabytes of 
random access memory and dual 75 gigabyte hard drives.  This computer is typically 
capable of running upwards of eight simultaneous MatLab simulations, due to its eight 
virtual CPUs, with no apparent slowdown. 
The elapsed time for simulations to complete varied from as little as less than a 
day, to more than four weeks.  The longest simulations were the ones that modeled 
10,000 users for 10,000 time steps, with three repetitions to achieve the desired non-
overlapping 95% confidence interval bounds.  The only technical issue that arose due to 
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computer equipment and/or software occurred during the execution of the 10,000 
user/10,000 time step simulations.  MatLab running on Microsoft Windows®-based 
computers has a two billion data element limitation.  The simulations were coded in such 
a way as to maximize the full set of available data elements, without exceeding the limit.  
However, after approximately three weeks into the execution, the workstation 
experienced a memory error and reboot, thereby not completing the simulation.  The page 
file statistics never surpassed two gigabytes during the executions; however, Windows 
XP does not have a native utility to track actual system memory usage or history, so there 
may have been an error that was not tracked.  The only logged error that was reported 
related to the Symantec “quarantine scan” operation.  The machine was removed from the 
local area network, and all anti-virus and security software was uninstalled.  This solved 
the problem. 
3.8 Metrics for Security Performance Evaluation and Analysis 
The overall objective of this research effort is the development of an efficient and 
scalable multicast security framework architecture for a LEOsat environment that 
provides improved performance over current secure group communications architectures.  
Efficiency is defined as a measure of average re-keying experienced by the individual 
users.  That is, the basis for determining efficiency is the number of times each user, on 
average, has to re-key during a given simulation period.  Scalability is defined as a 
measure of the overall system-level key count.  The more keys that have to be distributed 
per simulation, the less scalable the architecture.  Therefore, the following metrics are 
used throughout the following simulations and analysis: 
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- Average number of times each user is re-keyed during an iteration. 
- Total number of keys distributed in the system during an iteration 
These metrics are similar in concept to related research efforts and are germane to 
determining potential security performance improvements [HoI04, RaH03]. 
3.9 Time Scaling for Modeling Expediency 
Time scaling is a technique that has been successfully used in the past to reduce 
simulation times by appropriately adjusting packet sizes, delays, etc [Fos98, Sae03, 
Tho01].  This was helpful for analyzing end-to-end delays in prior research.  The focus of 
this research, however, was on the effects joining, leaving, and moving of users had on 
re-keying operations.  In this research, time was normalized to uniform time steps, and all 
events occurred within those steps.  The time steps can be enlarged to the order of 
seconds or even minutes to model broad, large-scale environments such as the global 
LEOSat network, or reduced to milliseconds to analyze small, localized networks in 
greater detail. 
3.10 Model Verification 
Model verification was accomplished using a systematic approach.  MatLab code 
was used for the modeling and simulation of the Hubenko Security Framework 
Architecture.  A spiral testing and verification method was employed on the architecture.  
Problems with syntax and illegal statements were identified and corrected after each 
section of code was written.  Further, each section of code was checked for proper, 
expected execution to ensure each progressive feature was correct before the next section 
was developed. 
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During development, most of the errors involved logical issues with the boundary 
conditions, such as properly accounting for the start or finish of a user’s duration, 
incorrectly incrementing re-key counts just before a user’s joining, or just after a user’s 
leaving the multicast group.  These errors were identified by stepping through the code 
by hand, using the results of the user structure population and comparing the output of 
functions with the expected output.  Figure 25 through Figure 30 (excluding Figure 28) 
graphically display contents of the Satellite, Cluster, Mobility, Join Time, and Duration 
fields for each of the individual users’ random assignments, summarized from the 
structured array.  Plots similar to these were used throughout the development and testing 
to ensure the expected randomization occurred, ensure the assignments were within the 
expected bounds, and to verify that the code was executing properly given certain values 
in the user structured arrays.  Figure 25 shows the satellites that each user is assigned to 
at the start of the simulation.  Figure 26 shows the respective cluster assignments for each 
user.  Combining the cluster assignment with the satellite assignment, each user’s 
location can be identified throughout the simulation.  Figure 28 is an aggregate of the 
data from the User.Mobility field (plotted as a bar plot in Figure 27), and verifies the 
distribution of the user Mobility Categories.  The distribution of the user mobility is used 
to define the specific “Rate of Mobility” for each of the model scenarios.  Each user’s 
Join Time and Duration assignments are shown in Figure 29 and Figure 30, respectively.  
These two fields dictate when the users join, and how long they remain active, thus 
allowing a verification of each user’s activity (or lack thereof) for each time slot. 
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Figure 25 - User Satellite Assignments 
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Figure 26 - User Cluster Assignments
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
User
M
ob
ili
ty
 T
yp
e
User Mobility Assignments
 
Figure 27 - User Mobility Assignments 
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Figure 28 - User Mobility Verification
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Figure 29 - User Join Time Assignments 
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Figure 30 - User Duration Assignments 
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Critical to the operation of the code is the identification of when users are active 
and when they are not.  As discussed in Section 3.6.1, all active users receive new keys 
upon the appropriate system or cluster re-key, whether or not they are transmitting data at 
that time.  Therefore, it is imperative to ensure the system is properly tracking each user’s 
current state of activity.  To verify the correct operation of simulated user activity, the 
user structure was examined with the help of spreadsheets, along with graphical plots 
such as Figure 31.  This figure shows the Join Times (positive slopes) as well as the 
Departures (negative slopes) of the ten users being examined.  Join Time plus Duration 
equals Departure Time. 
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Figure 31 - User Activity Verification 
To illustrate, User 10, depicted with the bold red line, had a Join Time of six (cf. 
Figure 29) and a Duration of sixteen (cf. Figure 30) for a Departure Time of twenty-two.  
Note the first descending line in Figure 31.  This line is associated with User 3.  User 3’s 
Join Time was set at Time Step one, and therefore there is no ascending line associated 
with the Join since the user initialized as active.  However, User 3 in the plotted example 
case had a Departure of Time Step four, and its respective descending line is clearly 
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identified.  Therefore, the plot shows nine ascending lines (indicating the Joins) and ten 
descending lines (indicating the Departures). 
Along with Joins and Departures, Mobile users can move between clusters.  This 
information was tracked in another multidimensional array and combined with the Join 
and Departure information to yield a set of “triggers” used to establish when clusters or 
systems would need to re-key.  Plots similar to Figure 32, along with exporting the arrays 
to a spreadsheet, were used to verify the correct operation of the Join, Leave, and 
Movement triggers.  Figure 32 is the aggregate of all users across all clusters in the 
system, for the sixty simulated Time Steps.  The height of the bars (either one or two) 
correlate to the Level One and Level Two events described earlier in Section 3.6.1.  Note 
that there are only nineteen Level Two events (Joins or Leaves) since there is a 
simultaneous Join and Leave at Time Step Thirty Five.  In addition, any movement that 
occurs within the same Time Step that a Join or Leave occurs will be masked by the 
higher priority event (i.e., a Join or a Leave). 
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Figure 32 - Cluster Trigger Verification 
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Returning to the examples of Users 3 and 10, Figure 32 was used to verify the 
Joins and Departures.  The Level 2 events shown at Time Steps 1, 4, 6, and 22 
correspond to the User 3 Join, User 3 Departure, User 10 Join, and User 10 Departure, 
respectively. 
Each successive step in the development ultimately led to the final performance 
statistics, namely, Average Per-User re-keying, and Total System Keys Distributed, 
shown in Figure 33 and Figure 34, respectively.  For the development and testing phases, 
the data was drawn in bar graphs for simplicity of analysis.  Further, there was only one 
iteration at a time under investigation.  Therefore, line plots similar to those shown in 
Section 4.2, which represent multiple iterations demonstrating the performance of the 
systems as the number of users grow, were unnecessary and impractical.  Bar graphs for 
each iteration would have been prohibitively cluttered for analysis beyond a few 
iterations.   
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Figure 33 - Average Per-User Re-keying 
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Figure 34 - Total System Keys 
During the initial stages of model development, there were multiple active 
multicast groups in each iteration.  This modeled multiple multicast groups co-existing 
 104 
within the same satellites and clusters.  This allows accurate modeling of the physical 
properties (e.g., time, frequency, and/or code division multiple access technologies) 
available on current and future satellite systems.  However, as the number of users and 
time steps increased, this method became too resource intensive in terms of the number 
of MatLab data elements required to execute the code.  The number of MatLab data 
elements is roughly two billion when operating on a Windows-based computing platform.  
The removal of the concurrent multicast groups conserved sufficient data space to allow 
the execution of larger numbers of concurrent users over longer simulated periods of 
time. 
Another tool used to verify the model development was the random number 
generator state control.  There are several options available in MatLab for manipulating 
the pseudorandom events.  Only two methods, however, were used in this model.  They 
were resetting the state to zero, and choosing a random seed for each simulation, as 
shown below. 
%  Return RAND to its default initial state to 
allow for repeatability 
rand('state',0);  
  
%  Initialize RAND to a different state each time. 
rand('state',sum(100*clock)) 
 
Setting the random number generator back to the same state on successive 
simulation executions allowed testing of certain functions, features, and changes in 
parameters through replication of the user assignments.  This was especially helpful when 
removing sections of code (such as the multiple multicast group feature), or adding the 
next successive feature.  The simulations could be run using the same user population on 
 105 
the before and after code, and the results compared to verify the correct operation of the 
new features. 
Enabling different states between successive executions ensured different user 
initialization parameters, thereby generating slightly different results.  MatLab can ensure 
a new seed each time by utilizing the current time of the system clock as a function for 
seed generation.  The MatLab function “clock” outputs the current time as a six element 
date vector with the year, month, day, hour, minute, and seconds, each in decimal form.  
Each element is multiplied by 100 to ensure integer values, and then are summed into a 
single scalar value to be used as the seed.  Since time is monotonically increasing, the 
seed does not duplicate on successive iterations. 
3.11 Model Validation 
Model validation was difficult since there are no known physical implementations 
of similar secure multicasting group architectures.  Therefore, the Hubenko Security 
Framework Architecture model was validated against one of the other architectures found 
in the literature, namely the Spatial Cluster architecture.  A comparison with the Iolus 
architecture was not possible since the article discussing the Iolus architecture did not 
perform any simulations examining average or total system re-keying.  Instead, time 
delays incurred by using the group security agents (GSA) were measured. 
Full replication of the simulation experiments to validate the Hubenko model with 
the Gothic architecture model was not possible due to lack of complete environment data 
(e.g., user parameters, mission trace data) used in [JuA02].  Additionally, the 
exceptionally long periods of simulated time (almost 700,000 time steps) used in the 
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Gothic analysis would have to be compressed and the data aggregated because the 
Hubenko model simulations were only capable of extending to approximately 10,000 
time steps and still complete in a reasonable amount of time (e.g., several weeks). 
The results found in [JuA02], shown in Figure 35 and Figure 36, demonstrate a 
trend similar to the results found when the Hubenko model incorporated the GACA-
GKM features.  Figure 35 shows that Gothic provided approximately an order of 
magnitude less cumulative key traffic in a live trace of data captured from a space shuttle 
mission as compared to a key management model that does not employ the group access 
control awareness features of Gothic.  While still favorable, the results are less 
impressive when Gothic is compared to the same architecture in a simulated trace, shown 
in Figure 36.  Figure 35 and Figure 36 show that Gothic provides a marked performance 
improvement when employed in a security architecture.  Similarly, the Hubenko 
Architecture provides results (cf. Section 4.2) of similar magnitude and form, and thus 
the Hubenko model is accurately modeling the simulated environment as specified. 
 
Figure 35 - Group Key Management 
Overhead - Actual Trace [JuA02] 
 
Figure 36 - Group Key Management 
Overhead - Simulated Trace [JuA02] 
The Hubenko model performs better than the Gothic model due to clustering 
which the Gothic architecture lacks.  An example of this is shown in Figure 37 for 
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comparison.  The Hubenko Architecture provides a greater degree of improvement over 
the Clustered architecture (Figure 37) than the Gothic architecture provides over the 
Normal LKH architecture (Figure 36).  As an aside, the effect of increasing mobility in 
the simulations is apparent in Figure 37.  The average keys distributed in the 1% 
(iterations 1 through 200) and 10% (iterations 201 through 400) RoM sets begin at or 
near zero, while the average keys distributed starts off higher in the 25% (iterations 401 
through 600) and the 75% (iterations 601 through 800) RoM sets.  From the very first 
iterations (401 and 601, respectively), there is significantly more movement throughout 
the 25% and 75% RoM sets as compared to the 1% and 10% RoM beginning iterations (1 
and 201, respectively). 
Note in all figures created during the course of this research, the transitions 
between different “iteration sets” (e.g., between two consecutive RoM sets) are drawn.  
This transition appears as a drop in key counts, but it is due only to the graphical process 
used to create each figure.  The most logical presentation for the data was using line 
graphs.  MatLab plotted the data as continuous functions rather than breaking the lines at 
each set transition.  At each transition point within the scenarios, the lines dip in the 
Hubenko plot due to the resetting of the user population.  When the user population drops 
from the maximum number of users in the last iteration of one set, to the minimum 
number of users in the first iteration of the next set, the Hubenko key counts all go down 
as well.  In the scenarios where the RoM changes, the Baseline and Cluster plot lines also 
drop at the transition.  However, in the Short versus Long Duration scenarios, the 
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Hubenko key count goes down on the first iteration of the Long set, while the Baseline 
and Cluster counts go up. 
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Figure 37 - Average Keys Distributed in a Highly Mobile Environment 
The final source for validating the Hubenko model comes from the results 
demonstrated in the Spatial Clustering experiments [BaB02] shown in Figure 38.  This 
figure demonstrates the near-constant key loading of the Spatial Cluster architecture as an 
increasing number of users simultaneously depart a multicast group consisting of 24,000 
users.  In [BaB02], keys were normalized to one byte each to allow different keying 
methods to be represented.  In Figure 38, the line with the square markers is the 
performance of Spatial Clustering with a single multicast address used for all 24,000 
users.  The 100 level indicates approximately 100 keys generated per iteration.  Due to 
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clustering, as the number of users simultaneously departing the multicast group increases, 
the key counts remain approximately the same. 
The validation simulations had the following characteristics.  The Hubenko 
Architecture had 2,112 clusters while Spatial Clustering states it had approximately 3,100 
clusters (and approximately 17,000 routers).  The Hubenko experiments used 23,323 
users (versus 24,000 users) for an average of eleven users per cluster.  The simulation 
focused on the steady state (i.e., all users already joined to group) just like Spatial 
Cluster, with no other events occurring except the noted departures.  There was no 
movement for this validation experiment, and hence no observed difference between the 
Cluster and Hubenko performance results. 
Under similar conditions as the experiments in [BaB02], the Hubenko 
Architecture also has a near-constant key loading for increased simultaneous departing 
users as shown in Figure 39. 
 
Figure 38 - Spatial Clustering- Varying 
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Figure 39 - Hubenko Model - Varying 
the Number of Hosts Leaving 
Close inspection of Figure 38 and Figure 39 reveals several differences.  First and 
foremost, the demonstrated key loading (on the log10 scale) for the Spatial Cluster 
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architecture is approximately 102 keys, while the loading for the Hubenko results is 
approximately 104 keys.  The reason for this difference is due to which keys are being 
considered in each case.  The Spatial Clustering experiments measured the keys 
distributed through the tree routers which does not include the final leaf routers, or the 
end users (hosts).  On the other hand, the Hubenko experiments measure the keys 
distributed through to the end users.  Furthermore, Spatial Clustering does not count any 
replicated keys sent to the individual users in each cluster.  This accounts for one order of 
magnitude of the difference since the approximate loading of each cluster is between 
eight and fifteen users.  The Hubenko Architecture assumes that across the domain of the 
24,000 users, the overall cluster loading average is eleven (which is roughly 101). 
The second order of magnitude difference is not as clearly explained due to 
insufficient information on the Spatial Cluster implementation, network topology, and 
other key parameters.  Therefore, it is assumed that unique keys are counted for the key 
hierarchy (where several users utilize the same sets of keys), and not the total number of 
keys distributed to each individual user.  Even so, since the keys are multicast to the 
group, there is no additional load on the network for sending multiple keys.  The values 
reported by Spatial Cluster are normalized byte loads, and not necessarily the number of 
keys distributed to all users.  In Figure 38, for example, one hundred keys are clearly not 
sufficient to re-key the remaining 12,000 users when 12,000 users simultaneously depart.  
Assuming a uniform distribution of users departing the group, there is no way to have 
12,000 users distributed among different clusters, with an average loading of 
approximately eleven users per cluster, and yet only require one hundred keys for said 
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users and clusters.  However, it is possible to contrive scenarios where the users that are 
simultaneously departing are all leaving from the same clusters.  In this case, all of the 
empty clusters would simply be pruned from the multicast tree rather than require any 
new keys to be issued.  It might then be possible that of the 12,000 users that departed, 
only 100 clusters of the remaining users were affected (i.e., only one or two users from a 
select few clusters left the group).  The Hubenko simulation did not contrive such a 
scenario; rather, it employed a uniform random distribution for the user departures. 
The trend of the results shown in Figure 39, compared to the results shown in 
Figure 38, validates the clustering portion of the Hubenko Security Framework 
Architecture model.  Similarly, the trends of the Gothic architecture, shown in Figure 35 
and Figure 36 above, validate the GACA portion of the Hubenko model results. 
3.12 Summary 
This chapter presents the methodology for the development of the secure, scalable 
Hubenko Security Framework Architecture for LEO satellite-based networks (LEOsat), 
and addresses the lack of a secure multicast architecture that scales well for very large 
numbers (10,000 or more) of highly mobile users.  The motivation for developing the 
Hubenko Architecture, along with the validity of employing a LEO satellite 
communications network is presented.  Additionally, the metrics that were collected and 
analyzed were defined in this chapter as well.  This chapter concludes with the model 
verification and validation. 
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IV. Performance Results and Analysis 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter discusses the modeling and simulation performance results.  
Analysis of the results confirms the re-keying advantages provided by the Hubenko 
Architecture over other secure group communications architectures in all of the simulated 
user environments.  Various user environment scenarios are presented with their 
corresponding simulation performance results, along with analysis and discussion.  
Finally, the performance results are summarized. 
4.2 Model Scenarios 
To determine the performance of the Hubenko Architecture over the Baseline and 
Clustered architectures, several scenarios are developed and analyzed.  In each scenario, 
the basic models are the same as those discussed in Section 3.6.2.  The only changes are 
to the values in the specified parameters for each scenario, as noted in each scenario 
discussion below. 
4.2.1 Highly Mobile User Environment (Four Different RoM) 
The first simulation scenario represented four independent Rates of Mobility 
(RoM) for a moderate user population size.  To contain the user movement in a relatively 
small geographical area, only a single satellite with ten active spot beams (clusters) is 
simulated.  This models a geographical coverage area that would encompass a typical 
theater of operations (e.g., deployed military operations overseas, or a widespread 
disaster recovery area).  In general, the model is capable of simulating any configuration 
of satellites and clusters by simply changing the experimental parameters.  However, 
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these scenarios used a single satellite because aircraft do not typically fly with sufficient 
speed or range to significantly impact terrestrial-based users over a larger area.  The first 
RoM, 1%, represents a user environment with little mobility, such as when all users are in 
garrison, and their movements do not cause them to cross into neighboring clusters.  
Subsequent RoM incrementally increase the user mobility (10%, and 25%), ending with a 
75% RoM to characterize the Hubenko Architecture in a highly mobile environment.  
Figure 40 shows the representative distribution of the users’ mobility categories (from the 
final iteration of each iteration set) for each of the four different Rates of Mobility, 
marked (a) through (d). 
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Figure 40 - Rates of Mobility for Highly Mobile Scenario 
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The distinct sections (“iteration sets”) marked (a) through (d) in Figure 41 and 
Figure 42 correspond to the four different Rates of Mobility (1%, 10%, 25%, and 75%), 
respectively.  Section (a) has iterations 1 through 200, section (b) iterations 201 through 
400, and so on.  From left to right in Figure 41 and Figure 42, as the iteration count 
increased, the number of users in the system also increased.  For example, iterations 1, 
201, 401, and 601 had ten users total, for an average cluster density of one user per 
cluster.  The maximum average cluster density for each simulation set (iterations 200, 
400, 600, and 800) was two hundred users, for a total of two thousand users across the ten 
satellite clusters.  The RoM was constant for all iterations within each iteration set.  
When the two hundredth iteration within each set completed, the RoM was increased to 
the next level and the number of users reset to an average cluster density of one user per 
cluster.  The key simulation parameters are summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5 - Highly Mobile User Environment Parameters 
Satellites 1
Clusters 10
Maximum Users 2000
Time Steps 2000
Rates of Mobility (%) 1, 10, 25, 75
Features Mobile users evenly divided between Sea, Ground, and Air  
With low overall mobility, both the Cluster and the Hubenko Architectures 
demonstrated significant improvement over the Baseline architecture in terms of average 
re-keys per user (Figure 41) and total keys distributed in each system (Figure 42).  Since 
there was relatively little movement with the 1% RoM, the Hubenko Architecture offered 
little improvement over the Cluster architecture.  The Group Access Control Awareness – 
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Group Key Management (GACA-GKM) did not have an opportunity to provide any 
benefits for supporting mobile users.  However, as the Rate of Mobility increased (shown 
in Figure 41 and Figure 42 (b) through (d)), the performance gains due to the inclusion of 
the GACA-GKM in the Hubenko Architecture also increased.  This is demonstrated by 
observing the difference in re-keying between the Cluster and the Hubenko architectures 
in the 1% mobility sections (~150 average re-keys), to the difference in the 75% mobility 
sections (~625 average re-keys).  The performance gain from the Hubenko Architecture 
is approximately 400%.   
Saturation is defined as each user being re-keyed at every time step.  The 
Baseline architecture results in saturation which a re-key of each user occurs per each 
time step.  Adding more users increases the Total Keys Distributed, but does not increase 
the Per-User Average Re-key result, which equals the number of time steps.  This is 
because at least one event occurs in each time step, and one or more events trigger a re-
key, and at most one re-key can occur per time step.  Therefore, the maximum number of 
keys that can be distributed in a system in a single iteration is the number of active users 
times the number of time steps.  Additionally, Maximum Capacity of an architecture is 
defined as the number of users that drives the respective architecture to its saturation 
point.  Beyond the maximum capacity, the architecture continues to re-key each user at 
each time step.  The per-user average re-keying will remain constant, roughly equal to the 
number of Time Steps (dependent on the average Duration for the users).  The Total Keys 
Distributed, however, will continue to increase as the number of users increases. 
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In this scenario, the Baseline architecture reached the “saturation” level near 
iteration 250 for the 10% RoM, the iteration 425 for the 25% RoM, and near iteration 608 
for the 75% RoM.  The saturation was driven by the increased movement coupled by the 
user joins and leaves.  This can be seen in Figure 41 by the increased average user re-
keys in iterations with lower cluster densities (i.e., the left side of section (d) is much 
higher than the corresponding left side of sections (a) and (b)). 
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Figure 41 - Average Times Each User is Re-Keyed (from 10 to 2000 Users, 2000 
Time Steps, Highly Mobile User Environment Scenario) 
The Cluster architecture approached the saturation level at a slower rate due to the 
reduced size of impacted users in each cluster affected by the increased mobility.  
However, by approximately iteration 50 (iteration 650 overall) of the 75% RoM set, the 
Cluster architecture was also saturated, due mostly by the frequent user movement into 
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and out of the clusters.  This means that the Cluster system reaches maximum capacity 
with only five hundred active users.  Meanwhile, in the final iteration (iteration 800), the 
Hubenko system was operating at approximately 22% capacity with four times as many 
users.  The values in the final iteration of the 75% RoM are:  2,000 Users, 137 Average 
Hubenko Keys, and 825 Average Cluster Keys.  Extrapolating this performance (shown 
in Equation 3), an estimate of approximately 12,000 users may be sufficient to saturate 
the Hubenko Architecture.  This is a 650% performance increase given a highly mobile 
user environment. 
 2000
137 825
Users xUsers
Average Keys Average Keys
=  (3) 
Had the Cluster and Baseline systems not saturated due to the MatLab simulation 
code limitations, the Hubenko Architecture improvement likely would have been 
demonstrated to be considerably larger.  In an attempt to demonstrate this improvement, 
sensitivity analysis was performed.  The size of the system (e.g., number of clusters) was 
increased to reduce the overall cluster densities.  However, as the density was reduced, 
the Hubenko Architecture once again performed better.  As the number of users was 
increased, the Cluster architecture saturated again.  The cycle of increasing the number of 
clusters to reduce the amount of Cluster re-keying, followed by increasing the overall 
cluster densities was repeated until the maximum number of Matlab elements was 
attained.  At this point (35,494 users, 5,000 clusters) the Hubenko Architecture could still 
not be saturated. 
Recall the transitions from last iteration of a RoM set to the first of the next RoM 
set (e.g., 200 to 201) is seen as a sharp drop.  This apparent transition is an artifact of the 
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MatLab graphical process of plotting the lines as continuous functions, and not allowing 
breaks between sets. 
Confidence Intervals are not plotted in the scenarios that have several hundred 
iterations due to visual cluttering.  Confidence Intervals are plotted in scenarios that 
contain 10,000 users and were executed with only thirty or so iterations because they 
were more visually reasonable. 
The overall performance improvements can also be seen in total number of keys 
distributed in each system, shown in Figure 42.  Again, the Baseline architecture 
approaches the saturation point quickly where the number of keys distributed is no longer 
affected by movement since the joins and leaves are enough to cause the frequent re-
keying of the system.  With increased movement in the 2,000 user iterations, the Cluster 
architecture suffers an order of magnitude more re-keying than the Hubenko 
Architecture. 
Note that the Hubenko Architecture has a slow growth in the total number of keys 
distributed.  This growth is due to the high number of users that are individually keyed as 
they move into new clusters.  With large numbers of mobile users, the issuance of single 
keys begins to add up to a significant amount.  This, of course, is still a much slower 
growth of total system keys than that experienced in either the Baseline or Cluster 
architectures. 
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Figure 42 - Total Keys Distributed in Each Architecture (from 10 to 2000 Users, 
2000 Time Steps, Highly Mobile User Environment Scenario) 
As seen in Figure 42, section (a), with only 1% mobility, the Hubenko 
Architecture issues approximately 300,000 keys in iteration 200.  Since there is little 
movement (i.e., 1%), the vast majority of the keys are issued due to the join or leave of 
users in each of the clusters, and not from movement.  Since the join and leave 
distribution are statistically the same across all iterations, the iteration 800 of Figure 42, 
section (d), with 75% mobility, would also have approximately 300,000 keys issued in 
the Hubenko Architecture due to joins and leaves.  Therefore, the additional 100,000 keys 
(for a total of 400,000 Hubenko Architecture keys) are due to individual key updates to 
mobile users as the mobile users travel to new clusters.  Comparing the same iterations of 
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the Cluster Architecture, there were 500,000 keys issued in iteration 200, and 1.6 million 
keys issued in iteration 800.  The difference due to the increased mobility is 1.1 million 
more Cluster Architecture keys.  The Hubenko Architecture, therefore, has a ten-fold 
improvement over the Cluster architecture with the same user joins, leave, and mobility. 
4.2.2 Short versus Long Duration 
The next simulation modeled two scenarios that also had a single satellite with ten 
spot beams, each spot beam representing a different cluster.  Using Total Keys 
Distributed and Per-User Average Re-keying as the figures of merit for comparison, the 
two scenarios demonstrate the performance improvements offered by the Hubenko 
Architecture with varying user duration characteristics.  The first scenario modeled a 
Rate of Mobility (RoM) of 1%, and the second scenario modeled a RoM of 50%.  The 
1% RoM is the low mobility environment, and 50% RoM is the high mobility 
environment.  The focus of this investigation is the impact of changing the Duration 
factor of the mobile users rather than increasing the Rate of Mobility.  The longer the 
users persist, the larger the number of re-keys is expected. 
Due the length of time to accomplish each experiment, a full factorial design was 
not used in all scenarios.  However, a full factorial design was used for the analysis of 
variance to investigate interactions. 
To investigate the impact a few aircraft flying over numerous terrestrial users 
have on re-keying, a “Control Group” of users is set aside in each scenario.  The users in 
the control group were assigned: a Join Time of one (became active in the first time step); 
a Duration equal to the number of Time Steps that kept the users active until the last time 
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step; and a Mobility category of Stationary.  The size of the control group varied across 
the scenarios, as noted below.  During the course of the simulations, the metrics were 
tracked for all users combined, as well as for just the control group users. 
For the first scenario, the number of users increase from as low as ten users in the 
system, to as high as one thousand.  With ten clusters in the system, there is a maximum 
average cluster density of 100 users per cluster in the 1000 user case.  In this case, 
increasing the user density beyond this number saturates the system for the Cluster 
architecture.   
The first scenario models a user population with 1% overall mobility  The control 
group size was held constant at 50% of the total user population.  In this scenario, the 
Stationary mobility category was used to model the ground troop component of a 
deployed contingency, and not a stationary infrastructure.  With respect to fast-moving 
vehicles and aircraft, troops appear stationary.  The value of 50% of the population 
allows the non-control group users to generate significant movement, and therefore 
mimic real-life situations where aircraft and vehicles are continuously moving throughout 
a theater of operations.  This scenario ran for two hundred iterations.  During each 
iteration, the user assignments remained constant for all three architectures.  For each 
successive iteration, the user population received an entirely new set of uniformly 
distributed assignments.  In the first one hundred iterations, the number of users increased 
from ten users to one thousand users in steps of ten.  In addition, each user’s Duration 
was set to a relatively “Short” period of time (approximately 20% of the total simulation 
time).  Within the second set of one hundred iterations, the number of users was reset to 
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begin at ten users again, and continue to one thousand in increments of ten users per 
successive iteration.  The user Durations for this second set of iterations were set to 
relatively “Long” periods of time (approximately 80% of the total simulation time).  
During the early stages of development, a sensitivity analysis was performed to 
investigate the trends produced by varying the Duration length.  The results indicated no 
significant knees in the curve, and therefore the values of 20% and 80% were chosen 
using sound engineering judgment as logical breakpoints to define “Short” and “Long,” 
respectively.  Table 6 summarizes the parameters for this scenario.  The two distinct sets 
of iterations can be seen in Figure 43, with the Short Durations on the left (Iterations 1 
through 100), and the Long Durations on the right (Iterations 101 through 200).  Iteration 
1 has ten users, iteration one hundred has one thousand users.  Similarly, iteration one 
hundred one has ten users, and iteration two hundred has one thousand users. 
Table 6 - First Short vs. Long Duration Scenario Parameters 
Satellites 1
Clusters 10
Maximum Users 1000
Time Steps 1000
Rates of Mobility (%) 1
Features
Short Duration=20%*TimeSteps
Long Duration=80%*TimeSteps
Control Group = 50%  
Figure 43 shows the total number of keys distributed to all users in each of the 
architectures.  Clustering provided about a half order of magnitude reduction in total keys 
distributed within the Cluster and Hubenko Architectures over the Baseline architecture.  
With relatively little movement between clusters, the Hubenko Architecture’s use of the 
Group Access Control Awareness subsystem provided a statistically insignificant benefit 
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over the Cluster architecture in the Short Duration iterations.  The benefits of the GACA 
subsystem emerged in the Long Duration iterations where there was slightly more 
movement due to users being active long enough to make a slight impact.  One percent 
mobility was not sufficient to saturate the Baseline architecture with re-keying activity 
since there is less than (number of users) x (one thousand time steps) total keys 
distributed in each iteration. 
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Figure 43 - Total Keys Distributed - 1% Mobility (from 10 to 1000 Users, 1000 Time 
Steps, Short versus Long Duration Scenario 1) 
The three data lines on the left side of Figure 43 (iterations 1 through 100, “Short 
Duration”) are relatively smooth since at most only 1% of the users were mobile, and 
they were active for only a short time.  This limited the overall mobility and therefore 
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variability across the iterations.  The lines on the right side (iterations 101 through 200, 
“Long Duration”) fluctuated more due to increased variability in the mobility between 
iterations.  The mobile users were not only active for longer periods of time, but the 
speeds at which they moved between clusters varied based on the mobility category.  
Therefore, if one iteration had five ground or sea users and only one aircraft, it would 
have fewer movement triggers than an iteration with five aircraft users. 
For the second Short versus Long Duration scenario, the number of users was 
increased to 10,000, the number of time steps was increased to 10,000, and the Rate of 
Mobility was increased to 50%.  The control group size was held constant at 50% of the 
total user population like the previous scenario.  Therefore, the remaining 50% of the 
users were randomly assigned to the three mobility categories.  Table 7 summarizes the 
parameters for this scenario. 
Table 7 - Second Short vs. Long Duration Scenario Parameters 
Satellites 1
Clusters 10
Maximum Users 10,000
Time Steps 10,000
Rates of Mobility (%) 50
Features
Short Duration=20%*TimeSteps
Long Duration=80%*TimeSteps
Control Group = 50%  
The performance of the Cluster architecture thus far was following a trend of 
saturating long before the Hubenko Architecture.  In Figure 44, for example, with one 
thousand users maximum simulated over one thousand time steps, with a 50% RoM.  
Even with a relatively small user population, the Cluster architecture approaches 
saturation, while the Hubenko Architecture performs at approximately one-ninth 
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capacity.  Therefore, increasing the number of users and time steps will determine the 
Hubenko performance under stress. 
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Figure 44 - Average Per-User Re-Key - 50% Mobility (from 10 to 1000 Users, 1000 
Time Steps, Short versus Long Duration Scenario 1) 
The apparent step increase that occurs in Iterations 16 through 30 is due to the 
increased length of time a mobile user remains active.  On average, they remain active 
four times longer in the Long Duration than the Short Duration.  Correspondingly, the 
average re-keying experienced per user also increases an average of four times as 
compared to the respective Short Duration iteration (e.g., Iterations 5 and 20 have the 
same number of users). 
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Note the difference in the plots between Figure 43 and Figure 44.  In preparation 
for simulating a much larger user population for a much larger number of time steps, the 
number of iterations is decreased (from 200 in Scenario 1 to 30 in Scenario 2).  The 
decrease was necessary to allow the simulations to complete in a reasonable amount of 
time (measured in weeks).  The decrease in step resolution, however, still produced 
sufficient data points to analyze the trends and detect significant changes.  Based on the 
results from previous scenarios, the trends had only minor variations due to random 
distributions as the population size grew.  Little certainty, if any, is lost by the decrease in 
granularity.  Along with the increased user population and increased time steps, the 
number of replications was increased from one simulation to three.  Running three 
replications of the 10,000 user simulations resulted in non-overlapping bounds at a 95% 
confidence interval (illustrated as dotted lines of the same color surrounding the main 
plot lines of interest).  The scenarios with 2,000 or less users required a sample size of 
five for non-overlapping confidence interval bounds, and therefore resulted in statistically 
different performance for the different architectures.  In the scenarios with 10,000 mobile 
users, three replications generally yielded Coefficients of Variance of less than 0.1%. 
Figure 45 demonstrates that the Short Duration iterations still do not have enough 
event activity to saturate the Baseline architecture which is operating at only about one-
third capacity.  However, the Long Duration iterations approach the maximum possible 
total keys distributed (approximately 8,700 out of 10,000 possible).  With increased 
mobility, the Cluster architecture shows significant increases in total keys distributed for 
both the Short and Long Durations from the 1% mobility scenario.  Despite the benefits 
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of the smaller clusters limiting the impact of local joins and leaves, the Cluster 
architecture also approaches the saturation point in the Long Duration iterations.  This 
occurs due to the frequent movement of the users throughout the simulation.  Despite the 
increased movement, the performance of the Hubenko Architecture remains nearly stable 
in this scenario, as it did in the 1% mobility scenario.  The main reason for this stability is 
due to the GACA subsystem tracking users as they move between clusters.  If users are 
able to maintain their credentials and meet the requirements for being able to transfer 
between clusters, the GACA subsystem issues the moving users keys without re-keying 
the entire old and new clusters. 
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Figure 45 - Average Per-User Re-Key - 50% Mobility (from 10 to 10,000 Users, 
10,000 Time Steps, Short versus Long Duration Scenario 2) 
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The Total Keys Distributed count in Figure 46 demonstrates nearly an order of 
magnitude fewer keys distributed between the Hubenko Architecture and the Baseline 
and Cluster architectures at Iteration 30.  Figure 46 shows all of the keys distributed for 
each of the architectures in the second Short versus Long Duration scenario.  The results 
for the Cluster and Baseline key counts are statistically equivalent due to their 
overlapping confidence interval bounds.  The Hubenko Architecture, however, distributes 
almost 80 million less keys to all users in the same span of time. 
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Figure 46 - Total Keys Distributed - All Users (from 10 to 10,000 Users, 10,000 Time 
Steps, Short versus Long Duration Scenario 2) 
Figure 47 shows the number of keys distributed to the Control Group (50% of the 
user population).  Since the Control Group persists for the entire simulation while the 
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mobile users leave after 20% or 80% of the available time, the Control Group would 
have, on average, more keys distributed to them than the mobile, non-control users. 
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Figure 47 - Total Keys Distributed - Control Group (from 10 to 10,000 Users, 10,000 
Time Steps, Short versus Long Duration Scenario 2) 
While this is true with the Baseline and Cluster cases, the Hubenko Control Group 
actually has slightly less keys on average due to the mobile users getting new keys each 
time they move from cluster to cluster.  For example, the Control Group of users in the 
Hubenko Architecture received approximately 4.4 million keys during the entire final 
iteration.  The total number of users acquired slightly more than 10 million keys.  
Therefore, the mobile users account for the 5.6 million remaining keys, with 
approximately 1 million keys issued due to movement between clusters.  The Baseline 
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and Cluster architectures, on the other hand, have 50 million keys issued to the Control 
Groups, but only about 37 million keys issued to the mobile users.  Therefore, 
implementing the Hubenko Architecture reduces the re-keying burden on the Control 
Group as well as reducing the overall re-keying for the system.  This reduced re-keying 
overall enhances scalability and increases the efficiency of the system. 
4.2.3 Increasing Aircraft over Stationary Users 
This set of scenarios determines any reduction in re-keying for terrestrial-based 
users provided by the Hubenko Architecture in a highly mobile environment.  A Highly 
Mobile Environment is a group of users in a network that collectively change satellite 
spot beams often.  These scenarios simulated a large population of terrestrial users with 
several aircraft flying overhead, continuously moving between the clusters.  The control 
group size was held constant at 85% of the total user population, and their Duration lasts 
for the entire number of time steps.  The Control Group’s Mobility Category is Stationary 
Users.  The Duration for the remaining 15% of users is at Long (up to 80% of the total 
possible time steps).  Six iteration sets were run with increasing overall average mobility 
as follows: 1%, 3%, 5%, 7%, 10%, and 15%.  If a user is mobile, its mobility category is 
set to Aircraft.  The first scenario was run with 1,000 users for 1,000 time steps to 
observe the behavior of the Cluster architecture in addition to the Hubenko Architecture.  
Table 8 summarizes the scenario parameters.  The sample size of five replications 
prevents significant overlap in the confidence interval bounds of the three architectures 
under the lower RoM.  The second scenario was run with 10,000 users and 5,000 time 
steps to demonstrate the performance of the Hubenko Architecture in a heavily populated 
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environment.  Due to the significantly larger number of users and time steps, three 
replications were sufficient. 
Table 8 - Increasing Aircraft Parameters - Scenario 1 
Satellites 1
Clusters 10
Maximum Users 1,000
Time Steps 1,000
Rates of Mobility (%) 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 15
Features Control Group = 85%Mobile User Duration = Long  
Observing the per-user average re-keying for all of the users in Figure 48, the 
Baseline architecture quickly saturates in all but the first iteration set (1% mobility).  The 
Cluster architecture shows modest improvement under low mobility.  By 7% mobility, 
clustering alone is insufficient to prevent re-keying saturation.  The Hubenko 
Architecture provides the most stable operation in the heavily mobile environment, with 
approximately one and a half orders of magnitude less average user re-keying.  The slow 
growth in the average number of re-keys in the respective iterations across the iteration 
sets was due to the increasing amount of movement in the mobile user population. 
By comparison, Figure 49 shows that the results are nearly identical for the 
Control Group under all simulated RoM, as demonstrated by the same average re-keying 
per user for each of the different RoM.  This is due to the randomization of the mobile 
users’ joins and departures that, with a uniform distribution, appear constant over the 
course of numerous iterations.  What is absent is the excessive re-keying caused by the 
frequent movement of the mobile users due to the GACA-GKM sub-system.  The trend is 
similar for the Control Group results of the Total Keys Distributed, shown in Figure 51. 
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Figure 48 - Average Per-User Re-Key - All Users (from 10 to 1000 Users, 1000 Time 
Steps, Increasing Aircraft Scenario 1) 
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Figure 49 - Average Per-User Re-Key - Control Group (from 10 to 1000 Users, 1000 
Time Steps, Increasing Aircraft Scenario 1) 
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Figure 50 shows the slight growth in the Total Keys Distributed for all users in 
the Hubenko Architecture, while the results are fairly constant across all RoM for the 
control group in Figure 51. 
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Figure 50 - Total Keys Distributed - All Users (from 10 to 1000 Users, 1000 Time 
Steps, Increasing Aircraft Scenario 1) 
Increasing the RoM has virtually no effect on the stationary terrestrial user, which 
was the goal of the Hubenko Architecture.  Due to the GACA-GKM subsystem, the large 
amount of stationary users (e.g., a brigade of Marines in a deployed AOR) does not need 
to re-key every time an aircraft flies overhead.  The Hubenko Architecture effectively 
buffers the non- or slow-moving users from the impacts of the rapidly-moving user.  In 
fact, the Control Group users could have been randomly assigned the Stationary, Sea, or 
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Ground Mobility Category instead of just Stationary, and the results would have been 
approximately the same.  There would be little change with the exception of the 
additional keys incurred by the individual Control Group users moving from one cluster 
to another.  The Air users flying overhead would not induce any additional re-keying on 
the non-stationary users, just as they induce no re-keying on the Stationary users 
(assuming those fast-moving aircraft have the proper credentials such that the GACA-
GKM subsystem can transparently authenticate, validate, and authorize them into the new 
clusters). 
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Figure 51 - Total Keys Distributed - Control Group (from 10 to 1000 Users, 1000 
Time Steps, Increasing Aircraft Scenario 1) 
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The Baseline architecture is saturated, and therefore no change is observed with 
increased RoM.  The Cluster architecture saturates on the higher number iterations within 
each iteration set (the ones with a higher number of active users), and increasingly 
approaches the saturation point in the iterations with lower RoM.  The overall results 
indicate that if the system designers implemented the Hubenko Architecture, terrestrial-
based users would experience reduced re-keying in environments where numerous 
aircraft are flying overhead.  If the Hubenko Architecture were not employed, each over-
flight would cause a re-key in the local cluster, thus increasing overhead and reducing 
system efficiency and scalability. 
In an effort to analyze the Hubenko Architecture under a higher user loading 
level, Scenario 2 with 10,000 users for 5,000 time steps was executed.  A sample size of 
three replications was sufficient to generate statistically different results for the Baseline 
and Cluster architectures, even for the 1% RoM.  The parameters are summarized in 
Table 9. 
Table 9 - Increasing Aircraft Parameters - Scenario 2 
Satellites 1
Clusters 10
Maximum Users 10,000
Time Steps 5,000
Rates of Mobility (%) 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 15
Features Control Group = 85%Mobile User Duration = Long  
As expected, the Cluster and Baseline architectures quickly saturate in the 3% 
RoM and beyond, while the Hubenko Architecture experiences linear growth in the Total 
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Keys Distributed, as shown in Figure 52.  There is approximately 15% growth in the total 
number of keys distributed, which corresponds to the representative increase in mobility. 
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Figure 52 - Total Keys Distributed - All Users (from 10 to 10,000 Users, 10,000 Time 
Steps, Increasing Aircraft Scenario 2) 
The average per-user re-keying displays similar performance in Figure 53, with 
the Cluster architecture operating within 2% of complete saturation, and the Baseline 
architecture re-keying during almost every single time step.  On the other hand, the 
Hubenko Architecture utilized only approximately 6% of the total possible re-keying 
capacity operating under the exact same environmental conditions. 
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Figure 53 - Average Per-User Re-Key - All Users (from 10 to 10,000 Users, 10,000 
Time Steps, Increasing Aircraft Scenario 2) 
4.2.4 Varied Air Content Rate of Mobility 
The final investigative experiment simulated five distinct RoM sets with the final 
RoM allocating 40% of the total user population to the Air mobility category.  At the 
beginning of each iteration, the users were assigned a mobility category using the 
weighted uniform random distribution shown in Table 10.  This weighting allows the 
growth in mobility to be controlled over the various RoM, thus allowing a comparison on 
the effects of the overall increase in movement on the system.  These RoM distributions 
are hypothetical, and are meant to stress the system with an increasing amount of 
mobility and plot the results side by side for analysis. 
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Table 10 - Rates of Mobility (Varied Air Content) 
Iteration User Type Demographics
1 through 100 All Stationary
101 through 200 ~1/2 Stationary, 1/2 Ground
201 through 300 ~1/3 Stationary, Ground, Sea
301 through 400 ~1/4 Stationary, Ground, Sea, Air
401 through 500 ~1/5 Stationary, Ground, Sea; 2/5 Air  
Within each RoM set, the user population is steadily increased from one through 
one hundred average users per cluster, for a total maximum user population of 2,000 
users.  Table 11 summarizes the scenario parameters.  This scenario analyzes the 
Hubenko Architecture performance in a heavily mobile environment with increasing air 
assets.  This scenario had the heaviest amount of mobility of all the modeled scenarios, 
with only 20% of the users stationary in the final RoM. 
Table 11 - Varied Air Content RoM Parameters 
Satellites
Clusters
Maximum Users
Time Steps
Rates of Mobility (%)
1 through 100 All Stationary
101 through 200 ~1/2 Stationary, 1/2 Ground
201 through 300 ~1/3 Stationary, Ground, Sea
301 through 400 ~1/4 Stationary, Ground, Sea, Air
401 through 500 ~1/5 Stationary, Ground, Sea; 2/5 Air
0, 50, 66, 75, 80
Features
2
10
2000
2000
 
Since there is no movement in the first iteration set (iterations 1 through 100 in 
Figure 54), the GACA-GKM provides no additional benefit in the Hubenko system 
compared to the Clustered system.  The steady growth in re-keying for all three 
architectures is due to the steady growth in overall number of active users in each system 
and their respective joins and leaves. 
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Figure 54 - Per-User Average Re-Key Results - All Users (from 10 to 2000 Users, 
2000 Time Steps, Varied Air Content Scenario) 
As mobility increases from left to right in Figure 54, so does the amount of 
average re-keying for the Baseline and Clustered architectures.  The flat architecture 
reaches its maximum due to the numerous joins and leaves throughout the system as early 
as the 50% RoM with only the relatively slow moving Ground users.  Beyond this level 
of mobility, the re-keying only gets worse if the system is not already saturated. 
The Clustered architecture, while performing under the saturation level in the first 
three RoM, saturates in the 75% RoM.  The Cluster architecture is able to avoid 
saturation in the 50% and 66% RoM sets because the movers were relatively slow 
(numerous time steps pass before the user moves to a new cluster).  None of the mobile 
users was the Air category.  Therefore, while the overall RoM for this scenario was the 
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same or higher than the scenario RoM in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, the speed at which the 
users changed clusters was considerably slower on average with no Air users.  
Correspondingly, the per-user average re-keying experience was lower in this scenario 
for the second and third RoM sets than in the previous scenarios.  With the introduction 
of the Air category of users in the fourth RoM (iterations 301 through 400), the Cluster 
architecture once again saturates beyond an average cluster density of fifty users per 
cluster.  The same is also true when the RoM increases to 80% and the allocation of Air 
users increases to 40%. 
The Hubenko Architecture experiences a considerably smaller rate of increase in 
per-user average re-keying in the respective RoM sets, clearly demonstrating the 
combined benefits of the clustering and GACA-GKM features.  Having a 50% mobile 
user population only increases average re-keying 10% over the all stationary case 
(iterations 1 through 100).  This relatively small increase is due to the mobile users 
changing clusters rather slowly, since none of the mobile users were rapidly moving 
users.  The 66% RoM has an increase of 15%; again a small increase due to the lack of 
Air users in the RoM allocation.  Increasing the RoM to 75% with 25% of the total user 
population being allocated to the rapid moving user category (Air) increases the average 
re-keying by about 50%.  Similarly, increasing the RoM to 80% with 40% of the total 
population becoming Air users increased the average re-keying by about 65% over the 
stationary case.  While this performance compared to the Stationary RoM appears 
significantly impacted, comparing the Hubenko performance to the respective Cluster 
performance demonstrates an improvement in re-keying performance.  The true 
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performance increase is masked by the Cluster architecture saturating under the given 
scenario parameters. 
4.3 Performance Conclusions 
Reducing the number of total keys distributed in each architecture to increase 
scalability was one focus for this research, while minimizing the re-keying impact (and 
hence increasing efficiency) for the individual terrestrial user was another. 
4.3.1 Re-Keying Performance Results 
First and foremost, regardless of the scenario, the Hubenko Architecture always 
performed better than either the Cluster or the Baseline architectures.  Table 12 
summarizes the average re-keying counts of the individual users in the different 
scenarios.  The data is from the iteration of each scenario with the maximum number of 
users simulated. 
Table 12 - Per-User Average Re-Keying Summary 
All
Users
Control 
Group All Users
Control 
Group All Users
Control 
Group
Short 55 89 63 102 230 382
Long 68 90 190 216 738 841
Short 574 884 2,609 4,382 2,689 4,541
Long 1,058 900 8,736 9,956 8,757 9,997
1% 244 259 4,206 4,248 4,921 4,994
3% 254 259 4,818 4,876 4,926 4,999
5% 264 260 4,859 4,921 4,924 4,997
7% 274 260 4,883 4,949 4,925 4,998
10% 288 259 4,897 4,964 4,927 4,999
15% 309 257 4,906 4,976 4,926 4,999
85% Long 10,000 5,000
Baseline
50%
1% 1,000 1,000
50% 10,000 10,000
Control
Group
Size
Rate
of
Mobility Duration
Max #
Users
Time
Steps
Hubenko Cluster
 
For the first scenario with 1% RoM, there is an extremely low overall mobility.  
In the Short duration iterations, All Users averaged less individual re-keying than the 
Control Group because the non-control group was active for a relatively short time, and 
therefore only re-keyed a few times.  Only active users re-key.  The Control Group, on 
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the other hand, was always active and so gathered many more keys.  Averaging the two 
groups together lowered the overall average number.  There was very little change in the 
Long duration iterations since there was very little movement overall. 
In the 50% RoM scenario, the Short duration again produced a lower average re-
keying for All Users compared to the Control Group in the Hubenko Architecture for 
similar reasons to the 1% RoM scenario.  However, the Long duration had significantly 
more movement for a longer period of time.  Therefore, more keys were distributed, on 
average, to All Users as compared to the Control Group.  This occurred because each 
individual mobile user would acquire a new key upon entry to a cluster (due to 
movement, not a new Join), whereas the Control Group was stationary and did not gain 
any more keys other than those which were assigned to the clusters as a whole (for a Join 
or a Leave).  The mobile users in the same clusters also receive a new key as well, and 
therefore the net sum for that case is the same between the two groups.  Comparing the 
Long to the Short durations for the 50% RoM, the All Users average doubles while the 
Control Group remains effectively the same.  The difference between the two All Users 
statistics is due to the increased individual movement.  The difference between the two 
Control Group statistics is due to the random distribution of Join and Leave times.  The 
number of time steps (i.e., 10,000) gives sufficient range for the users to individually join 
and leave at different time steps.  The difference of sixteen keys falls within the 
confidence interval bounds at a 95% confidence level, and therefore the two results are 
not different. 
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In the Increasing Aircraft scenario with the 85% Control Group size, extrapolating 
the results gives the crossover point to be about 4% Rate of Mobility for the Control 
Group and the All Users averages to be even, despite the 15/85 split in user population 
size.  With more than 4% RoM, however, the All Users average is larger than the Control 
Group average due to the extra keys generated by the moving users.  Compared to the 
other scenarios, similar trends are observed as the overall RoM increases:  the Control 
Group averages remain statistically equivalent between RoM, and the All User average 
increases as the RoM increases. 
In all scenarios, the Hubenko Control Group average re-keying count was 
virtually unaffected by increasing Rates of Mobility, which was the research goal of the 
Hubenko Architecture.  In contrast, the Control Group averages doubled for both the 
Cluster and the Baseline architectures in the Short/Long scenarios.  The number would 
have been larger for the Cluster and the Baseline counts had those systems not saturated. 
Using the same scenarios as above, Table 13 summarizes the Total Keys 
Distributed for the three architectures.  The first observation to note is that, unlike the 
averages in Table 12, the All Users entries are always higher than the corresponding 
Control Group entries.  This is expected since the All Users value includes the key count 
for the Control Group.  The difference between the All Users value and the Control 
Group value is the number of keys distributed to the mobile users in each of the 
simulations. 
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Table 13 - Total Keys Distributed Summary 
All
Users
Control 
Group All Users
Control 
Group All Users
Control 
Group
Short 54,698 44,428 62,980 50,960 230,019 191,000
Long 67,523 44,883 189,988 108,249 737,977 420,500
Short 5,740,023 4,417,780 26,090,714 21,909,020 26,891,443 22,703,333
Long 10,577,002 4,499,922 87,363,595 49,782,164 87,568,289 49,985,000
1% 2,444,874 2,200,596 42,055,851 36,107,938 49,214,102 42,449,000
3% 2,536,541 2,200,724 48,179,126 41,450,189 49,257,760 42,488,667
5% 2,638,523 2,206,712 48,593,570 41,831,655 49,244,917 42,471,667
7% 2,742,361 2,208,028 48,830,033 42,069,857 49,251,433 42,485,833
10% 2,877,280 2,201,124 48,965,305 42,190,781 49,268,474 42,491,500
15% 3,087,913 2,185,256 49,057,807 42,293,289 49,257,078 42,491,500
Control
Group
Size
10,000 10,000
5,00010,000
50%
50%
85% Long
BaselineClusterHubenko
1% 1,000 1,000
Time
Steps
Max #
UsersDuration
Rate
of
Mobility
 
In the 1% RoM scenario, with low mobility and short duration, the Hubenko 
Architecture All Users count has 25% growth over the Control Group count.  Although 
50% of the total users were active at some point during the iteration, they were only 
active for at most 20% of the total available number of Time Steps.  This was not long 
enough either to allow the mobile users to generate significant cluster activity, or to 
collect numerous keys as they moved between clusters.  Similarly, the key count for All 
Users in the Long duration does not increase significantly.  While those mobile users 
were active for up to 80% of the total available time, the 1% mobility still limits the 
potential number of keys that could have been generated.  Even with the limited mobility, 
the Hubenko Architecture collected one-third as many keys in the same iteration as the 
Cluster architecture, and one-tenth as many as the Baseline architecture.  Therefore, the 
Hubenko Architecture begins to improve scalability and efficiency even with extremely 
low mobility. 
In the 50% RoM scenario, the Hubenko Architecture’s All Users key count 
experiences a 30% growth over the Control Group key count for the Short Duration 
iteration, and 135% growth for the Long Duration iteration.  Comparing the same 
statistics for the Cluster and Baseline architectures, they both experienced only 18% key 
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growth for the Short Duration, and only 76% key growth for the Long Duration.  The 
reason for the comparatively low percentage increases is that the two systems reached the 
saturation points, as discussed earlier, and therefore the counts ceased to increase.  The 
efficiency and scalability benefits of the Hubenko Architecture are obvious when the total 
counts of the three systems are compared.  The Hubenko Architecture produced four and 
a half times less keys overall for the Short Duration, and eight and a quarter times less 
keys for the Long Duration.  Again, if the model’s data element limitations could be 
lifted, these numbers would have been even better. 
The Hubenko Architecture has modest growth as the RoM steadily increases from 
1% to 15% in the “Increasing Aircraft” scenario.  The growth is strictly due to the mobile 
users moving to new clusters and gathering new keys as they enter each new cluster 
(assuming, of course, the users are properly authorized to do so).  The results are similar 
to the Per User Average Re-keying just discussed.  With the exception of the 1% RoM, 
there is no further increase in total key count in either the Cluster or Baseline architecture 
for the increased RoM due to the saturation of those architectures. 
Though the results were not tabularized, the performance in the “Varied Air 
Content” scenario also demonstrates the superior performance of the Hubenko 
Architecture, this time in an excessively (80%) mobile scenario.  Even in the most mobile 
case simulated in that scenario, the Hubenko Architecture still did not double the amount 
of re-keying, while the Cluster and Baseline architectures saturated with the introduction 
of the Air users. 
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4.3.2 Hubenko Saturation 
In all simulated scenarios, the Hubenko Architecture outperformed the Baseline 
and the Cluster architectures with fewer re-keys individually and at the system level.  By 
observing the trend of increased re-keying with increasing numbers of users, one can 
predict that the Hubenko Architecture too will eventually saturate.  Due to the two billion 
data element limit of MatLab, however, it was not possible to simulate a scenario with 
any appreciable length of time where the Hubenko Architecture saturates.  This was 
because of the need for very large numbers of users (e.g., in the “Varied Air Content” 
scenario, beyond 50,000 users).  At that point, though, there would no longer be any 
benefit to implementing either a Hubenko or a Clustered architecture.  Therefore, in the 
case of an excessively saturated system, the simplest solution becomes the most efficient: 
re-key the entire system simultaneously on a pre-determined scheduled that meets the 
required security level.  For any system loading less than this, however, the Hubenko 
Architecture is the superior choice for systems with highly mobile users. 
4.3.3 RoM Sensitivity 
From the validation simulation (Section 3.11) where all users were set to 
Stationary, and the 0% RoM iteration set in the Varied Air Content RoM scenario 
(Section 4.2.4), it is clear that without movement, the Hubenko Architecture provides no 
re-keying performance increase over the Cluster architecture.  With the introduction of 
mobility come the scalability and efficiency benefits provided by the Hubenko 
Architecture. 
 147 
In the Short versus Long Duration scenario with 1% RoM (Section 4.2.2), the 
Short Duration iteration set demonstrated statistically insignificant differences in the 
Cluster and Hubenko performances.  This was due to the Short Duration parameter not 
allowing the mobile users to move between clusters often enough to impact the re-keying 
results.  Keeping the RoM at 1% while increasing the Duration to Long yielded 
approximately a half order of magnitude performance increase for the Hubenko 
Architecture.  Movement was not the only factor to influence the performance of the 
Hubenko Architecture.  Increasing the length of time that users were active increased the 
amount of overall movement throughout the simulation led to the observation of the 
increased re-keying performance in the Hubenko Architecture.  Therefore, overall 
movement is the main contributor to being able to discern the benefits of implementing 
the Hubenko Architecture. 
The results of the other scenarios corroborate this conclusion.  In all simulated 
scenarios, the more movement that occurred during the simulation, the better the 
Hubenko Architecture performed compared to the Baseline and Cluster architectures.  
The increase in movement could come from either an increase in the RoM (more users 
moving throughout the simulation period), or an increase in the length of time the moving 
users are allowed to move about, or the overall relative speeds at which the mobile users 
are allowed to move.  Consider the case shown in Figure 54.  Iterations 101 through 200 
have 50% Stationary/50% Ground users, and iterations 201 through 300 having one third 
each Stationary, Ground, and Sea users.  While the overall RoM for the sets are 50% and 
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66% respectively, the Cluster architecture did not saturate until the Air category was 
added (Iterations 301 through 400). 
The driver to the above results was the overall “Mobility Content” of the RoM.  
Each time a user moves from one cluster to another is considered one move.  Mobility 
Content is the overall expected average number of collective moves by the mobile users,  
 
4
2
i
i i
TimeSteps AvgDuration NumberUsersMobility Content
Speed=
× ×=∑  (4) 
where i is the Mobility Category, and 2 equals Ground, 3 equals Sea, and 4 equals Air.  
The Stationary users do not contribute to the Mobility Content and therefore are not 
included in this calculation.  The Speed of the user is the number of Time Steps that pass 
between successive moves.  The lower the number, the faster the user is moving.  The 
numbers were selected based on the descriptions of the Mobility Categories and their 
analogous physical world representations. 
The Mobility Content for the final iteration of each RoM set for the Varied Air 
Content Scenario is shown in Table 14.  The Average Duration for the mobile users was 
set at 50% of the Time Steps for all of the Rates of Mobility in this scenario.   
Table 14 - Mobility Content for Varied Air Content Scenario 
Average 
Mobile User 
Duration
50%
Users Time Steps Rate Users Rate Users Speed Rate Users Speed Rate Users Speed
Mobility 
Content
100% 2000 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0
50% 1000 50% 1000 0% 0 0% 0 50000
33% 667 33% 667 33% 667 0% 0 50000
25% 500 25% 500 25% 500 25% 500 137500
20% 400 20% 400 20% 400 40% 800 190000
2000 2000 60% 1200 40% 800 5 160000
Air
Rate of Mobility
Stationary Ground Sea
20002000 20 540
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Note the Mobility Content for the second and third sets (50% and 66% RoM) are 
equal despite the third RoM having 16% more active mobile users.  The reason for the 
equivalent Mobility Content is the Sea users move more slowly, and therefore contribute 
less movement to the overall scenario as compared to the Ground users.  One might then 
expect that the two RoM sets might produce equivalent re-keying statistics.  This is not 
true.  The latter RoM set, with 16% more users, induced approximately 15% more re-
keying due to the additional joins and leaves of the extra users, shown again in Figure 55. 
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Figure 55 - Varied Air Content RoM Scenario Revisited (from 10 to 2000 Users, 
2000 Time Steps) 
Increasing the RoM by 9% with the inclusion of the Air users more than doubled 
the Mobility Content, and caused the Cluster Architecture to saturate while the Hubenko 
Architecture increased by 50% over the Stationary RoM set.  To demonstrate that the 
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main contributor to the Cluster’s saturation was the Air user, this scenario should have 
included a RoM with 40% Air users and the rest Stationary.  The last row in Table 14 is 
the expected Mobility Content.  The Cluster architecture would have saturated due to the 
more than tripling of Mobility Content as compared to the 50% Ground RoM iteration.  
Therefore, the main contributor to the increased re-keying is the Mobility Content of each 
Scenario. 
4.4 Analysis of Variance 
In general, experiments are used to study the performance of processes and 
systems.  Experiments consist of several inputs, of which some variables are controllable, 
and others are not.  These inputs are processed by the system, and a response is observed.  
To increase the fidelity of the system analysis, multiple replications of the same 
experiment can be processed, and the observations recorded and analyzed.  One method 
of analyzing the data is through the Analysis of Variance, or ANOVA.  This allows the 
complexities of the numerous observations to be divided into manageable groups with 
definable impacts on the system. 
There are three main Factors that were controlled throughout the simulations: 
Duration, RoM, and Number of Users.  In the ANOVA analysis that follows, the three 
factors each had three levels of input: Duration (0.2, 0.5, 0.8); RoM (25%, 50%, 75%); 
and Number of Users (200, 600, 1000).  Alone, each Factor may have an effect, or 
Factors may combine through interactions. 
In the following ANOVA tables, the observations are the total keys distributed for 
the Baseline, Cluster, and Hubenko architectures, respectively.  The raw data collected is 
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listed in Table 30.  For the first ANOVA table, the Duration was held constant at 20% of 
the available simulation time, giving the users a short period in which to interact.  With 
the Join Time held at 10% to ensure all users would be active at some point during each 
simulation, having a Duration of 20% means all users will Join and Leave a multicast 
group during the simulation.  Therefore, the Joins and Leaves had more of an impact than 
the amount of movement.  Unfortunately, the amount of re-keying due to Joins and 
Leaves versus the amount of re-keying due to movement was not captured during the 
simulations, so there is no definite proof that this statement is true.  However, observing 
the F-statistics and the P-values the Summary ANOVA table in Table 15, we see that the 
Number of Users in the Baseline architecture is a significant factor, while the RoM and 
the interaction of the RoM and Number of Users are not.  A significant factor at the 95% 
confidence level is one having a P-value less than or equal to 0.05.  For the Hubenko and 
Cluster Architectures, where the systems are less sensitive to motion, both the Number of 
Users and the RoM are significant factors, as well as their interactions. 
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Table 15 - ANOVA with Duration = 0.2 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Number of Users 4.16E+12 2 2.08E+12 318945.839 0.000 3.259
RoM 5.69E+06 2 2.84E+06 0.436 0.650 3.259
Interaction 6.80E+07 4 1.70E+07 2.609 0.052 2.634
Error 2.35E+08 36 6.51E+06
Total 4.16E+12 44
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Number of Users 4.46E+12 2 2.23E+12 35480.347 0.000 3.259
RoM 8.84E+09 2 4.42E+09 70.300 0.000 3.259
Interaction 1.66E+09 4 4.16E+08 6.617 0.000 2.634
Error 2.26E+09 36 6.29E+07
Total 4.48E+12 44
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Number of Users 6.05E+10 2 3.02E+10 14129.994 0.000 3.259
RoM 1.92E+09 2 9.59E+08 448.136 0.000 3.259
Interaction 5.39E+08 4 1.35E+08 62.909 0.000 2.634
Error 7.71E+07 36 2.14E+06
Total 6.30E+10 44
Hubenko
Cluster
Baseline
 
Increasing the Duration to 50% of the available simulation time means that there 
was more time for the users to move about and interact, thus making the RoM more 
significant of a factor in the Baseline Architecture.  However, the interaction between the 
Number of Users and the RoM was not significant in the Baseline and Cluster 
Architectures, as shown in Table 16. 
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Table 16 - ANOVA with Duration = 0.5 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Number of Users 3.57E+12 2 1.79E+12 120246.946 0.000 3.259
RoM 1.91E+08 2 9.56E+07 6.430 0.004 3.259
Interaction 2.04E+08 4 5.11E+07 3.439 0.018 2.634
Error 5.35E+08 36 1.49E+07
Total 3.57E+12 44
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Number of Users 3.67E+12 2 1.84E+12 39613.784 0.000 3.259
RoM 1.35E+10 2 6.73E+09 145.058 0.000 3.259
Interaction 4.59E+08 4 1.15E+08 2.472 0.062 2.634
Error 1.67E+09 36 4.64E+07
Total 3.69E+12 44
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Number of Users 5.71E+10 2 2.86E+10 15831.566 0.000 3.259
RoM 1.24E+09 2 6.19E+08 342.914 0.000 3.259
Interaction 3.46E+08 4 8.65E+07 47.939 0.000 2.634
Error 6.50E+07 36 1.80E+06
Total 5.88E+10 44
Cluster
Hubenko
Baseline
 
Finally, the Duration was increased to 80%, and the Number of Users and the 
RoM were significant factors for all three architectures.  The interactions, however, were 
only significant for the Hubenko Architecture, as shown in Table 17. 
 154 
Table 17 - ANOVA with Duration = 0.8 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Number of Users 3.02E+12 2 1.51E+12 39745.053 0.000 3.259
RoM 3.40E+08 2 1.70E+08 4.468 0.018 3.259
Interaction 2.48E+08 4 6.21E+07 1.632 0.187 2.634
Error 1.37E+09 36 3.80E+07
Total 3.02E+12 44
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Number of Users 3.00E+12 2 1.50E+12 14541.172 0.000 3.259
RoM 2.00E+10 2 1.00E+10 96.948 0.000 3.259
Interaction 1.54E+09 4 3.85E+08 3.729 0.012 2.634
Error 3.71E+09 36 1.03E+08
Total 3.02E+12 44
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Number of Users 5.22E+10 2 2.61E+10 25127.946 0.000 3.259
RoM 8.63E+08 2 4.32E+08 415.784 0.000 3.259
Interaction 2.51E+08 4 6.27E+07 60.399 0.000 2.634
Error 3.74E+07 36 1.04E+06
Total 5.33E+10 44
Hubenko
Baseline
Cluster
 
 
4.5 Summary 
Analysis was performed on four different user scenarios, simulating a wide array 
of potential communications environments.  In all simulated cases, the Hubenko 
Architecture demonstrated superior re-keying efficiency and scalability results over the 
Cluster and Baseline architectures.  As the Mobility Content of the scenarios increased, 
the Hubenko Architecture steadily increased as well, rather than saturating like the 
Cluster and Baseline architectures.  Within the data capacity limitations of the MatLab 
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software operating on a Windows platform, the Hubenko Architecture could not be 
saturated, whereas the Cluster and Baseline architectures readily saturated with moderate 
Mobility Content.  The primary objective of the Hubenko Architecture was achieved, as 
shown by the minimal re-keying impact on the Control Group users when numerous 
rapidly moving users were present in the system. 
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V. Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of Research 
Relatively few research efforts are aimed at securing group communications while 
scaling well to large groups of highly mobile users.  A few of the architectures noted in 
Chapter II contribute pieces to an overall framework for secure group communications in 
a multicast network.  None of the research, though, specifically addressed a LEOsat 
network environment, nor do they completely address the issues facing a global, highly 
mobile user base dependent on a LEO communications satellite system as their best 
means for infrastructure. 
After a rigorous search through the literature to survey the history and determine 
the state-of-the-art of satellite multicasting and secure group communications, this 
research provides an efficient and scalable secure multicasting in the LEO satellite 
network environment by developing the novel “Hubenko Security Framework 
Architecture.” 
This research develops and analyzes the Baseline, Cluster, and Hubenko 
Architectures in multiple mobile communication environment scenarios, and consistently 
demonstrates the superior re-keying advantage offered by the “Hubenko Security 
Framework Architecture.” 
This research was the basis for several publications, as noted in Section 5.3.  
Further, this research has been used in the development of an application of the Hubenko 
Architecture to the unmanned aerial vehicle environment at the Master’s degree level. 
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5.2 Research Contributions 
In today’s highly mobile world of deployed communications, security and 
efficiency are critical requirements that must be met.  Employing a security scheme that 
negatively impacts the user’s network experience is undesirable.  Leveraging multicast 
architectures that provide disparate scalability benefits in non-mobile environments, the 
Hubenko Architecture provides efficient security in a mobile multicast environment using 
a low earth orbit satellite-based infrastructure.  The aforementioned simulations 
demonstrate the Hubenko Architecture’s results in significantly less re-keying for both 
the individual user and the overall system.  Less re-keying means less system overhead 
which corresponds to better network throughput and lower mean delay.  An example of 
the increased efficiency is the 835% reduction of individual re-keying in the Varied Air 
Content scenario.  An example of the increased scalability is the Hubenko Architecture 
operating at 22% capacity with four times the number of users that caused the Cluster 
architecture to saturate. 
This research produced a novel architecture that can be applied to numerous 
group communications environments to reduce the re-keying overhead (increased 
efficiency) and increase the number of supportable users (increased scalability).  
Increased efficiency means smaller devices that are battery-dependent can re-key less 
often, which translates to longer battery life for performing more sensing operations.  
Users in the field connected via low-rate secure links will effectively have more 
bandwidth due to less time wasted on repeatedly transferring new keys.  Larger numbers 
of supportable users means the network can support a larger number of sensors, or 
accommodate an order of magnitude of more users in the same network. 
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5.3 Publications 
The number of refereed publications in international journals and conference 
proceedings demonstrates the novelty of this research.  To date, five papers have been 
published including two journal articles [HuR06a, HuR06b, HuR07a, HuR07b, HuR08].  
Specific titles and publication venues are listed at the end of this chapter. 
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
5.4.1 Adapt Hubenko Security Framework Architecture to Other Environments 
With relatively minor adjustments, the Hubenko Architecture can be applied to 
several other areas of communications, namely unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarms, 
wireless sensor networks (WSN), and mobile ad hoc networks.  Master’s level research is 
currently underway in applying the Hubenko Architecture to a UAV environment, with a 
goal of assessing battery life and communications overhead performance gains. 
Additionally, the Hubenko Architecture could be applied to wireless sensor 
networks in a heterogeneous environment to reduce the amount of re-keying on the WSN 
when mobile units pass through the WSN field.  Another potential application is to use an 
Air Battle Node instead of a LEO satellite network.  This would bring the main 
infrastructure closer to the tactical theater network, reducing propagation delays even 
more. 
5.4.2 Incorporate Features from the Integrated Architecture Concept 
Another area of potential interest for increasing system scalability and efficiency 
makes use of the “integrated architecture” concept from [AmN05].  This concept 
removes some of the security processing burden from the users, as shown in Figure 56.  
By centralizing the key agreement and distribution across the satellite group versus the 
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user group, a further increase in system scalability should be achieved due to less 
processing requirements being placed on the end users.  Incidentally, a corollary benefit 
from implementing the integrated architecture is the potential for bringing the GIG’s 
“Power to the Edge” by allowing the end users to upload heavyweight processing tasks to 
the satellites for computation.  The radio frequency propagation time for the user to send 
data to the LEO system and receive a reply (a single round trip; up once and down once) 
is between 1.33 and 13.33 milliseconds.  This shifts ground-based processing tasks 
performed by deployed tactical users to more capable orbital resources.  This corollary is 
based on the assumption that the next generation LEO satellite system processes and 
downloads large amounts of data more quickly than the tactical ground system and 
independently of satellite handoff delays.  Leveraging the capabilities of the satellite 
infrastructure to perform the “heavy lifting” computations for reduced-capability mobile 
terrestrial users is a potential benefit inherent in the overall system with minimal 
adaptation required. 
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Figure 56 - Integrated Architecture Services Added 
5.4.3 Re-establish Original LEOSat Baseline with Hubenko Architecture 
With the Hubenko Security Framework Architecture complete, a port of the 
MatLab simulations to the OPNET [OPN06] environment for more detailed analysis at 
the packet level would be beneficial.  One could re-investigate the End-to-End, Received-
to-Sent, and Data-to-Overhead ratio performance with a more detailed packet- and 
system-level analysis of the architecture. 
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VI. Appendix 
This section presents the raw data tables and a printout of the MatLab code.  The 
only tables included here are for the three scenarios that had thirty iterations.  Due to their 
large size, each of the tables for the other scenarios, with ninety or more iterations, are 
available in softcopy.  A sample printout of the MatLab code is also attached in this 
section.  Numerous versions of the code were used throughout development.  Within each 
version, the outer loops of the code (illustrated in Figure 24) were modified as needed to 
accommodate the parameter changes for each scenario.  The core architectural portion of 
the code, however, was not modified after verification and validation, and was carried 
through in each version unaltered. 
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6.1 Short versus Long Duration Scenario 1  (Section 4.2.2) 
Table 18 - Total Keys Distributed (All Users, 
Short vs. Long Duration Scenario 1) 
Iteration Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko
1 0.1134 0.0785 0.0446 1,148 221 30 10,131 2,818 662
2 0.1649 0.2358 0.0892 4,482 2,340 164 27,178 9,923 1,842
3 0.0345 0.0932 0.0389 1,582 1,801 136 45,889 19,324 3,485
4 0.0351 0.0553 0.0190 2,268 1,781 107 64,630 32,198 5,650
5 0.0168 0.0287 0.0230 1,370 1,264 185 81,764 43,979 8,040
6 0.0313 0.0364 0.0131 3,069 2,247 150 98,073 61,804 11,506
7 0.0423 0.0707 0.0080 4,870 5,195 118 115,201 73,432 14,743
8 0.0150 0.0366 0.0117 2,012 3,280 221 133,960 89,656 18,834
9 0.0299 0.0261 0.0111 4,523 2,765 254 151,078 105,908 22,916
10 0.0192 0.0321 0.0215 3,304 4,091 610 171,998 127,295 28,313
11 0.0243 0.0287 0.0055 4,564 4,125 183 187,664 143,656 33,331
12 0.0188 0.0208 0.0110 3,877 3,350 427 206,772 160,803 38,712
13 0.0076 0.0377 0.0143 1,691 6,596 630 223,545 175,030 44,099
14 0.0111 0.0283 0.0059 2,734 5,685 306 247,133 200,620 51,572
15 0.0065 0.0188 0.0077 1,687 4,076 443 261,293 216,475 57,767
16 0.1329 0.2125 0.2180 6,632 5,419 688 49,913 25,495 3,156
17 0.0173 0.0446 0.0337 1,974 3,333 215 114,203 74,794 6,389
18 0.0025 0.0355 0.0380 430 4,784 418 171,567 134,790 11,004
19 0.0067 0.0203 0.0224 1,555 4,074 364 230,844 200,323 16,268
20 0.0092 0.0379 0.0459 2,677 9,747 979 290,027 257,069 21,311
21 0.0062 0.0138 0.0469 2,162 4,483 1,345 348,178 324,141 28,688
22 0.0037 0.0122 0.0341 1,521 4,699 1,274 406,813 385,056 37,316
23 0.0006 0.0070 0.0179 270 3,116 765 465,786 442,460 42,654
24 0.0022 0.0015 0.0370 1,168 747 1,807 522,956 497,912 48,760
25 0.0022 0.0040 0.0341 1,309 2,257 2,031 584,313 563,508 59,511
26 0.0008 0.0047 0.0235 486 2,904 1,565 642,065 621,087 66,617
27 0.0022 0.0007 0.0254 1,540 459 1,903 697,785 674,657 74,859
28 0.0025 0.0049 0.0111 1,925 3,599 952 756,834 733,793 86,077
29 0.0039 0.0057 0.0038 3,230 4,519 369 818,866 799,647 96,531
30 0.0004 0.0031 0.0105 366 2,617 1,115 874,995 853,895 106,548
Coeff of Variance Sample Standard Dev Mean
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Table 19 - Total Keys Distributed (Control Group Users, 
Short vs. Long Duration Scenario 1) 
Iteration Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko
1 0.1185 0.0739 0.0520 963 150 14 8,129 2,034 263
2 0.1646 0.2328 0.0381 3,628 1,769 37 22,043 7,599 971
3 0.0394 0.0979 0.0049 1,480 1,489 10 37,600 15,203 2,058
4 0.0389 0.0601 0.0147 2,066 1,539 53 53,111 25,594 3,584
5 0.0281 0.0155 0.0134 1,899 547 72 67,691 35,251 5,386
6 0.0246 0.0304 0.0082 2,000 1,518 65 81,400 49,887 7,887
7 0.0444 0.0718 0.0079 4,252 4,250 82 95,763 59,196 10,391
8 0.0239 0.0364 0.0021 2,674 2,653 29 112,051 72,860 13,662
9 0.0359 0.0317 0.0102 4,543 2,741 172 126,400 86,420 16,919
10 0.0200 0.0325 0.0180 2,884 3,366 376 143,856 103,631 20,872
11 0.0302 0.0387 0.0160 4,733 4,533 398 156,831 117,220 24,872
12 0.0194 0.0232 0.0159 3,355 3,056 465 173,067 131,829 29,266
13 0.0127 0.0373 0.0170 2,385 5,372 574 188,211 144,196 33,715
14 0.0091 0.0261 0.0161 1,887 4,321 637 208,126 165,638 39,614
15 0.0068 0.0251 0.0068 1,500 4,457 301 219,000 177,836 44,388
16 0.1251 0.2180 0.0247 3,363 2,770 7 26,884 12,708 263
17 0.0153 0.0439 0.0031 981 1,736 3 64,030 39,554 927
18 0.0052 0.0327 0.0243 503 2,380 49 97,167 72,692 2,022
19 0.0047 0.0204 0.0089 609 2,208 31 130,473 108,280 3,479
20 0.0047 0.0376 0.0094 771 5,275 52 164,606 140,387 5,559
21 0.0048 0.0181 0.0074 945 3,243 58 197,733 178,941 7,791
22 0.0020 0.0105 0.0055 466 2,249 59 231,602 213,295 10,656
23 0.0020 0.0086 0.0129 534 2,106 175 265,131 245,582 13,601
24 0.0012 0.0038 0.0109 346 1,058 187 298,300 276,737 17,146
25 0.0015 0.0049 0.0224 509 1,534 473 331,779 313,363 21,115
26 0.0025 0.0061 0.0137 924 2,099 343 365,410 346,826 25,052
27 0.0015 0.0032 0.0098 611 1,206 291 397,867 377,165 29,703
28 0.0025 0.0066 0.0150 1,090 2,729 518 431,124 410,427 34,514
29 0.0006 0.0026 0.0147 270 1,160 582 465,755 448,308 39,586
30 0.0006 0.0038 0.0070 289 1,812 315 499,167 479,751 45,032
Coeff of Variance Sample Standard Dev Mean
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Table 20 - Average Per-User Re-Key (All Users, 
Short vs. Long Duration Scenario 1) 
Iteration Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko
1 0.1134 0.0785 0.0446 17.14 3.30 0.44 151 42 10
2 0.1649 0.2358 0.0892 33.45 17.46 1.23 203 74 14
3 0.0345 0.0932 0.0389 7.91 9.00 0.68 229 97 17
4 0.0351 0.0553 0.0190 8.50 6.67 0.40 242 121 21
5 0.0168 0.0287 0.0230 4.10 3.78 0.55 245 132 24
6 0.0313 0.0364 0.0131 7.67 5.62 0.38 245 155 29
7 0.0423 0.0707 0.0080 10.43 11.12 0.25 247 157 32
8 0.0150 0.0366 0.0117 3.77 6.14 0.41 251 168 35
9 0.0299 0.0261 0.0111 7.54 4.61 0.42 252 177 38
10 0.0192 0.0321 0.0215 4.95 6.13 0.91 258 191 42
11 0.0243 0.0287 0.0055 6.22 5.62 0.25 256 196 45
12 0.0188 0.0208 0.0110 4.85 4.19 0.53 258 201 48
13 0.0076 0.0377 0.0143 1.95 7.61 0.73 258 202 51
14 0.0111 0.0283 0.0059 2.93 6.09 0.33 265 215 55
15 0.0065 0.0188 0.0077 1.69 4.08 0.44 261 216 58
16 0.1329 0.2125 0.2180 98.98 80.88 10.27 745 381 47
17 0.0173 0.0446 0.0337 14.73 24.88 1.61 852 558 48
18 0.0025 0.0355 0.0380 2.15 23.92 2.09 858 674 55
19 0.0067 0.0203 0.0224 5.82 15.26 1.36 865 750 61
20 0.0092 0.0379 0.0459 8.02 29.18 2.93 868 770 64
21 0.0062 0.0138 0.0469 5.40 11.21 3.36 870 810 72
22 0.0037 0.0122 0.0341 3.26 10.06 2.73 871 825 80
23 0.0006 0.0070 0.0179 0.51 5.84 1.43 872 829 80
24 0.0022 0.0015 0.0370 1.95 1.25 3.01 872 830 81
25 0.0022 0.0040 0.0341 1.96 3.38 3.04 876 845 89
26 0.0008 0.0047 0.0235 0.66 3.96 2.13 875 846 91
27 0.0022 0.0007 0.0254 1.92 0.57 2.38 872 843 94
28 0.0025 0.0049 0.0111 2.22 4.15 1.10 873 846 99
29 0.0039 0.0057 0.0038 3.46 4.84 0.39 877 856 103
30 0.0004 0.0031 0.0105 0.37 2.62 1.12 875 854 107
Coeff of Variance Sample Standard Dev Mean
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Table 21 - Average Per-User Re-Key (Control Group Users, 
Short vs. Long Duration Scenario 1) 
Iteration Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko
1 0.1185 0.0739 0.0520 28.76 4.49 0.41 243 61 8
2 0.1646 0.2328 0.0381 54.15 26.40 0.55 329 113 14
3 0.0394 0.0979 0.0049 14.80 14.89 0.10 376 152 21
4 0.0389 0.0601 0.0147 15.48 11.53 0.39 398 192 27
5 0.0281 0.0155 0.0134 11.37 3.28 0.43 405 211 32
6 0.0246 0.0304 0.0082 10.00 7.59 0.32 407 249 39
7 0.0444 0.0718 0.0079 18.21 18.20 0.35 410 254 45
8 0.0239 0.0364 0.0021 10.02 9.93 0.11 420 273 51
9 0.0359 0.0317 0.0102 15.14 9.14 0.57 421 288 56
10 0.0200 0.0325 0.0180 8.65 10.09 1.13 431 311 63
11 0.0302 0.0387 0.0160 12.90 12.35 1.08 427 319 68
12 0.0194 0.0232 0.0159 8.39 7.64 1.16 433 330 73
13 0.0127 0.0373 0.0170 5.50 12.39 1.32 434 333 78
14 0.0091 0.0261 0.0161 4.04 9.25 1.36 446 355 85
15 0.0068 0.0251 0.0068 3.00 8.91 0.60 438 356 89
16 0.1251 0.2180 0.0247 100.38 82.69 0.19 803 379 8
17 0.0153 0.0439 0.0031 14.64 25.91 0.04 956 590 14
18 0.0052 0.0327 0.0243 5.03 23.80 0.49 972 727 20
19 0.0047 0.0204 0.0089 4.57 16.54 0.23 977 811 26
20 0.0047 0.0376 0.0094 4.62 31.59 0.31 986 841 33
21 0.0048 0.0181 0.0074 4.73 16.22 0.29 989 895 39
22 0.0020 0.0105 0.0055 2.00 9.63 0.25 992 913 46
23 0.0020 0.0086 0.0129 2.00 7.89 0.66 993 920 51
24 0.0012 0.0038 0.0109 1.15 3.53 0.62 994 922 57
25 0.0015 0.0049 0.0224 1.53 4.60 1.42 995 940 63
26 0.0025 0.0061 0.0137 2.52 5.72 0.93 996 945 68
27 0.0015 0.0032 0.0098 1.53 3.02 0.73 995 943 74
28 0.0025 0.0066 0.0150 2.51 6.30 1.19 995 947 80
29 0.0006 0.0026 0.0147 0.58 2.48 1.25 997 960 85
30 0.0006 0.0038 0.0070 0.58 3.62 0.63 998 960 90
Coeff of Variance Sample Standard Dev Mean
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6.2 Short versus Long Duration Scenario 2  (Section 4.2.2) 
Table 22 - Total Keys Distributed (All Users, 
Short vs. Long Duration Scenario 2) 
Iteration Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko
1 0.0183 0.0433 0.0553 30,387 53,151 3,285 1,661,172 1,226,265 59,351
2 0.0099 0.0131 0.0170 33,605 38,596 2,795 3,410,688 2,935,814 164,514
3 0.0083 0.0076 0.0145 43,726 36,575 4,702 5,294,894 4,783,084 324,829
4 0.0074 0.0099 0.0166 52,041 64,736 8,852 7,008,409 6,513,867 533,315
5 0.0105 0.0107 0.0031 92,975 88,962 2,451 8,851,142 8,327,963 795,164
6 0.0078 0.0047 0.0030 83,311 46,993 3,280 10,637,850 10,072,815 1,084,649
7 0.0039 0.0068 0.0076 48,052 80,884 10,948 12,435,709 11,874,432 1,449,019
8 0.0039 0.0033 0.0027 56,194 45,029 4,847 14,248,129 13,623,667 1,826,417
9 0.0074 0.0078 0.0008 119,049 119,129 1,852 16,059,457 15,311,133 2,271,602
10 0.0057 0.0106 0.0038 101,588 180,271 10,339 17,859,429 17,072,154 2,745,599
11 0.0029 0.0016 0.0059 56,133 31,149 19,133 19,640,751 18,947,681 3,269,541
12 0.0011 0.0018 0.0031 23,675 36,891 11,794 21,493,120 20,755,037 3,838,068
13 0.0024 0.0066 0.0014 56,414 146,353 6,368 23,124,297 22,329,092 4,416,859
14 0.0009 0.0012 0.0014 22,197 29,339 7,127 25,056,137 24,233,676 5,066,143
15 0.0012 0.0020 0.0036 32,866 51,068 20,789 26,891,443 26,090,714 5,740,023
16 0.0010 0.0035 0.0363 5,639 19,454 11,078 5,816,340 5,591,317 304,988
17 0.0047 0.0053 0.0150 54,213 60,802 10,416 11,656,030 11,453,313 692,885
18 0.0008 0.0010 0.0240 13,435 16,705 26,624 17,465,774 17,264,926 1,111,409
19 0.0008 0.0004 0.0113 19,227 8,566 18,212 23,326,603 23,121,042 1,616,300
20 0.0009 0.0016 0.0153 26,182 47,787 33,135 29,184,609 28,974,514 2,163,270
21 0.0024 0.0026 0.0015 84,754 89,706 4,178 34,929,849 34,699,256 2,724,421
22 0.0018 0.0017 0.0117 72,387 70,384 40,301 40,874,192 40,668,990 3,446,372
23 0.0012 0.0010 0.0068 57,003 46,167 28,072 46,662,197 46,458,033 4,146,359
24 0.0005 0.0003 0.0046 27,470 15,474 22,674 52,509,643 52,291,032 4,906,205
25 0.0005 0.0002 0.0027 26,606 12,282 15,822 58,391,091 58,197,611 5,766,391
26 0.0015 0.0016 0.0077 94,048 100,309 50,990 64,226,145 64,020,551 6,622,766
27 0.0002 0.0004 0.0054 13,273 25,565 40,619 69,988,711 69,789,077 7,538,044
28 0.0005 0.0004 0.0058 37,933 29,955 49,615 75,926,247 75,743,459 8,537,221
29 0.0007 0.0008 0.0064 56,403 63,710 61,429 81,712,054 81,499,750 9,532,191
30 0.0009 0.0013 0.0058 82,644 109,593 61,331 87,568,289 87,363,595 10,577,002
Coeff of Variance Sample Standard Dev Mean
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Table 23 - Total Keys Distributed (Control Group Users, 
Short vs. Long Duration Scenario 2) 
Iteration Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko
1 0.0227 0.0423 0.0015 31,317 42,080 34 1,381,395 994,705 22,448
2 0.0066 0.0085 0.0024 19,034 20,533 214 2,866,321 2,424,052 87,917
3 0.0104 0.0085 0.0004 46,458 33,555 87 4,453,667 3,962,800 195,752
4 0.0083 0.0111 0.0039 48,668 60,024 1,358 5,894,526 5,414,396 344,642
5 0.0105 0.0102 0.0023 78,497 70,845 1,237 7,457,047 6,945,763 533,802
6 0.0101 0.0067 0.0023 90,561 56,402 1,724 8,984,667 8,429,919 760,599
7 0.0077 0.0098 0.0016 80,963 97,225 1,643 10,461,950 9,909,673 1,030,454
8 0.0053 0.0040 0.0026 64,027 45,943 3,498 12,047,728 11,431,506 1,329,609
9 0.0075 0.0079 0.0040 102,059 100,824 6,765 13,564,000 12,824,160 1,672,945
10 0.0067 0.0127 0.0029 101,369 181,969 6,021 15,078,492 14,300,051 2,045,510
11 0.0033 0.0014 0.0049 55,046 21,514 12,089 16,569,951 15,883,761 2,448,507
12 0.0015 0.0015 0.0057 28,000 26,725 16,461 18,116,000 17,384,439 2,894,303
13 0.0021 0.0070 0.0007 41,334 130,668 2,375 19,498,500 18,710,533 3,359,104
14 0.0003 0.0016 0.0019 7,129 32,111 7,539 21,181,957 20,365,983 3,884,750
15 0.0014 0.0003 0.0039 32,532 7,275 17,163 22,703,333 21,909,020 4,417,780
16 0.0022 0.0023 0.0055 7,212 7,134 122 3,293,370 3,099,634 22,357
17 0.0022 0.0029 0.0067 14,352 18,680 592 6,629,313 6,439,848 88,379
18 0.0009 0.0004 0.0055 8,622 3,563 1,086 9,967,333 9,775,485 196,101
19 0.0015 0.0001 0.0032 19,787 1,596 1,115 13,295,786 13,097,456 347,714
20 0.0003 0.0010 0.0040 4,812 16,941 2,172 16,652,774 16,447,879 536,905
21 0.0011 0.0018 0.0010 22,716 36,014 745 19,974,000 19,748,673 766,169
22 0.0006 0.0008 0.0021 12,849 19,636 2,219 23,319,113 23,117,654 1,039,744
23 0.0003 0.0005 0.0061 8,148 13,121 8,135 26,623,772 26,423,277 1,341,442
24 0.0002 0.0005 0.0035 6,245 14,333 5,873 29,978,000 29,762,559 1,688,906
25 0.0002 0.0006 0.0038 5,091 20,553 7,798 33,315,557 33,124,632 2,073,335
26 0.0001 0.0002 0.0053 2,117 7,562 13,269 36,654,110 36,450,991 2,483,995
27 0.0003 0.0007 0.0021 10,066 26,456 6,296 39,978,667 39,781,343 2,936,168
28 0.0003 0.0001 0.0008 10,904 5,375 2,737 43,314,112 43,133,423 3,436,971
29 0.0002 0.0004 0.0038 10,778 16,930 15,033 46,654,443 46,444,294 3,936,133
30 0.0000 0.0006 0.0043 0 27,686 19,145 49,985,000 49,782,164 4,499,922
MeanSample Standard DevCoeff of Variance
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Table 24 - Average Per-User Re-Key (All Users, 
Short vs. Long Duration Scenario 2) 
Iteration Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko
1 0.0183 0.0433 0.0553 45.56 79.69 4.93 2,491 1,838 89
2 0.0099 0.0131 0.0170 25.19 28.93 2.10 2,557 2,201 123
3 0.0083 0.0076 0.0145 21.86 18.29 2.35 2,647 2,392 162
4 0.0074 0.0099 0.0166 19.51 24.27 3.32 2,628 2,442 200
5 0.0105 0.0107 0.0031 27.89 26.68 0.74 2,655 2,498 239
6 0.0078 0.0047 0.0030 20.83 11.75 0.82 2,659 2,518 271
7 0.0039 0.0068 0.0076 10.30 17.33 2.35 2,665 2,544 310
8 0.0039 0.0033 0.0027 10.54 8.44 0.91 2,671 2,554 342
9 0.0074 0.0078 0.0008 19.84 19.85 0.31 2,677 2,552 379
10 0.0057 0.0106 0.0038 15.24 27.04 1.55 2,679 2,561 412
11 0.0029 0.0016 0.0059 7.65 4.25 2.61 2,678 2,584 446
12 0.0011 0.0018 0.0031 2.96 4.61 1.47 2,687 2,594 480
13 0.0024 0.0066 0.0014 6.51 16.89 0.73 2,668 2,576 510
14 0.0009 0.0012 0.0014 2.38 3.14 0.76 2,684 2,596 543
15 0.0012 0.0020 0.0036 3.29 5.11 2.08 2,689 2,609 574
16 0.0010 0.0035 0.0363 8.45 29.17 16.61 8,720 8,383 457
17 0.0047 0.0053 0.0150 40.64 45.58 7.81 8,738 8,586 519
18 0.0008 0.0010 0.0240 6.72 8.35 13.31 8,733 8,632 556
19 0.0008 0.0004 0.0113 7.21 3.21 6.83 8,746 8,669 606
20 0.0009 0.0016 0.0153 7.85 14.33 9.94 8,754 8,691 649
21 0.0024 0.0026 0.0015 21.19 22.43 1.04 8,732 8,675 681
22 0.0018 0.0017 0.0117 15.51 15.08 8.64 8,758 8,714 738
23 0.0012 0.0010 0.0068 10.69 8.66 5.26 8,748 8,710 777
24 0.0005 0.0003 0.0046 4.58 2.58 3.78 8,752 8,715 818
25 0.0005 0.0002 0.0027 3.99 1.84 2.37 8,758 8,729 865
26 0.0015 0.0016 0.0077 12.82 13.68 6.95 8,757 8,729 903
27 0.0002 0.0004 0.0054 1.66 3.20 5.08 8,749 8,724 942
28 0.0005 0.0004 0.0058 4.38 3.46 5.72 8,760 8,739 985
29 0.0007 0.0008 0.0064 6.04 6.83 6.58 8,754 8,731 1,021
30 0.0009 0.0013 0.0058 8.26 10.96 6.13 8,757 8,736 1,058
Coeff of Variance Sample Standard Dev Mean
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Table 25 - Average Per-User Re-Key (Control Group Users, 
Short vs. Long Duration Scenario 2) 
Iteration Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko
1 0.0227 0.0423 0.0015 93.90 126.18 0.10 4,142 2,983 67
2 0.0066 0.0085 0.0024 28.54 30.78 0.32 4,297 3,634 132
3 0.0104 0.0085 0.0004 46.46 33.55 0.09 4,454 3,963 196
4 0.0083 0.0111 0.0039 36.50 45.01 1.02 4,420 4,060 258
5 0.0105 0.0102 0.0023 47.09 42.50 0.74 4,473 4,167 320
6 0.0101 0.0067 0.0023 45.28 28.20 0.86 4,492 4,215 380
7 0.0077 0.0098 0.0016 34.70 41.66 0.70 4,483 4,247 442
8 0.0053 0.0040 0.0026 24.01 17.23 1.31 4,517 4,286 499
9 0.0075 0.0079 0.0040 34.02 33.61 2.25 4,521 4,275 558
10 0.0067 0.0127 0.0029 30.41 54.59 1.81 4,523 4,290 614
11 0.0033 0.0014 0.0049 15.01 5.87 3.30 4,519 4,332 668
12 0.0015 0.0015 0.0057 7.00 6.68 4.12 4,529 4,346 724
13 0.0021 0.0070 0.0007 9.54 30.15 0.55 4,499 4,318 775
14 0.0003 0.0016 0.0019 1.53 6.88 1.62 4,539 4,364 832
15 0.0014 0.0003 0.0039 6.51 1.45 3.43 4,541 4,382 884
16 0.0022 0.0023 0.0055 21.62 21.39 0.37 9,875 9,294 67
17 0.0022 0.0029 0.0067 21.52 28.01 0.89 9,939 9,655 133
18 0.0009 0.0004 0.0055 8.62 3.56 1.09 9,967 9,775 196
19 0.0015 0.0001 0.0032 14.84 1.20 0.84 9,971 9,822 261
20 0.0003 0.0010 0.0040 2.89 10.16 1.30 9,990 9,867 322
21 0.0011 0.0018 0.0010 11.36 18.01 0.37 9,987 9,874 383
22 0.0006 0.0008 0.0021 5.51 8.41 0.95 9,993 9,907 446
23 0.0003 0.0005 0.0061 3.06 4.92 3.05 9,983 9,907 503
24 0.0002 0.0005 0.0035 2.08 4.78 1.96 9,993 9,921 563
25 0.0002 0.0006 0.0038 1.53 6.17 2.34 9,994 9,937 622
26 0.0001 0.0002 0.0053 0.58 2.06 3.62 9,996 9,940 677
27 0.0003 0.0007 0.0021 2.52 6.61 1.57 9,995 9,945 734
28 0.0003 0.0001 0.0008 2.52 1.24 0.63 9,995 9,953 793
29 0.0002 0.0004 0.0038 2.31 3.63 3.22 9,997 9,952 843
30 0.0000 0.0006 0.0043 0.00 5.54 3.83 9,997 9,956 900
Coeff of Variance Sample Standard Dev Mean
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6.3 Increasing Aircraft Over Stationary Users Scenario 2  (Section 4.2.3) 
Table 26 - Total Keys Distributed (All Users, 
Increasing Aircraft Over Stationary Users Scenario 2) 
Iteration Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko
1 0.0904 0.0897 0.0023 784,829 274,033 275 8,681,369 3,055,333 117,732
2 0.0407 0.1177 0.0152 772,818 1,173,413 6,646 18,976,685 9,970,518 437,455
3 0.0018 0.0431 0.0025 53,566 800,236 2,317 29,433,570 18,562,466 940,188
4 0.0003 0.0404 0.0044 10,262 1,263,530 7,033 39,320,710 31,313,357 1,608,110
5 0.0007 0.0324 0.0071 34,017 1,361,841 17,303 49,214,102 42,055,851 2,444,874
6 0.0035 0.0569 0.0231 34,400 380,817 3,230 9,770,308 6,687,975 139,861
7 0.0011 0.0251 0.0195 22,200 425,981 9,252 19,609,750 16,984,644 473,900
8 0.0009 0.0075 0.0036 26,589 208,018 3,619 29,520,563 27,701,209 1,006,610
9 0.0002 0.0025 0.0055 9,491 96,303 9,387 39,379,345 38,265,499 1,702,262
10 0.0002 0.0032 0.0012 7,713 154,483 2,920 49,257,760 48,179,126 2,536,541
11 0.0010 0.0202 0.0218 9,728 167,167 3,459 9,761,333 8,293,889 158,682
12 0.0008 0.0025 0.0099 15,507 46,824 5,109 19,659,593 18,822,068 518,121
13 0.0006 0.0011 0.0072 16,456 31,920 7,623 29,535,431 28,846,826 1,060,091
14 0.0002 0.0008 0.0114 5,989 29,226 20,325 39,391,169 38,757,835 1,783,214
15 0.0003 0.0014 0.0025 16,778 68,131 6,575 49,244,917 48,593,570 2,638,523
16 0.0006 0.0314 0.0420 5,667 279,120 7,442 9,788,197 8,876,319 177,390
17 0.0000 0.0052 0.0099 976 99,539 5,534 19,676,719 19,142,139 556,938
18 0.0002 0.0012 0.0082 4,753 35,696 9,177 29,534,553 29,074,184 1,122,987
19 0.0003 0.0002 0.0045 11,313 8,768 8,248 39,395,378 38,967,151 1,839,463
20 0.0004 0.0009 0.0116 17,796 41,728 31,904 49,251,433 48,830,033 2,742,361
21 0.0009 0.0025 0.0096 8,935 23,533 2,026 9,822,170 9,404,468 211,796
22 0.0001 0.0026 0.0066 1,976 49,842 4,105 19,688,321 19,352,214 622,009
23 0.0002 0.0008 0.0035 5,392 22,836 4,155 29,553,302 29,207,472 1,201,793
24 0.0004 0.0002 0.0024 13,963 8,793 4,646 39,393,821 39,096,376 1,969,192
25 0.0001 0.0012 0.0047 7,355 60,835 13,404 49,268,474 48,965,305 2,877,280
26 0.0011 0.0036 0.0213 11,052 34,605 5,545 9,831,126 9,575,730 259,776
27 0.0005 0.0009 0.0055 10,650 18,365 3,900 19,682,966 19,467,606 709,542
28 0.0000 0.0002 0.0102 1,191 6,918 13,743 29,545,568 29,301,262 1,349,402
29 0.0003 0.0007 0.0084 12,390 26,241 18,085 39,409,317 39,218,908 2,145,057
30 0.0001 0.0006 0.0040 5,036 28,360 12,442 49,257,078 49,057,807 3,087,913
Coeff of Variance Sample Standard Dev Mean
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Table 27 - Total Keys Distributed (Control Group Users, 
Increasing Aircraft Over Stationary Users Scenario 2) 
Iteration Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko
1 0.0904 0.0901 0.0126 674,779 235,371 1,256 7,465,833 2,613,564 99,820
2 0.0402 0.1173 0.0106 657,918 1,001,880 4,076 16,348,333 8,542,335 385,210
3 0.0017 0.0428 0.0039 42,466 681,868 3,254 25,375,900 15,916,084 841,788
4 0.0002 0.0403 0.0027 6,800 1,083,386 3,878 33,904,800 26,874,601 1,440,893
5 0.0007 0.0326 0.0060 29,445 1,176,173 13,210 42,449,000 36,107,938 2,200,596
6 0.0038 0.0570 0.0125 32,300 326,376 1,244 8,418,400 5,728,202 99,719
7 0.0014 0.0254 0.0130 24,122 369,534 5,050 16,903,667 14,565,260 387,465
8 0.0010 0.0079 0.0068 25,669 188,972 5,765 25,460,900 23,789,119 848,794
9 0.0002 0.0028 0.0055 6,800 90,976 7,965 33,959,200 32,900,293 1,455,898
10 0.0001 0.0035 0.0029 4,907 143,850 6,306 42,488,667 41,450,189 2,200,724
11 0.0011 0.0202 0.0102 8,833 143,706 1,021 8,409,900 7,102,288 100,134
12 0.0007 0.0025 0.0035 11,940 39,913 1,337 16,951,267 16,165,912 384,375
13 0.0006 0.0011 0.0017 15,581 27,851 1,419 25,471,100 24,805,061 838,692
14 0.0001 0.0009 0.0061 3,926 28,921 8,929 33,975,067 33,354,936 1,457,823
15 0.0001 0.0015 0.0028 4,907 62,574 6,271 42,471,667 41,831,655 2,206,712
16 0.0011 0.0325 0.0028 8,996 247,237 277 8,437,100 7,610,948 100,467
17 0.0003 0.0055 0.0020 5,194 89,699 763 16,971,667 16,457,992 389,310
18 0.0002 0.0013 0.0043 5,100 33,277 3,668 25,474,500 25,023,431 847,141
19 0.0003 0.0002 0.0058 10,387 8,326 8,332 33,984,133 33,562,246 1,443,860
20 0.0001 0.0011 0.0111 4,907 46,662 24,403 42,485,833 42,069,857 2,208,028
21 0.0010 0.0027 0.0065 8,500 21,593 649 8,467,700 8,074,409 100,624
22 0.0002 0.0030 0.0129 3,926 49,773 4,970 16,985,267 16,655,744 386,205
23 0.0002 0.0010 0.0035 5,100 25,709 2,977 25,489,800 25,148,962 845,165
24 0.0003 0.0002 0.0087 10,387 5,070 12,642 33,984,133 33,689,599 1,445,425
25 0.0000 0.0013 0.0037 0 54,912 8,253 42,491,500 42,190,781 2,201,124
26 0.0009 0.0037 0.0013 7,852 30,083 132 8,475,633 8,228,259 100,677
27 0.0005 0.0011 0.0058 8,996 18,061 2,244 16,976,200 16,763,702 384,039
28 0.0001 0.0002 0.0046 2,944 4,016 3,852 25,486,400 25,244,285 840,838
29 0.0002 0.0006 0.0026 7,852 20,685 3,715 33,988,667 33,799,540 1,443,188
30 0.0000 0.0005 0.0027 0 23,186 5,843 42,491,500 42,293,289 2,185,256
Coeff of Variance Sample Standard Dev Mean
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Table 28 - Average Per-User Re-Key (All Users, 
Increasing Aircraft Over Stationary Users Scenario 2) 
Iteration Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko
1 0.0904 0.0897 0.0023 392.41 137.02 0.14 4,341 1,528 59
2 0.0407 0.1177 0.0152 193.20 293.35 1.66 4,744 2,493 109
3 0.0018 0.0431 0.0025 8.93 133.37 0.39 4,906 3,094 157
4 0.0003 0.0404 0.0044 1.28 157.94 0.88 4,915 3,914 201
5 0.0007 0.0324 0.0071 3.40 136.18 1.73 4,921 4,206 244
6 0.0035 0.0569 0.0231 17.20 190.41 1.62 4,885 3,344 70
7 0.0011 0.0251 0.0195 5.55 106.50 2.31 4,902 4,246 118
8 0.0009 0.0075 0.0036 4.43 34.67 0.60 4,920 4,617 168
9 0.0002 0.0025 0.0055 1.19 12.04 1.17 4,922 4,783 213
10 0.0002 0.0032 0.0012 0.77 15.45 0.29 4,926 4,818 254
11 0.0010 0.0202 0.0218 4.86 83.58 1.73 4,881 4,147 79
12 0.0008 0.0025 0.0099 3.88 11.71 1.28 4,915 4,706 130
13 0.0006 0.0011 0.0072 2.74 5.32 1.27 4,923 4,808 177
14 0.0002 0.0008 0.0114 0.75 3.65 2.54 4,924 4,845 223
15 0.0003 0.0014 0.0025 1.68 6.81 0.66 4,924 4,859 264
16 0.0006 0.0314 0.0420 2.83 139.56 3.72 4,894 4,438 89
17 0.0000 0.0052 0.0099 0.24 24.88 1.38 4,919 4,786 139
18 0.0002 0.0012 0.0082 0.79 5.95 1.53 4,922 4,846 187
19 0.0003 0.0002 0.0045 1.41 1.10 1.03 4,924 4,871 230
20 0.0004 0.0009 0.0116 1.78 4.17 3.19 4,925 4,883 274
21 0.0009 0.0025 0.0096 4.47 11.77 1.01 4,911 4,702 106
22 0.0001 0.0026 0.0066 0.49 12.46 1.03 4,922 4,838 156
23 0.0002 0.0008 0.0035 0.90 3.81 0.69 4,926 4,868 200
24 0.0004 0.0002 0.0024 1.75 1.10 0.58 4,924 4,887 246
25 0.0001 0.0012 0.0047 0.74 6.08 1.34 4,927 4,897 288
26 0.0011 0.0036 0.0213 5.53 17.30 2.77 4,916 4,788 130
27 0.0005 0.0009 0.0055 2.66 4.59 0.98 4,921 4,867 177
28 0.0000 0.0002 0.0102 0.20 1.15 2.29 4,924 4,884 225
29 0.0003 0.0007 0.0084 1.55 3.28 2.26 4,926 4,902 268
30 0.0001 0.0006 0.0040 0.50 2.84 1.24 4,926 4,906 309
Coeff of Variance Sample Standard Dev Mean
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Table 29 - Average Per-User Re-Key (Control Group Users, 
Increasing Aircraft Over Stationary Users Scenario 2) 
Iteration Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko Baseline Cluster Hubenko
1 0.0904 0.0901 0.0126 396.93 138.45 0.74 4,392 1,537 59
2 0.0402 0.1173 0.0106 193.51 294.67 1.20 4,808 2,512 113
3 0.0017 0.0428 0.0039 8.33 133.70 0.64 4,976 3,121 165
4 0.0002 0.0403 0.0027 1.00 159.32 0.57 4,986 3,952 212
5 0.0007 0.0326 0.0060 3.46 138.37 1.55 4,994 4,248 259
6 0.0038 0.0570 0.0125 19.00 191.99 0.73 4,952 3,370 59
7 0.0014 0.0254 0.0130 7.09 108.69 1.49 4,972 4,284 114
8 0.0010 0.0079 0.0068 5.03 37.05 1.13 4,992 4,665 166
9 0.0002 0.0028 0.0055 1.00 13.38 1.17 4,994 4,838 214
10 0.0001 0.0035 0.0029 0.58 16.92 0.74 4,999 4,876 259
11 0.0011 0.0202 0.0102 5.20 84.53 0.60 4,947 4,178 59
12 0.0007 0.0025 0.0035 3.51 11.74 0.39 4,986 4,755 113
13 0.0006 0.0011 0.0017 3.06 5.46 0.28 4,994 4,864 164
14 0.0001 0.0009 0.0061 0.58 4.25 1.31 4,996 4,905 214
15 0.0001 0.0015 0.0028 0.58 7.36 0.74 4,997 4,921 260
16 0.0011 0.0325 0.0028 5.29 145.43 0.16 4,963 4,477 59
17 0.0003 0.0055 0.0020 1.53 26.38 0.22 4,992 4,841 115
18 0.0002 0.0013 0.0043 1.00 6.52 0.72 4,995 4,907 166
19 0.0003 0.0002 0.0058 1.53 1.22 1.23 4,998 4,936 212
20 0.0001 0.0011 0.0111 0.58 5.49 2.87 4,998 4,949 260
21 0.0010 0.0027 0.0065 5.00 12.70 0.38 4,981 4,750 59
22 0.0002 0.0030 0.0129 1.15 14.64 1.46 4,996 4,899 114
23 0.0002 0.0010 0.0035 1.00 5.04 0.58 4,998 4,931 166
24 0.0003 0.0002 0.0087 1.53 0.75 1.86 4,998 4,954 213
25 0.0000 0.0013 0.0037 0.00 6.46 0.97 4,999 4,964 259
26 0.0009 0.0037 0.0013 4.62 17.70 0.08 4,986 4,840 59
27 0.0005 0.0011 0.0058 2.65 5.31 0.66 4,993 4,931 113
28 0.0001 0.0002 0.0046 0.58 0.79 0.76 4,997 4,950 165
29 0.0002 0.0006 0.0026 1.15 3.04 0.55 4,998 4,971 212
30 0.0000 0.0005 0.0027 0.00 2.73 0.69 4,999 4,976 257
Coeff of Variance Sample Standard Dev Mean
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6.4 Analysis of Variance Data 
Table 30 - Data in Raw Format for use in ANOVA 
HubenkoKeys 0.25 0.5 0.75 ClusterKeys 0.25 0.5 0.75 BaselineKeys 0.25 0.5 0.75
1000 78705 96077 96539 1000 678480 727819 751231 1000 780039 771508 784647
80187 93370 96289 694094 740147 749768 774599 779642 785121
82611 95486 99117 715227 745256 759803 786635 780241 786688
82798 95729 96551 717437 749569 750438 786870 785123 790336
80328 95047 95869 703392 746920 741463 786768 783815 777905
200 6409 9495 10867 200 76347 112138 123405 200 138653 151657 158605
5983 8350 9922 76190 102476 115171 150363 151019 154580
6890 9407 8970 88997 107686 104683 144765 155989 143972
6643 9351 8382 86878 111108 104525 147129 152841 152870
5802 8601 9691 65519 98375 112416 124882 140072 149441
600 32936 43346 43080 600 348562 430105 425057 600 450133 466361 462598
33518 42874 42817 372809 418082 421233 465622 462892 465291
33539 44514 44686 374467 438655 430816 464372 474679 469654
32935 44100 42714 354295 429474 418483 450464 466626 461737
34963 42289 43076 390184 426299 431277 463910 465025 468947
HubenkoKeys 0.25 0.5 0.75 ClusterKeys 0.25 0.5 0.75 BaselineKeys 0.25 0.5 0.75
1000 86396 102936 103496 1000 804281 832975 831874 1000 852191 859060 854526
83452 102418 104980 803760 825468 819547 856372 850410 848034
83300 103212 101494 806027 838547 826800 855043 859267 853373
83967 101947 102635 798536 834741 831642 852950 856949 854613
82946 103504 98948 793114 824300 823272 855147 851912 849878
200 7002 11431 11052 200 97543 135558 138206 200 159692 167489 170433
6168 11735 9050 81536 140216 118701 152752 170230 161093
7426 11118 11757 99265 135499 135425 164819 165724 165422
6699 11307 11572 83309 135302 134502 147497 167374 167217
7132 12049 10464 97895 131714 130681 160683 167690 167498
600 37593 48308 47614 600 459543 480248 485931 600 513106 504398 513162
37314 47585 47160 436552 482656 480814 502764 511364 510648
36669 47932 46620 437864 489190 483317 509750 515704 509550
35508 46129 46962 433769 489641 487819 510790 516069 514236
37656 44985 51763 454465 478111 491065 506198 510161 510793
HubenkoKeys 0.25 0.5 0.75 ClusterKeys 0.25 0.5 0.75 BaselineKeys 0.25 0.5 0.75
1000 87451 105485 105656 1000 900834 907866 915652 1000 927558 923079 928342
84191 108622 108244 902430 915710 912431 928957 926334 925213
82594 109975 107839 898208 912661 914815 929441 925012 926635
86055 109757 105374 897640 914624 916090 927184 926510 928024
83551 108729 106264 894082 915006 915966 925934 927601 928174
200 7620 11906 11502 200 116975 151883 151606 200 181335 182648 183438
6343 13656 11606 83983 160799 153013 168162 183902 185226
7671 13220 13412 114657 157223 153972 185090 185144 184077
8243 13467 10438 123471 160494 144516 183311 185474 183871
6364 10171 13341 93729 138507 159756 180862 182688 183080
600 40656 52254 53048 600 527847 542282 544162 600 558364 555703 556938
36294 52303 52093 500028 543180 539710 557349 557388 555623
40153 50335 52523 522066 538361 537698 556304 555800 553446
38156 51677 55220 516321 542177 546951 557758 556073 557402
38079 52637 51474 507080 543549 540104 554970 556329 556133
DURATION = 0.8
DURATION = 0.5
DURATION = 0.2
 
6.5 MatLab Code from Increasing Aircraft Over Stationary Users Scenario 2  
(Section 4.2.3) 
% Maj Victor Hubenko 
clear; clc; 
tic 
RunVersion = 'CI 6sets 10kU 5kTS SS3 2007 06 11 WS'; 
VersionName = strrep(RunVersion, ' ', ''); 
TimeStamp=num2str(datestr(now)); 
 
warning off MATLAB:xlswrite:AddSheet 
 
%  EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS  
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ControlGroupSize=0.85;  %sets the control group size.  0.5 = 50% of the users  
                       %are stationary and being counted for the impacts 
MaxNumUsers=10000;  %Maximum possible number of users for final iterations 
numTimeSteps=5000; 
 
numSets=6;  % Number of sets.  e.g. use '2' for Short and Long, or '6' for the Milcom 
Increase AC experiment 
            % NOTE:  If more than 2, need to modify 'MobilityFactor' 
numDataPoints=5;  % Number of Data Points within each Set 
numIterations=numSets*numDataPoints;  %NOTE:  Must be EVEN!! 
 
%Now can plot with different markers at each data point 
numSats=1; 
numClusters=10; 
numMoving=4; 
numWait=5;  %the Lower the number, the more frequent the cluster changing 
numSpeed=8; % Difference in speed between Mobililty 2/3 vs Mobility 4 
            % NOTE:  numWait*numSpeed must be even! 
 
DurationFactor=0.1;  % The higher the number, the longer the "Short" duration, and the 
shorter the "Long" duration 
%JoinFactor=0.3;  % The lower the number, the more users join earlier 
 
MobilityProfile=[0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.1 0.15];  % This gives mobility profiles for all 
experiment sets 
                 
%MobilityProfile=[0.01 .1 .25 .75];  % This gives the mobility profiles for sets 
                % of experiments, 1, 10, 25 and 75% total mobility 
 
IterationsAxis=zeros(numIterations,1, 'uint16');%5June zeros(numIterations,1, 'uint16'); 
JoinTimeSetter=0.1;  % This has everyone join within the first 10% of the simulation 
 
% STATISTICS: 
SampleSize= 3; %number of times to run each complete set.  Also number of samples of data 
for each identical run 
sqrtofn=sqrt(SampleSize); 
% df -->      1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10      11      12      13      14      15      16      17      18      19      20      
21   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   29   30 
alpha05=      [6.314 2.92 2.353 2.132 2.015 1.943 1.895 1.86 1.833 1.812
 1.796 1.782 1.771 1.761 1.753 1.746 1.74 1.734 1.729 1.725 1.721
 1.717 1.714 1.711 1.708 1.706 1.703 1.701 1.699 1.697]; 
alpha025=    [12.706 4.303 3.182 2.776 2.571 2.447 2.365 2.306 2.262 2.228
 2.201 2.179 2.16 2.145 2.131 2.12 2.11 2.101 2.093 2.086 2.08
 2.074 2.069 2.064 2.06 2.056 2.052 2.048 2.045 2.042]; 
% use alpha05 for 90% CI, alpha025 for 95% CI 
tAlphaHalf= alpha025(SampleSize-1); %Value of t Alpha over 2 per table 
 
%FirstStep=numSats*numClusters; %5June 
%LastStep=FirstStep*numIterations; %5June           
 
%   numIterSteps=1;  %number of steps to test the join factor  (.1, .2, .3, etc) 
 
%  numIterations=ceil(numIterSteps*numIterFactor*2/numDataPoints);  % number of times to 
run this analysis experiment 
                % This ensures divisible by 4 for creation of JoinFactor, 
                % and must be even for MobilityFactor.  The *2 is to allow 
                % the MobilityFactor to repeat after half of the iterations 
 
 
% CONSTANTS 
numArchitectures=3;  % Baseline, Clustered, Hubenko 
 
MobilityBins=[1 2 3 4];  % 1=Stationary, 2=Ground, 3=Sea, 4=Air 
MobilityHistPlot=zeros(numIterations,4); 
AvgKeySummaryPlot1=zeros(numIterations,4);  % Average Re-keys per Mobility Type for 
Baseline 
AvgKeySummaryPlot2=zeros(numIterations,4);  % Average Re-keys per Mobility Type for 
Cluster 
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AvgKeySummaryPlot3=zeros(numIterations,4);  % Average Re-keys per Mobility Type for 
Hubenko 
 
TotalKeysDistribCount=zeros(numIterations,numArchitectures,SampleSize); 
% Total Number of keys distributed in a MCast Group for the simulation 
% period.  Single dimension array, running tally. Count all of the new keys 
% that are distributed to all users, satellites each time a new key is 
% distributed for the MCast Group. 1=baseline, 2=clusters, 3=Hubenko 
 
TotalHalfKeysDistribCount=zeros(numIterations,numArchitectures,SampleSize); 
% Total Number of keys distributed for the Stationary "control group" users 
 
DensityVsRekeys=zeros(numIterations,numArchitectures,SampleSize); 
DensityVsHalfRekeys=zeros(numIterations,numArchitectures,SampleSize); 
 
%  [+ B - + C - + H - ...] Where B, C, H are the means for the SampleSize, 
%  + is the Top of the confidence interval, - is the Bottom of the 
%  Confidence Interval 
TotalKeysDistribCountPlot=zeros(numIterations,3*numArchitectures); 
TotalHalfKeysDistribCountPlot=zeros(numIterations,3*numArchitectures); 
DensityVsRekeysPlot=zeros(numIterations,3*numArchitectures); 
DensityVsHalfRekeysPlot=zeros(numIterations,3*numArchitectures); 
 
%xMeanArray is the mean array for each of the above arrays 
TKDMeanArray=zeros(numIterations,numArchitectures); 
THKDMeanArray=zeros(numIterations,numArchitectures); 
DVRMeanArray=zeros(numIterations,numArchitectures); 
DVHRMeanArray=zeros(numIterations,numArchitectures); 
 
% xSampleSDArray is the sample standard deviation array for each of the above arrays 
TKDSampleSDArray=zeros(numIterations,numArchitectures); 
THKDSampleSDArray=zeros(numIterations,numArchitectures); 
DVRSampleSDArray=zeros(numIterations,numArchitectures); 
DVHRSampleSDArray=zeros(numIterations,numArchitectures); 
 
% % The Coefficient of Variation (C.O.V.) [Jai91], is the ratio of standard 
% deviation to sample mean: xSampleSDArray/xMeanArray. 
COVTKD=zeros(numIterations,numArchitectures); 
COVTHKD=zeros(numIterations,numArchitectures); 
COVDVR=zeros(numIterations,numArchitectures); 
COVDVHR=zeros(numIterations,numArchitectures); 
 
FigNum=0; 
index = datestr(clock); 
index = strrep(index, ' ', '-'); 
index = strrep(index, ':', '-'); 
 
% %  Return RAND to its default initial state to allow for repeatability 
% rand('state',0);  
 
%  Initialize RAND to a different state each time. 
rand('state',sum(100*clock)) 
 
for IterAxisMaker=1:numIterations 
    IterationsAxis(IterAxisMaker,1)=IterAxisMaker; 
end 
 
MobilityFactor=zeros(numIterations,1); 
MFactorCount=1; 
for MobilityMaker=1:numIterations  %(numIterations/2) 
    MobilityFactor(MobilityMaker,1)=MobilityProfile(MFactorCount); 
    if mod(MobilityMaker,numDataPoints)==0 
        MFactorCount=MFactorCount+1; 
    end 
end 
% JoinFactor=zeros(numIterations,1); 
% multiplier=0.1; 
% for JoinMaker=1:numIterations 
%     JoinFactor(JoinMaker,1)=multiplier; 
%     if mod(JoinMaker,numDataPoints)==0 
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%         multiplier=multiplier+0.1; 
%     end 
% end 
%  Note:  FirstStep=numSats*numClusters;  LastStep=FirstStep*numIterations; 
for h=1:numIterations     %FirstStep:hStepSize:LastStep 
 
%    ModTest1=h/FirstStep; 
    ModTest2=mod(h,numDataPoints); 
    if ModTest2==0 
        IterRep=numDataPoints; 
    else IterRep=ModTest2; 
    end 
 
%    numUsers=h; 
numUsers=ceil(IterRep*MaxNumUsers/numDataPoints) 
                            % Rate of Mobility is held for numDataPoints times 
 
for g=1:SampleSize % Start Loop for run repetition for Statistics calculations 
    pause(0); 
ClusterActivity=zeros((numSats*numClusters)+1,numTimeSteps, 'uint16'); 
%ClusterActivity=zeros((numSats*numClusters)+1,numMCGroups,numTimeSteps, 'uint16'); 
% Tracks when a user joins or leaves a specific Cluster within a Multicast 
% Group.  As a user joins or leaves, increment/decrement as appropriate. 
% The last element {(numSats*numClusters)+1} in each set is the 
% total count of Active Users in that MCGroup across all satellites and 
% clusters.   
 
ClusterTriggers=zeros((numSats*numClusters)+1,numTimeSteps, 'uint8'); 
%ClusterTriggers=zeros((numSats*numClusters)+1,numMCGroups,numTimeSteps, 'uint8'); 
% Tracks when a cluster needs to be rekeyed.  When a new user first joins 
% or leaves the system, the corresponding cluster element is set to 1.  If 
% a registered mobile user enters or leaves the cluster, the cluster 
% element is set to 2.  The last 
% element {(numSats*numClusters)+1} in each set is the "MCGroup Rekey 
% Trigger Flag," which is set to the max of that MCGroup (0, 1, or 2).  0 
% means no joins, leaves, or mobile users entering/exiting; 1 means a user 
% registered or deregistered from the system; 2 means a mobile user entered 
% or left the cluster. 
 
% Initialize Users 
UserMoverPercent=0; 
MFcalc=MobilityFactor(h); 
 
%Initialize User Structure 
User=repmat(struct('Satellite',int8(0),'Cluster',int8(0),... 
    'TimesRekeyed1',0,'TimesRekeyed2',0,'TimesRekeyed3',0,'JoinTime',int16(0),... 
    
'Duration',int16(0),'Mobility',int8(0),'Waiting',int8(0),'Active',zeros(numTimeSteps,1, 
'uint8')),1,numUsers); 
for i=1:numUsers 
    pause(0); 
    User(i).Satellite = ceil(rand*numSats); 
    User(i).Cluster = ceil(rand*numClusters); 
% The following were initialized in the repmat(struct) statement 
%     User(i).TimesRekeyed1 = 0;  % Baseline System Rekey Count 
%     User(i).TimesRekeyed2 = 0;  % Cluster System Rekey Count 
%     User(i).TimesRekeyed3 = 0;  % Hubenko System Rekey Count 
    if i<=(numUsers*ControlGroupSize) 
        % For the first half of the users, set them to Join at one, and 
        % stay the whole time.  Also set them to Stationary 
        User(i).JoinTime = 1;  %ceil(rand*numTimeSteps*JoinTimeSetter);  
        User(i).Duration = numTimeSteps-1; 
        User(i).Mobility = 1; 
    else % Otherwise, set them to Join randomly in 1st third, Short and Long Durations, 
         % and random mobility up to the Mobility Profile 
         User(i).JoinTime = ceil(rand*numTimeSteps*JoinTimeSetter);  
%          if h <= (numIterations/2) 
%              User(i).Duration = ceil(rand*DurationFactor*(numTimeSteps-
User(i).JoinTime));  % "Short" 
%          else  
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        User(i).Duration = ceil((1-rand*DurationFactor)*(numTimeSteps-User(i).JoinTime));  
% "Long" 
%          end %if for Duration assignment 
             % Uniformly assign durations to be within remaining time, under the 
             % constraint of "Short" or "Long" DurationFactor 
        if UserMoverPercent < (MFcalc*numUsers) 
%             UserMover=rand; 
%             if UserMover > MFcalc % if UserMover is greater than the Mobility Profile 
%                                   %for this increment, then set the user to Stationary 
%                User(i).Mobility = 1; 
%             else  % Otherwise, uniformly assign it to either Sea, Ground, or Air 
               User(i).Mobility = 1+ceil(rand*3); 
               UserMoverPercent=UserMoverPercent+1; 
            %end % if/else UserMover > MFcalc 
        else User(i).Mobility = 1; 
        end %if/else UserMoverPercent < (MFcalc*numUsers) 
    end %Of the if/else for i<=(numUsers*ControlGroupSize) 
 
% Both of the following were initialized in the repmat(struct) statement 
%    User(i).Waiting = 0; %holder for how long to wait until moving to next cluster 
%    User(i).Active=zeros(numTimeSteps,1, 'uint8');  % Initialize to all  
    % zeros indicating not active.  When Active, each slot will be set to 1. 
 
     
% if mod(i,1800)==0 
%     InitializeUsersLoopsTaken=i 
% end 
 
end %for i=numUsers Loop 
 
MobilityHist=[User.Mobility]; 
MobilityHistPlot(h,:)=hist(MobilityHist,MobilityBins); 
 
% Below is to check to ensure random spread in the correct ranges 
%  Lo=Locator; 
% figure, mesh(Lo);  %meshc gives contour plot under mesh 
%figure,surf(Lo); 
% Sa = [User.Satellite] 
% Cl = [User.Cluster] 
% MC = [User.MCGroup] 
% JT = [User.JoinTime] 
% Du = [User.Duration]; 
% Mo = [User.Mobility] 
 
% figure,bar(Du) 
% xlabel('User #'); 
% ylabel('Duration Value');  
% title({['User.Duration for iteration ',num2str(ModTest1)]}) 
 
% Start stepping through "Time." 
% Array indexing starts at "1"; nomenclature is (rows, columns) 
% Joins and leaves are edge triggered.  Can not join and leave in 
% same time step.  Can have join duration of one time step, but not less. 
 
for simTime=1:numTimeSteps 
   % timeis=simTime 
        for j=1:numUsers 
            % First check if each User is Active 
            if ((User(j).JoinTime <= simTime) && (simTime <= (User(j).JoinTime + 
User(j).Duration - 1)))  % changed from & to && based on auto-recommendation 
                % If Active, load the User's location based on the Satellite and Cluster 
                % Line below assumes User can only be in one MCGroup at a time 
                ClusterActivity(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,simTime)=ClusterActivity(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,simTime)+1; 
%ClusterActivity(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,User(j).MCGroup,simTime)=ClusterActivity(((User(j).Satell
ite-1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,User(j).MCGroup,simTime)+1; 
                User(j).Active(simTime,1)=1;  % Set User Active Flag since it is active 
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                % Then check if user just became active during this time slot.  If 
                % so, then process the rekeying as appropriate.   
                if (User(j).JoinTime == simTime) % if true, this is a new user to the 
group/cluster 
                    % Set the flag for the new user 
                    ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,simTime)=2; 
%ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,User(j).MCGroup,simTime)=2; 
                    if User(j).Mobility >1 
                        User(j).Waiting=1; 
                    end 
                end % Check if just became Active 
                 
                if User(j).Mobility >1 
                    User(j).Waiting=User(j).Waiting+1; 
                    if (User(j).Mobility==2)  % This is the Ground User; 2xfaster than 
Sea User 
                        if User(j).Waiting ==(numWait*numSpeed*0.5) 
                            User(j).Waiting=1; 
%if ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,User(j).MCGroup,simTime)~=2                             
                            if ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,simTime)~=2 
                                %This triggers the current cluster for the 
                                %departing user. 
%ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,User(j).MCGroup,simTime)=1; 
                                ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,simTime)=1; 
                            end 
                            %Now get a new location, and set the trigger 
                            User(j).Satellite = ceil(rand*numSats); 
                            User(j).Cluster = ceil(rand*numClusters); 
%if ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,User(j).MCGroup,simTime)~=2 
%ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,User(j).MCGroup,simTime)=1; 
                            if ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,simTime)~=2 
                                ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,simTime)=1; 
                                %This triggers the new cluster for the user 
                            end 
                        end%if User Waiting 
 
                    elseif (User(j).Mobility==3)  % This is the Sea User; half as fast as 
Ground User 
                        if User(j).Waiting ==(numWait*numSpeed) 
                            User(j).Waiting=1; 
                            if ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,simTime)~=2 
%if ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,User(j).MCGroup,simTime)~=2 
                                %This triggers the current cluster for the 
                                %departing user. 
                                ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,simTime)=1; 
                            end 
                            %Now get a new location, and set the trigger 
                            User(j).Satellite = ceil(rand*numSats); 
                            User(j).Cluster = ceil(rand*numClusters); 
                            if ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,simTime)~=2 
                                ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,simTime)=1; 
                                %This triggers the new cluster for the user 
                            end 
                        end%if User Waiting 
                         
 181 
                    elseif User(j).Mobility==4  % This is the Air Mover, so moves in 
fewest # of TimeSteps 
                        if User(j).Waiting ==numWait 
                            User(j).Waiting=1; 
                            if ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,simTime)~=2 
                                %This triggers the current cluster for the 
                                %departing user. 
                                ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,simTime)=1; 
                            end 
                            %Now get a new location, and set the trigger 
                            User(j).Satellite = ceil(rand*numSats); 
                            User(j).Cluster = ceil(rand*numClusters); 
                            if ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,simTime)~=2 
                                ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,simTime)=1; 
                                %This triggers the new cluster for the user 
                            end 
                        end%if User Waiting 
                    end%if & elseif 
                end%if User Mobility >1 
                 
            % Check to see if User just left the MCGroup/System 
            elseif (simTime == (User(j).JoinTime + User(j).Duration)) 
                % Set the flag for the leaving user 
                ClusterTriggers(((User(j).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(j).Cluster,simTime)=2; 
                 
                % Decrement the User's instant key count.  If the user leaves, 
                % it will definitely drop the key regardless if the 
                % Group/Cluster rekeys or not 
 
            end %if & elseif 
 
        end %j 
        pause(0); 
 
        % Check for joins and leaves.  If either a join, a leave, or both 
        % in the MC Group, then rekey.  Otherwise, no need to rekey. 
            
ClusterActivity((numSats*numClusters)+1,simTime)=sum(ClusterActivity(1:(numSats*numCluste
rs),simTime)); 
            
ClusterTriggers((numSats*numClusters)+1,simTime)=max(ClusterTriggers(1:(numSats*numCluste
rs),simTime)); 
             
            if ClusterTriggers((numSats*numClusters)+1,simTime)>=1 
                % If true, this means there was some kind of activity in 
                % the MCGroup,so all active users must rekey for the Baseline system. 
%                 if ClusterTriggers((numSats*numClusters)+1,NewKeyCheckLoop,simTime)==2 
%                     %If true, there was a new or departing user, so all 
%                     %active users must rekey for the Baseline system. 
     %            
TotalKeysDistribCount(NewKeyCheckLoop,1)=TotalKeysDistribCount(NewKeyCheckLoop,1)+Cluster
Activity((numSats*numClusters)+1,NewKeyCheckLoop,simTime); 
%                end 
                 
                % First check which users were active, then see who was 
                % affected. 
                for k=1:numUsers 
                    if User(k).Active(simTime,1)==1 
                        %If the user is Active, continue.  Otherwise move 
                        %on to next user. 
                        if ClusterTriggers((numSats*numClusters)+1,simTime)>=1 
                            %If true, this means a new user joined or left 
                            %the MCGroup, and therefore all users in the 
                            %baseline must rekey, as well as all users in 
                            %the Cluster must key 
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 %                           
TotalKeysDistribCount(NewKeyCheckLoop,1)=TotalKeysDistribCount(NewKeyCheckLoop,1)+1; 
                            User(k).TimesRekeyed1 = User(k).TimesRekeyed1+1;  % Baseline 
System Rekey Count 
                        end%if ClusterTriggers >=1 at the MCGroup level 
                         
                        if ClusterTriggers(((User(k).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(k).Cluster,simTime)==2 
                            %If ClusterTriggers for this cluster==2, then  
                            %a new user joined or a non-mobile user left.   
                            %Therefore, both Cluster and Hubenko rekey 
                            User(k).TimesRekeyed2 = User(k).TimesRekeyed2+1;  % Cluster 
System Rekey Count 
 %                           
TotalKeysDistribCount(NewKeyCheckLoop,2)=TotalKeysDistribCount(NewKeyCheckLoop,2)+1;  
%zeros(numMCGroups,numArchitectures); 
%                                 if (User(j).JoinTime ~= simTime) && User(j).Waiting~=1 
%                                     % If the User did not just join right 
%                                     % now, and if the User didn't just move right now,  
%                                     % then increment its Hubenko Key count 
%                                     User(j).Waiting~=1 
                                User(k).TimesRekeyed3 = User(k).TimesRekeyed3+1;  % 
Hubenko System Rekey Count 
%                            end 
  %                          
TotalKeysDistribCount(NewKeyCheckLoop,3)=TotalKeysDistribCount(NewKeyCheckLoop,3)+1; 
 
                        elseif ClusterTriggers(((User(k).Satellite-
1)*numClusters)+User(k).Cluster,simTime)==1 
                            %If ClusterTriggers for this cluster==1, then  
                            %a mobile user joined or left the cluster.   
                            %Therefore, only Cluster rekeys, along with any users that 
just moved in the Hubenko case. 
                            User(k).TimesRekeyed2 = User(k).TimesRekeyed2+1;  % Cluster 
System Rekey Count 
                            if  User(k).Waiting == 1  %  If true, the user just moved, so 
increment Hubenko key count 
                                User(k).TimesRekeyed3 = User(k).TimesRekeyed3+1;  % 
Hubenko System Rekey Count 
                            end 
 
 %                           
TotalKeysDistribCount(NewKeyCheckLoop,2)=TotalKeysDistribCount(NewKeyCheckLoop,2)+1;   
                        end%if ClusterTriggers == 2 or 1 
                    end%ifActive & MCGroup 
                end% for k 
            end%If Cluster Triggers 
                         
% if mod(simTime,3000)==0 
%     SimTimeLoopsTaken=simTime 
% end 
 
pause(0); 
end %simTime 
 
%****************************** 
% Figure out how many times, on average, each mobility type re-keyed 
 
MobilityHist=[User.Mobility];  %this gives # of each type 
 
for i=1:numUsers 
    if User(i).Mobility == 1 
        AvgKeySummaryPlot1(h,1)=AvgKeySummaryPlot1(h,1)+User(i).TimesRekeyed1; 
        AvgKeySummaryPlot2(h,1)=AvgKeySummaryPlot2(h,1)+User(i).TimesRekeyed2; 
        AvgKeySummaryPlot3(h,1)=AvgKeySummaryPlot3(h,1)+User(i).TimesRekeyed3; 
    elseif User(i).Mobility == 2 
        AvgKeySummaryPlot1(h,2)=AvgKeySummaryPlot1(h,2)+User(i).TimesRekeyed1; 
        AvgKeySummaryPlot2(h,2)=AvgKeySummaryPlot2(h,2)+User(i).TimesRekeyed2; 
        AvgKeySummaryPlot3(h,2)=AvgKeySummaryPlot3(h,2)+User(i).TimesRekeyed3; 
    elseif User(i).Mobility == 3 
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        AvgKeySummaryPlot1(h,3)=AvgKeySummaryPlot1(h,3)+User(i).TimesRekeyed1; 
        AvgKeySummaryPlot2(h,3)=AvgKeySummaryPlot2(h,3)+User(i).TimesRekeyed2; 
        AvgKeySummaryPlot3(h,3)=AvgKeySummaryPlot3(h,3)+User(i).TimesRekeyed3; 
    else 
        AvgKeySummaryPlot1(h,4)=AvgKeySummaryPlot1(h,4)+User(i).TimesRekeyed1; 
        AvgKeySummaryPlot2(h,4)=AvgKeySummaryPlot2(h,4)+User(i).TimesRekeyed2; 
        AvgKeySummaryPlot3(h,4)=AvgKeySummaryPlot3(h,4)+User(i).TimesRekeyed3; 
    end %end if 
 
end %for i=numUsers Loop 
% Now average each of the sumarries out using the precalculated number in 
% each mobility type 
pause(0); 
AvgKeySummaryPlot1(h,:)=AvgKeySummaryPlot1(h,:)./MobilityHistPlot(h,:); 
AvgKeySummaryPlot2(h,:)=AvgKeySummaryPlot2(h,:)./MobilityHistPlot(h,:); 
AvgKeySummaryPlot3(h,:)=AvgKeySummaryPlot3(h,:)./MobilityHistPlot(h,:); 
%************************************** 
 
% All of the User's different Keys 
UserKeys1=[User.TimesRekeyed1]; 
UserKeys2=[User.TimesRekeyed2]; 
UserKeys3=[User.TimesRekeyed3]; 
% Only the Control Group's keys 
HalfUserKeys1=UserKeys1(1:(numUsers*ControlGroupSize)); 
HalfUserKeys2=UserKeys2(1:(numUsers*ControlGroupSize)); 
HalfUserKeys3=UserKeys3(1:(numUsers*ControlGroupSize)); 
 
SumUserKeys1=sum(UserKeys1); 
SumUserKeys2=sum(UserKeys2); 
SumUserKeys3=sum(UserKeys3); 
SumHalfUserKeys1=sum(HalfUserKeys1); 
SumHalfUserKeys2=sum(HalfUserKeys2); 
SumHalfUserKeys3=sum(HalfUserKeys3); 
 
TotalKeysDistribCount(h,:,g)=[SumUserKeys1 SumUserKeys2 SumUserKeys3]; 
TotalHalfKeysDistribCount(h,:,g)=[SumHalfUserKeys1 SumHalfUserKeys2 SumHalfUserKeys3]; 
 
AverageUserKeys1=SumUserKeys1/numUsers; 
AverageUserKeys2=SumUserKeys2/numUsers; 
AverageUserKeys3=SumUserKeys3/numUsers; 
AvearageUserKeys=[AverageUserKeys1 AverageUserKeys2 AverageUserKeys3]; 
AverageHalfUserKeys1=SumHalfUserKeys1/(numUsers*ControlGroupSize); 
AverageHalfUserKeys2=SumHalfUserKeys2/(numUsers*ControlGroupSize); 
AverageHalfUserKeys3=SumHalfUserKeys3/(numUsers*ControlGroupSize); 
AvearageHalfUserKeys=[AverageHalfUserKeys1 AverageHalfUserKeys2 AverageHalfUserKeys3]; 
 
figure,bar(AvearageUserKeys) 
xlabel('Architecture'); 
set(gca,'XTickLabel',{'Baseline';'Cluster';'Hubenko'}) 
ylabel('Average Times Rekeyed');  
% XMinorTick off 
% YMinorTick off 
title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed'];['for the Different 
Archtiectures'];['Time Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Users:',num2str(numUsers),', 
MCGroups:',num2str(numMCGroups),', Sats:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clust:',num2str(numClusters)];[' Baseline:',num2str(AverageUserKeys1),', 
Cluster:',num2str(AverageUserKeys2),', Hubenko:',num2str(AverageUserKeys3)]}) 
set(gcf, 'PaperPositionMode', 'manual'); 
set(gcf, 'PaperUnits', 'inches'); 
set(gcf, 'PaperPosition', [1 1 4.9 3.7]); 
 
PlotJoinTimeUserKeys=[User.TimesRekeyed1; User.TimesRekeyed2; User.TimesRekeyed3; 
User.JoinTime]; 
figure,bar(PlotJoinTimeUserKeys') 
title({['Join Time Vs User Times Rekeyed']}) 
legend('Baseline Keys','Cluster Keys','Hubenko Keys','Time Joined'); 
 
PlotClusterActivity=zeros(1,numTimeSteps); 
PlotClusterActivity(:,:)=ClusterActivity((numSats*numClusters)+1,1,:); 
figure,plot(PlotClusterActivity) 
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xlabel('Time Step'); 
ylabel('Number of Current Active Users');  
title({['Number of Current Active Users Out of ',num2str(numUsers),' Possible 
Users'];['Time Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters)];}) 
%  
PlotClusterTriggers=zeros(1,numTimeSteps); 
PlotClusterTriggers(:,:)=ClusterTriggers((numSats*numClusters)+1,1,:); 
figure,plot(PlotClusterTriggers) 
xlabel('Time Step'); 
ylabel('Cluster Trigger');  
title({['Cluster Triggers.  2 = new or leave, 1 = moving, 0 = no change']}) 
 
DensityVsRekeys(h,:,g)=AvearageUserKeys; 
DensityVsHalfRekeys(h,:,g)=AvearageHalfUserKeys; 
 
%  path = 'D:\Victor Data\1 - Dissertation Work\Matlab Files\'; 
  path = 'D:\Victor Workstation Data\Workstation Matlab Files\'; 
% %  
  filename = [path 'Mobility Analysis-Sat-' num2str(numSats) '-Clus-' 
num2str(numClusters) '-Mov-' num2str(numMoving) '-Its-' num2str(numIterations) '-TS-' 
num2str(numTimeSteps) '-' index '.txt']; 
dlmwrite(filename, AvearageUserKeys, '-append', 'delimiter', '\t', 'precision', 6); 
 
% Clear EVERYTHING except "DensityVsRekeys" 
% Changed 27 Feb 07 clear numUsers; 
%clear UserKeyCount; 
%clear MCGroupKeys; 
%clear TotalKeysDistribCount; 
clear ClusterActivity; 
clear ClusterTriggers; 
clear User; 
clear SimTimeLoopsTaken; 
clear InitializeUsersLoopsTaken; 
clear simTime; 
%clear NewKeyCheckLoop; 
clear i; 
clear j; 
clear k; 
% clear TotalKeyscheckfor1; 
% clear TotalKeyscheckfor2; 
% clear TotalKeyscheckfor3; 
clear UserKeys1; 
clear UserKeys2; 
clear UserKeys3; 
clear HalfUserKeys1; 
clear HalfUserKeys2; 
clear HalfUserKeys3; 
clear AverageUserKeys1; 
clear AverageUserKeys2; 
clear AverageUserKeys3; 
clear AvearageUserKeys; 
clear AverageHalfUserKeys1; 
clear AverageHalfUserKeys2; 
clear AverageHalfUserKeys3; 
clear AvearageHalfUserKeys; 
 
clear PlotClusterActivity; 
clear MobilityHist; 
 
pause(0); 
  
end % for g=1:SampleSize loop 
 
if mod(h,20)==0 
    IterationsTaken=h 
    NumberOfIterations=numIterations 
    toc 
end 
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UpdateNote=strcat('cmd /c "net send /domain:enxp401x "Iteration #',num2str(iter),' 
completed.""'); 
system(UpdateNote);   %USE THIS ONE FOR AN UPDATE ON EACH TRIAL 
 
if mod(h,numDataPoints)==0 
     UpdateNote=strcat('cmd /c "net send /domain:enxp401x "Iter# ',num2str(h),' of 
',num2str(numIterations),'-',VersionName,'.""'); 
     system(UpdateNote); 
 end 
 
%end "h" loop here for iterations of number of users, then plot out results 
end 
 
% Now Compute the Confidence Intervals: 
% %  [+ B - + C - + H - ...] Where B, C, H are the means for the SampleSize, 
% %  + is the Top of the confidence interval, - is the Bottom of the 
% %  Confidence Interval 
% TotalKeysDistribCountPlot=zeros(numIterations,3*numArchitectures); 
% TotalHalfKeysDistribCountPlot=zeros(numIterations,3*numArchitectures); 
% DensityVsRekeysPlot=zeros(numIterations,3*numArchitectures); 
% DensityVsHalfRekeysPlot=zeros(numIterations,3*numArchitectures); 
 
 % xMeanArray is the mean array for each of the above arrays 
 % NOTE: mean(x,3) produces the mean in the third dimension, namely the repeated samples 
TKDMeanArray=mean(TotalKeysDistribCount,3); 
THKDMeanArray=mean(TotalHalfKeysDistribCount,3); 
DVRMeanArray=mean(DensityVsRekeys,3); 
DVHRMeanArray=mean(DensityVsHalfRekeys,3); 
 
% % xSampleSDArray is the sample standard deviation array for each of the above arrays 
% NOTE: s = std(X,flag,dim) computes the standard deviations along the  
% dimension of X specified by scalar dim. Set flag to 0 to normalize 
% Y by n-1; set flag to 1 to normalize by n. 
% Using std(x,0,3) for ssd across the sample size 
TKDSampleSDArray=std(TotalKeysDistribCount,0,3); 
THKDSampleSDArray=std(TotalHalfKeysDistribCount,0,3); 
DVRSampleSDArray=std(DensityVsRekeys,0,3); 
DVHRSampleSDArray=std(DensityVsHalfRekeys,0,3); 
 
% % The Coefficient of Variation (C.O.V.) [Jai91], is the ratio of standard 
% deviation to sample mean: xSampleSDArray/xMeanArray. 
COVTKD=TKDSampleSDArray./TKDMeanArray; 
COVTHKD=THKDSampleSDArray./THKDMeanArray; 
COVDVR=DVRSampleSDArray./DVRMeanArray; 
COVDVHR=DVHRSampleSDArray./DVHRMeanArray; 
 
%XBar= ; %means for each set of identical runs 
%n=SampleSize 
%sqrtofn=sqrt(SampleSize) 
%SampleSD= Sample Standard Deviation 
%use alpha05 for 90% CI, alpha025 for 95% CI 
%tAlphaHalf= alpha025(SampleSize-1); %Value of t Alpha over 2 per table 
 
% Confidence Interval (+) = Xbar + (tAlphaHalf*SampleSD/sqrtofn) 
% Confidence Interval (-) = Xbar - (tAlphaHalf*SampleSD/sqrtofn) 
 
    for statA=1:numArchitectures 
         
        %Put the Means in place: 
        TotalKeysDistribCountPlot(:,(3*statA)-1)=TKDMeanArray(:,statA);   
        TotalHalfKeysDistribCountPlot(:,(3*statA)-1)=THKDMeanArray(:,statA); 
        DensityVsRekeysPlot(:,(3*statA)-1)=DVRMeanArray(:,statA); 
        DensityVsHalfRekeysPlot(:,(3*statA)-1)=DVHRMeanArray(:,statA); 
         
        %Now Calculate the + CI Bounds 
        TotalKeysDistribCountPlot(:,(3*statA)-2)=TotalKeysDistribCountPlot(:,(3*statA)-
1)+(tAlphaHalf*TKDSampleSDArray(:,statA)/sqrtofn); 
        TotalHalfKeysDistribCountPlot(:,(3*statA)-
2)=TotalHalfKeysDistribCountPlot(:,(3*statA)-
1)+(tAlphaHalf*THKDSampleSDArray(:,statA)/sqrtofn); 
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        DensityVsRekeysPlot(:,(3*statA)-2)=DensityVsRekeysPlot(:,(3*statA)-
1)+(tAlphaHalf*DVRSampleSDArray(:,statA)/sqrtofn); 
        DensityVsHalfRekeysPlot(:,(3*statA)-2)=DensityVsHalfRekeysPlot(:,(3*statA)-
1)+(tAlphaHalf*DVHRSampleSDArray(:,statA)/sqrtofn); 
         
        %Now Calculate the - CI Bounds 
        TotalKeysDistribCountPlot(:,(3*statA))=TotalKeysDistribCountPlot(:,(3*statA)-1)-
(tAlphaHalf*TKDSampleSDArray(:,statA)/sqrtofn); 
        
TotalHalfKeysDistribCountPlot(:,(3*statA))=TotalHalfKeysDistribCountPlot(:,(3*statA)-1)-
(tAlphaHalf*THKDSampleSDArray(:,statA)/sqrtofn); 
        DensityVsRekeysPlot(:,(3*statA))=DensityVsRekeysPlot(:,(3*statA)-1)-
(tAlphaHalf*DVRSampleSDArray(:,statA)/sqrtofn); 
        DensityVsHalfRekeysPlot(:,(3*statA))=DensityVsHalfRekeysPlot(:,(3*statA)-1)-
(tAlphaHalf*DVHRSampleSDArray(:,statA)/sqrtofn); 
         
    end % for statA 
 
pause(0); 
 
figurebox = figure; 
subplot(2,2,1),bar(MobilityHistPlot(ceil(numDataPoints*0.25),:))%,MobilityBins)  Changed 
from Hist to Bar 
 xlabel('(a)', 'FontWeight','bold'); 
 set(gca,'XTickLabel',{'Stationary';'Ground';'Sea';'Air'}, 'FontWeight','bold') 
 ylabel('Number of Users', 'FontWeight','bold');  
 title(['User Mobility Distribution for 
???',num2str(numSats*numClusters*numDataPoints*0.25),' Users.  (Iteration 
',num2str(numDataPoints*0.25),')'], 'FontWeight','bold'); 
%See if need to reset numUsers with numUsers=FirstStep*numDataPoints 
 hfinder = findobj(gca,'Type','patch'); 
set(hfinder,'FaceColor','b','EdgeColor','w') 
 
 subplot(2,2,2),bar(MobilityHistPlot(ceil(numDataPoints*0.5),:))%,MobilityBins) 
 xlabel('(b)', 'FontWeight','bold'); 
 set(gca,'XTickLabel',{'Stationary';'Ground';'Sea';'Air'}, 'FontWeight','bold') 
 ylabel('Number of Users', 'FontWeight','bold');  
 title(['User Mobility Distribution for 
???',num2str(numSats*numClusters*numDataPoints*0.5),' Users.  (Iteration 
',num2str(numDataPoints*0.5),')'], 'FontWeight','bold'); 
 hfinder = findobj(gca,'Type','patch'); 
set(hfinder,'FaceColor','b','EdgeColor','w') 
 
 subplot(2,2,3),bar(MobilityHistPlot(ceil(numDataPoints*0.75),:))%,MobilityBins) 
 xlabel('(c)', 'FontWeight','bold'); 
 set(gca,'XTickLabel',{'Stationary';'Ground';'Sea';'Air'}, 'FontWeight','bold') 
 ylabel('Number of Users', 'FontWeight','bold');  
 title(['User Mobility Distribution for 
???',num2str(numSats*numClusters*numDataPoints*0.75),' Users.  (Iteration 
',num2str(numDataPoints*0.75),')'], 'FontWeight','bold'); 
 hfinder = findobj(gca,'Type','patch'); 
set(hfinder,'FaceColor','b','EdgeColor','w') 
 
 subplot(2,2,4),bar(MobilityHistPlot(numDataPoints,:))%,MobilityBins)  
 xlabel('(d)', 'FontWeight','bold'); 
 set(gca,'XTickLabel',{'Stationary';'Ground';'Sea';'Air'}, 'FontWeight','bold') 
 ylabel('Number of Users', 'FontWeight','bold');  
 title(['User Mobility Distribution for ???',num2str(numSats*numClusters*numDataPoints),' 
Users.  (Iteration ',num2str(numDataPoints),')'], 'FontWeight','bold'); 
 hfinder = findobj(gca,'Type','patch'); 
set(hfinder,'FaceColor','b','EdgeColor','w') 
 
% Create textbox 
annotation1 = annotation(... 
  figurebox,'textbox',... 
  'LineStyle', 'none',...   % no outline box 
  'Position',[0.417 0.96 0.2 0.02],...  % [left, bottom, width, height] 
  'HorizontalAlignment', 'center',...  
  'FontWeight', 'bold',... 
  'FitHeightToText','off',... 
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  'String',{num2str(TimeStamp)}); 
 
DateStamp=num2str(datestr(now,30)); 
FigNum=FigNum+1; 
FigName=strcat(DateStamp,VersionName,num2str(FigNum),'.fig'); 
saveas(gcf,FigName) 
%print('-dmeta', '-r1200', FigName); 
 
tickmarksforx=zeros(1,numIterations); 
for tickmaker=1:numIterations 
    tickmarksforx(1,tickmaker)=tickmaker; 
end 
 
%figure,[AX,H1,H2] = plotyy(X,Y1,X,Y2,DensityVsRekeys,JoinFactor); %,'plot'); 
% Turn Plot Colors on and off 
%set(0,'DefaultAxesLineStyleOrder',{'-',':','--'})  % setting a default value for the 
axes LineStyleOrder property 
% s = square, o = o, d = diamond 
%set(0,'DefaultAxesColorOrder',[0,0,0])  % Sets default line color to black (see 
"ColorSpec" for colors) 
% set(0,'DefaultAxesLineStyleOrder','-|--|:',... 
%       'DefaultLineLineWidth',1.5)                     %'DefaultAxesColorOrder',[1 0 0;0 
1 0;0 0 1],... 
%      '-',':o','--x'  {'-*',':','o'}      ,'LineWidth',2 
% % Dual plot on single axes 
% figure,[ax,h1,h2] = plotyy(IterationsAxis, JoinFactor, IterationsAxis, 
DensityVsRekeys);  
% % grid on 
% ylabel('Rate of Mobility','FontWeight','bold'); % puts a label on the left axis. 
% axes(ax(2)) % makes the 2nd yaxis the current axis.  
% xlabel('Iteration','FontWeight','bold');   % puts a label on the X axis  
% ylabel('Average Times Rekeyed','FontWeight','bold');  % puts a label on the right axis  
% legend('Baseline','Cluster','Hubenko'); 
% %title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. increasing Join Factor 
(Higher JF=Slower Join Rate)'];['JoinFactor Varies and Nobody Leaves.  Last Iteration 
Average Users per Cluster= ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters))];['Time 
Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving:',num2str(numMoving)];['IterFactor: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps:',num2str(numIterSteps),', 
numWait:',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed:',num2str(numSpeed)]}) 
% % title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. increasing Join Factor 
(Higher JF=Slower Join Rate)'];['JoinFactor Varies and Nobody Leaves.  Last Iteration 
Average Users per Cluster= ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters))];['Time 
Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving:',num2str(numMoving),', 
numWait:',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed:',num2str(numSpeed)];['IterFactor: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps:',num2str(numIterSteps),' 
RunVersion=',RunVersion]}) 
% title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. Increasing Mobility and 
Increasing User Density'];['Last Iteration Average Users per Cluster = 
',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters)),'.  JoinFactor held constant at 
',num2str(JoinTimeSetter)];['Time Steps: ',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites: 
',num2str(numSats),', Clusters: ',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving: 
',num2str(numMoving),', numWait: ',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed: 
',num2str(numSpeed)];['IterFactor: ',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps: 
',num2str(numIterSteps),' RunVersion = ',RunVersion,' 
',num2str(TimeStamp)]},'FontWeight','bold') 
 
set(0,'DefaultLineLineWidth',1.5) 
%figure,plot(IterationsAxis, DensityVsRekeys);  
 
%************************************************** 
% These lines below name each on of the lines, and gives them their 
% linestyles.  They will then show up in the legend with the given names. 
% set(plot2(2),'DisplayName','Baseline'); 
% set(plot2(5),'DisplayName','Cluster','LineStyle','--'); 
% set(plot2(8),'DisplayName','Hubenko','LineStyle',':'); 
%  
% xlabel('Iteration','FontWeight','bold'); 
% ylabel('Average Times Rekeyed','FontWeight','bold'); 
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%  
% %These lines below turn off the HandleVisibility for the lines that I don't 
% %want to show up in the legend.  Be sure to call Legend after the lines are 
% %"shut off" otherwise the lines will still end up in the legend. 
% set(plot2(1),'HandleVisibility','off'); 
% set(plot2(3),'HandleVisibility','off'); 
% set(plot2(4),'HandleVisibility','off'); 
% set(plot2(6),'HandleVisibility','off'); 
% set(plot2(7),'HandleVisibility','off'); 
% set(plot2(9),'HandleVisibility','off'); 
% legend('Location','NorthWest'); 
%************************************************** 
 
% s = square, o = o, d = diamond 
%set(0,'DefaultAxesColorOrder',[0,0,0])  % Sets default line color to black (see 
"ColorSpec" for colors) 
% set(0,'DefaultAxesLineStyleOrder','-|--|:',... 
%       'DefaultLineLineWidth',1.5)                     %'DefaultAxesColorOrder',[1 0 0;0 
1 0;0 0 1],... 
%      '-',':o','--x'  {'-*',':','o'}  style color marker 
 
figure,plot2 = plot(IterationsAxis, DensityVsRekeysPlot); 
set(plot2(2),'DisplayName','Baseline','LineStyle','-','Marker','s','Color','b'); 
set(plot2(5),'DisplayName','Cluster','LineStyle','--','Marker','o','Color',[0 0.5 0]); 
set(plot2(8),'DisplayName','Hubenko','LineStyle',':','Marker','d','Color','r'); 
set(plot2(1),'LineStyle',':','Color','b','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot2(3),'LineStyle',':','Color','b','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot2(4),'LineStyle',':','Color',[0 0.5 0],'HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot2(6),'LineStyle',':','Color',[0 0.5 0],'HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot2(7),'LineStyle',':','Color','r','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot2(9),'LineStyle',':','Color','r','HandleVisibility','off'); 
legend('Location','NorthWest'); 
xlabel('Iteration','FontWeight','bold'); 
ylabel('Average Times Rekeyed','FontWeight','bold'); 
%legend('Baseline','Cluster','Hubenko','Location','NorthWest'); 
%title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. increasing Join Factor (Higher 
JF=Slower Join Rate)'];['JoinFactor Varies and Nobody Leaves.  Last Iteration Average 
Users per Cluster= ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters))];['Time 
Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving:',num2str(numMoving)];['IterFactor: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps:',num2str(numIterSteps),', 
numWait:',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed:',num2str(numSpeed)]}) 
% title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. increasing Join Factor 
(Higher JF=Slower Join Rate)'];['JoinFactor Varies and Nobody Leaves.  Last Iteration 
Average Users per Cluster= ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters))];['Time 
Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving:',num2str(numMoving),', 
numWait:',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed:',num2str(numSpeed)];['IterFactor: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps:',num2str(numIterSteps),' 
RunVersion=',RunVersion]}) 
title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed (All Users)'];['Last Iteration 
Average Users per Cluster = ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters)),'.  JoinFactor held 
constant at ',num2str(JoinTimeSetter)];['Time Steps: ',num2str(numTimeSteps),', 
Satellites: ',num2str(numSats),', Clusters: ',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving: 
',num2str(numMoving),', numWait: ',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed: 
',num2str(numSpeed)];['Number of Data Points: ',num2str(numDataPoints),', Number of Sets: 
',num2str(numSets),' RunVersion = ',RunVersion,' 
',num2str(TimeStamp)]},'FontWeight','bold') 
 
FigNum=FigNum+1; 
FigName=strcat(DateStamp,VersionName,num2str(FigNum),'.fig'); 
saveas(gcf,FigName) 
%print('-dmeta', '-r1200', FigName); 
 
%figure,semilogy(IterationsAxis, DensityVsRekeys);  
figure,semilogy3 = semilogy(IterationsAxis, DensityVsRekeysPlot); 
set(semilogy3(2),'DisplayName','Baseline','LineStyle','-','Marker','s','Color','b'); 
set(semilogy3(5),'DisplayName','Cluster','LineStyle','--','Marker','o','Color',[0 0.5 
0]); 
set(semilogy3(8),'DisplayName','Hubenko','LineStyle',':','Marker','d','Color','r'); 
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set(semilogy3(1),'LineStyle',':','Color','b','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy3(3),'LineStyle',':','Color','b','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy3(4),'LineStyle',':','Color',[0 0.5 0],'HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy3(6),'LineStyle',':','Color',[0 0.5 0],'HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy3(7),'LineStyle',':','Color','r','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy3(9),'LineStyle',':','Color','r','HandleVisibility','off'); 
legend('Location','NorthWest'); 
xlabel('Iteration','FontWeight','bold'); 
ylabel('Average Times Rekeyed (log scale)','FontWeight','bold'); 
%legend('Baseline','Cluster','Hubenko','Location','NorthWest'); 
%title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. increasing Join Factor (Higher 
JF=Slower Join Rate)'];['JoinFactor Varies and Nobody Leaves.  Last Iteration Average 
Users per Cluster= ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters))];['Time 
Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving:',num2str(numMoving)];['IterFactor: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps:',num2str(numIterSteps),', 
numWait:',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed:',num2str(numSpeed)]}) 
% title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. increasing Join Factor 
(Higher JF=Slower Join Rate)'];['JoinFactor Varies and Nobody Leaves.  Last Iteration 
Average Users per Cluster= ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters))];['Time 
Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving:',num2str(numMoving),', 
numWait:',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed:',num2str(numSpeed)];['IterFactor: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps:',num2str(numIterSteps),' 
RunVersion=',RunVersion]}) 
title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed (All Users)'];['Last Iteration 
Average Users per Cluster = ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters)),'.  JoinFactor held 
constant at ',num2str(JoinTimeSetter)];['Time Steps: ',num2str(numTimeSteps),', 
Satellites: ',num2str(numSats),', Clusters: ',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving: 
',num2str(numMoving),', numWait: ',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed: 
',num2str(numSpeed)];['Number of Data Points: ',num2str(numDataPoints),', Number of Sets: 
',num2str(numSets),' RunVersion = ',RunVersion,' 
',num2str(TimeStamp)]},'FontWeight','bold') 
 
FigNum=FigNum+1; 
FigName=strcat(DateStamp,VersionName,num2str(FigNum),'.fig'); 
saveas(gcf,FigName) 
%print('-dmeta', '-r1200', FigName); 
 
 
%figure,plot(IterationsAxis, DensityVsHalfRekeys);  
figure,plot4 = plot(IterationsAxis, DensityVsHalfRekeysPlot); 
set(plot4(2),'DisplayName','Baseline','LineStyle','-','Marker','s','Color','b'); 
set(plot4(5),'DisplayName','Cluster','LineStyle','--','Marker','o','Color',[0 0.5 0]); 
set(plot4(8),'DisplayName','Hubenko','LineStyle',':','Marker','d','Color','r'); 
set(plot4(1),'LineStyle',':','Color','b','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot4(3),'LineStyle',':','Color','b','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot4(4),'LineStyle',':','Color',[0 0.5 0],'HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot4(6),'LineStyle',':','Color',[0 0.5 0],'HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot4(7),'LineStyle',':','Color','r','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot4(9),'LineStyle',':','Color','r','HandleVisibility','off'); 
legend('Location','NorthWest'); 
xlabel('Iteration','FontWeight','bold'); 
ylabel('Average Times Rekeyed','FontWeight','bold'); 
%legend('Baseline','Cluster','Hubenko','Location','NorthWest'); 
%title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. increasing Join Factor (Higher 
JF=Slower Join Rate)'];['JoinFactor Varies and Nobody Leaves.  Last Iteration Average 
Users per Cluster= ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters))];['Time 
Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving:',num2str(numMoving)];['IterFactor: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps:',num2str(numIterSteps),', 
numWait:',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed:',num2str(numSpeed)]}) 
% title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. increasing Join Factor 
(Higher JF=Slower Join Rate)'];['JoinFactor Varies and Nobody Leaves.  Last Iteration 
Average Users per Cluster= ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters))];['Time 
Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving:',num2str(numMoving),', 
numWait:',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed:',num2str(numSpeed)];['IterFactor: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps:',num2str(numIterSteps),' 
RunVersion=',RunVersion]}) 
 190 
title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed (Control Group= 
',num2str(ControlGroupSize*100),'% of all Users)'];['Last Iteration Average Users per 
Cluster = ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters)),'.  JoinFactor held constant at 
',num2str(JoinTimeSetter)];['Time Steps: ',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites: 
',num2str(numSats),', Clusters: ',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving: 
',num2str(numMoving),', numWait: ',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed: 
',num2str(numSpeed)];['Number of Data Points: ',num2str(numDataPoints),', Number of Sets: 
',num2str(numSets),' RunVersion = ',RunVersion,' 
',num2str(TimeStamp)]},'FontWeight','bold') 
 
FigNum=FigNum+1; 
FigName=strcat(DateStamp,VersionName,num2str(FigNum),'.fig'); 
saveas(gcf,FigName) 
%print('-dmeta', '-r1200', FigName); 
 
%figure,semilogy(IterationsAxis, DensityVsHalfRekeys);  
figure,semilogy5 = semilogy(IterationsAxis, DensityVsHalfRekeysPlot); 
set(semilogy5(2),'DisplayName','Baseline','LineStyle','-','Marker','s','Color','b'); 
set(semilogy5(5),'DisplayName','Cluster','LineStyle','--','Marker','o','Color',[0 0.5 
0]); 
set(semilogy5(8),'DisplayName','Hubenko','LineStyle',':','Marker','d','Color','r'); 
set(semilogy5(1),'LineStyle',':','Color','b','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy5(3),'LineStyle',':','Color','b','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy5(4),'LineStyle',':','Color',[0 0.5 0],'HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy5(6),'LineStyle',':','Color',[0 0.5 0],'HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy5(7),'LineStyle',':','Color','r','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy5(9),'LineStyle',':','Color','r','HandleVisibility','off'); 
legend('Location','NorthWest'); 
xlabel('Iteration','FontWeight','bold'); 
ylabel('Average Times Rekeyed (log scale)','FontWeight','bold'); 
%legend('Baseline','Cluster','Hubenko','Location','NorthWest'); 
%title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. increasing Join Factor (Higher 
JF=Slower Join Rate)'];['JoinFactor Varies and Nobody Leaves.  Last Iteration Average 
Users per Cluster= ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters))];['Time 
Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving:',num2str(numMoving)];['IterFactor: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps:',num2str(numIterSteps),', 
numWait:',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed:',num2str(numSpeed)]}) 
% title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. increasing Join Factor 
(Higher JF=Slower Join Rate)'];['JoinFactor Varies and Nobody Leaves.  Last Iteration 
Average Users per Cluster= ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters))];['Time 
Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving:',num2str(numMoving),', 
numWait:',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed:',num2str(numSpeed)];['IterFactor: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps:',num2str(numIterSteps),' 
RunVersion=',RunVersion]}) 
title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed (Control Group= 
',num2str(ControlGroupSize*100),'% of all Users)'];['Last Iteration Average Users per 
Cluster = ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters)),'.  JoinFactor held constant at 
',num2str(JoinTimeSetter)];['Time Steps: ',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites: 
',num2str(numSats),', Clusters: ',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving: 
',num2str(numMoving),', numWait: ',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed: 
',num2str(numSpeed)];['Number of Data Points: ',num2str(numDataPoints),', Number of Sets: 
',num2str(numSets),' RunVersion = ',RunVersion,' 
',num2str(TimeStamp)]},'FontWeight','bold') 
 
FigNum=FigNum+1; 
FigName=strcat(DateStamp,VersionName,num2str(FigNum),'.fig'); 
saveas(gcf,FigName) 
%print('-dmeta', '-r1200', FigName); 
 
% set(0,'DefaultLineLineWidth',1.5) 
% figure,plot(IterationsAxis, DensityVsRekeys);  
% % ylabel('Rate of Mobility','FontWeight','bold'); % puts a label on the left axis. 
% % axes(ax(2)) % makes the 2nd yaxis the current axis.  
% xlabel('Iteration','FontWeight','bold'); 
% ylabel('Average Times Rekeyed','FontWeight','bold'); 
% legend('Baseline','Cluster','Hubenko'); 
% %title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. increasing Join Factor 
(Higher JF=Slower Join Rate)'];['JoinFactor Varies and Nobody Leaves.  Last Iteration 
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Average Users per Cluster= ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters))];['Time 
Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving:',num2str(numMoving)];['IterFactor: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps:',num2str(numIterSteps),', 
numWait:',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed:',num2str(numSpeed)]}) 
% % title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. increasing Join Factor 
(Higher JF=Slower Join Rate)'];['JoinFactor Varies and Nobody Leaves.  Last Iteration 
Average Users per Cluster= ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters))];['Time 
Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving:',num2str(numMoving),', 
numWait:',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed:',num2str(numSpeed)];['IterFactor: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps:',num2str(numIterSteps),' 
RunVersion=',RunVersion]}) 
% title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. Increasing Mobility and 
Increasing User Density'];['Last Iteration Average Users per Cluster = 
',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters)),'.  JoinFactor held constant at 
',num2str(JoinTimeSetter)];['Time Steps: ',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites: 
',num2str(numSats),', Clusters: ',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving: 
',num2str(numMoving),', numWait: ',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed: 
',num2str(numSpeed)];['IterFactor: ',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps: 
',num2str(numIterSteps),' RunVersion = ',RunVersion,' 
',num2str(TimeStamp)]},'FontWeight','bold') 
 
% % plot(DensityVsRekeys) 
% % % Plotting Multiple Plots with Different Axis Limits on same Plot 
% % ax1 = gca; 
% % ax2 = axes('Position',get(ax1,'Position'),... 
% %           'XAxisLocation','bottom',... 
% %            'YAxisLocation','right'); %,... 
% % %           'Color','none',... 
% %  %          'XColor','k','YColor','k'); 
% % plot(JoinFactor,ax2) 
% xlabel('Average Number of Users per Cluster'); 
% ylabel('Average Times Rekeyed');  
% legend('Baseline','Cluster','Hubenko'); 
% title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed'];['Versus increasing User 
Cluster Density'];['JoinFactor Varies and Nobody Leaves'];['Time 
Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters)];['numMoving:',num2str(numMoving),', 
numWait:',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed:',num2str(numSpeed)]}) 
%set(gca, 'xtick',tickmarksforx,'xminortick', 'off') 
%set(gca, 'yminortick', 'off') 
 
% figure,bar(DensityVsRekeys) 
% %title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. increasing Join Factor 
(Higher JF=Slower Join Rate)'];['JoinFactor Varies and Nobody Leaves.  Last Iteration 
Average Users per Cluster= ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters))];['Time 
Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving:',num2str(numMoving),', 
numWait:',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed:',num2str(numSpeed)];['IterFactor: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps:',num2str(numIterSteps),' 
RunVersion=',RunVersion]}) 
% title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. Increasing Mobility and 
Increasing User Density'];['Last Iteration Average Users per Cluster = 
',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters)),'.  JoinFactor held constant at 
',num2str(JoinTimeSetter)];['Time Steps: ',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites: 
',num2str(numSats),', Clusters: ',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving: 
',num2str(numMoving),', numWait: ',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed: 
',num2str(numSpeed)];['IterFactor: ',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps: 
',num2str(numIterSteps),' RunVersion = ',RunVersion,' 
',num2str(TimeStamp)]},'FontWeight','bold') 
% %title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. increasing Join Factor 
(Higher JF=Slower Join Rate)'];['JoinFactor Varies and Nobody Leaves.  Last Iteration 
Average Users per Cluster= ',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters))];['Time 
Steps:',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving:',num2str(numMoving)];['IterFactor: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps:',num2str(numIterSteps),', 
numWait:',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed:',num2str(numSpeed)]}) 
% % XMinorTick off 
% % YMinorTick off 
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% xlabel('Iteration','FontWeight','bold');   % puts a label on the X axis  
% ylabel('Average Times Rekeyed','FontWeight','bold');  % puts a label on the right axis  
% legend('Baseline','Cluster','Hubenko'); 
 
% figure,bar(DensityVsRekeys') 
% title({['Average Number of Times Each User is Rekeyed vs. Increasing Mobility and 
Increasing User Density'];['Last Iteration Average Users per Cluster = 
',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters)),'.  JoinFactor held constant at 
',num2str(JoinTimeSetter)];['Time Steps: ',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites: 
',num2str(numSats),', Clusters: ',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving: 
',num2str(numMoving),', numWait: ',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed: 
',num2str(numSpeed)];['IterFactor: ',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps: 
',num2str(numIterSteps),' RunVersion = ',RunVersion,' 
',num2str(TimeStamp)]},'FontWeight','bold') 
% set(gca,'XTickLabel',{'Baseline';'Cluster';'Hubenko'}) 
 
%figure,plot(TotalKeysDistribCount) 
figure,plot6 = plot(TotalKeysDistribCountPlot); 
set(plot6(2),'DisplayName','Baseline','LineStyle','-','Marker','s','Color','b'); 
set(plot6(5),'DisplayName','Cluster','LineStyle','--','Marker','o','Color',[0 0.5 0]); 
set(plot6(8),'DisplayName','Hubenko','LineStyle',':','Marker','d','Color','r'); 
set(plot6(1),'LineStyle',':','Color','b','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot6(3),'LineStyle',':','Color','b','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot6(4),'LineStyle',':','Color',[0 0.5 0],'HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot6(6),'LineStyle',':','Color',[0 0.5 0],'HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot6(7),'LineStyle',':','Color','r','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot6(9),'LineStyle',':','Color','r','HandleVisibility','off'); 
legend('Location','NorthWest'); 
xlabel('Iteration','FontWeight','bold'); 
ylabel('Total Keys Distributed in the System');   
%legend('Baseline','Cluster','Hubenko','Location','NorthWest'); 
% set(gca,'XTickLabel',{'Baseline';'Cluster';'Hubenko'}) 
title({['Total Keys Distributed in the System'];['Users:',num2str(numUsers),', 
Sats:',num2str(numSats),', Clust:',num2str(numClusters)];[' 
Mobility:',num2str(numMoving),', Wait:',num2str(numWait),', 
Speed:',num2str(numSpeed)];['Number of DataPoints: ',num2str(numDataPoints),', Number of 
Sets: ',num2str(numSets),' RunVersion = ',RunVersion,' ',num2str(TimeStamp)]}) 
% set(gcf, 'PaperPositionMode', 'manual'); 
% set(gcf, 'PaperUnits', 'inches'); 
% set(gcf, 'PaperPosition', [1 5 4.9 3.7]);  %  space from left edge, space 
% from bottom, width, height 
FigNum=FigNum+1; 
FigName=strcat(DateStamp,VersionName,num2str(FigNum),'.fig'); 
saveas(gcf,FigName) 
%print('-dmeta', '-r1200', FigName); 
 
%figure,semilogy(TotalKeysDistribCount) 
figure,semilogy7 = semilogy(TotalKeysDistribCountPlot); 
set(semilogy7(2),'DisplayName','Baseline','LineStyle','-','Marker','s','Color','b'); 
set(semilogy7(5),'DisplayName','Cluster','LineStyle','--','Marker','o','Color',[0 0.5 
0]); 
set(semilogy7(8),'DisplayName','Hubenko','LineStyle',':','Marker','d','Color','r'); 
set(semilogy7(1),'LineStyle',':','Color','b','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy7(3),'LineStyle',':','Color','b','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy7(4),'LineStyle',':','Color',[0 0.5 0],'HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy7(6),'LineStyle',':','Color',[0 0.5 0],'HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy7(7),'LineStyle',':','Color','r','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy7(9),'LineStyle',':','Color','r','HandleVisibility','off'); 
legend('Location','NorthWest'); 
xlabel('Iteration','FontWeight','bold'); 
ylabel('Total Keys Distributed in the System (log scale)');   
%legend('Baseline','Cluster','Hubenko','Location','NorthWest'); 
% set(gca,'XTickLabel',{'Baseline';'Cluster';'Hubenko'}) 
title({['Total Keys Distributed in the System'];['Users:',num2str(numUsers),', 
Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters)];['Mobility:',num2str(numMoving),', 
Wait:',num2str(numWait),', Speed:',num2str(numSpeed)];['Number of DataPoints: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', Number of Sets: ',num2str(numSets),' RunVersion = 
',RunVersion,' ',num2str(TimeStamp)]}) 
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FigNum=FigNum+1; 
FigName=strcat(DateStamp,VersionName,num2str(FigNum),'.fig'); 
saveas(gcf,FigName) 
%print('-dmeta', '-r1200', FigName); 
 
%figure,plot(TotalHalfKeysDistribCount) 
figure,plot8 = plot(TotalHalfKeysDistribCountPlot); 
set(plot8(2),'DisplayName','Baseline','LineStyle','-','Marker','s','Color','b'); 
set(plot8(5),'DisplayName','Cluster','LineStyle','--','Marker','o','Color',[0 0.5 0]); 
set(plot8(8),'DisplayName','Hubenko','LineStyle',':','Marker','d','Color','r'); 
set(plot8(1),'LineStyle',':','Color','b','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot8(3),'LineStyle',':','Color','b','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot8(4),'LineStyle',':','Color',[0 0.5 0],'HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot8(6),'LineStyle',':','Color',[0 0.5 0],'HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot8(7),'LineStyle',':','Color','r','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(plot8(9),'LineStyle',':','Color','r','HandleVisibility','off'); 
legend('Location','NorthWest'); 
xlabel('Iteration','FontWeight','bold'); 
ylabel('Total Keys Distributed for the Control Group');   
%legend('Baseline','Cluster','Hubenko','Location','NorthWest'); 
% set(gca,'XTickLabel',{'Baseline';'Cluster';'Hubenko'}) 
title({['Total Keys Distributed for the Control Group (',num2str(ControlGroupSize*100),'% 
of all Users)'];['Users:',num2str(numUsers),', Sats:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clust:',num2str(numClusters)];[' Mobility:',num2str(numMoving),', 
Wait:',num2str(numWait),', Speed:',num2str(numSpeed)];['Number of DataPoints: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', Number of Sets: ',num2str(numSets),' RunVersion = 
',RunVersion,' ',num2str(TimeStamp)]}) 
% set(gcf, 'PaperPositionMode', 'manual'); 
% set(gcf, 'PaperUnits', 'inches'); 
% set(gcf, 'PaperPosition', [1 5 4.9 3.7]);  %  space from left edge, space 
% from bottom, width, height 
 
FigNum=FigNum+1; 
FigName=strcat(DateStamp,VersionName,num2str(FigNum),'.fig'); 
saveas(gcf,FigName) 
%print('-dmeta', '-r1200', FigName); 
 
%figure,semilogy(TotalHalfKeysDistribCount) 
figure,semilogy9 = semilogy(TotalHalfKeysDistribCountPlot); 
set(semilogy9(2),'DisplayName','Baseline','LineStyle','-','Marker','s','Color','b'); 
set(semilogy9(5),'DisplayName','Cluster','LineStyle','--','Marker','o','Color',[0 0.5 
0]); 
set(semilogy9(8),'DisplayName','Hubenko','LineStyle',':','Marker','d','Color','r'); 
set(semilogy9(1),'LineStyle',':','Color','b','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy9(3),'LineStyle',':','Color','b','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy9(4),'LineStyle',':','Color',[0 0.5 0],'HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy9(6),'LineStyle',':','Color',[0 0.5 0],'HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy9(7),'LineStyle',':','Color','r','HandleVisibility','off'); 
set(semilogy9(9),'LineStyle',':','Color','r','HandleVisibility','off'); 
legend('Location','NorthWest'); 
xlabel('Iteration','FontWeight','bold'); 
ylabel('Total Keys Distributed for the Control Group (log scale)');   
%legend('Baseline','Cluster','Hubenko','Location','NorthWest'); 
% set(gca,'XTickLabel',{'Baseline';'Cluster';'Hubenko'}) 
title({['Total Keys Distributed for the Control Group (',num2str(ControlGroupSize*100),'% 
of all Users)'];['Users:',num2str(numUsers),', Satellites:',num2str(numSats),', 
Clusters:',num2str(numClusters)];['Mobility:',num2str(numMoving),', 
Wait:',num2str(numWait),', Speed:',num2str(numSpeed)];['Number of DataPoints: 
',num2str(numDataPoints),', Number of Sets: ',num2str(numSets),' RunVersion = 
',RunVersion,' ',num2str(TimeStamp)]}) 
FigNum=FigNum+1; 
FigName=strcat(DateStamp,VersionName,num2str(FigNum),'.fig'); 
saveas(gcf,FigName) 
%print('-dmeta', '-r1200', FigName); 
 
% figure,bar(AvgKeySummaryPlot1) 
% title({['Average Number of Times Each User Type is Rekeyed for the Baseline 
Architecture'];['Last Iteration Average Users per Cluster = 
',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters)),'.  JoinFactor held constant at 
',num2str(JoinTimeSetter)];['Time Steps: ',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites: 
 194 
',num2str(numSats),', Clusters: ',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving: 
',num2str(numMoving),', numWait: ',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed: 
',num2str(numSpeed)];['IterFactor: ',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps: 
',num2str(numSets),' RunVersion = ',RunVersion,' 
',num2str(TimeStamp)]},'FontWeight','bold') 
%  
% figure,bar(AvgKeySummaryPlot2) 
% title({['Average Number of Times Each User Type is Rekeyed for the Clustered 
Architecture'];['Last Iteration Average Users per Cluster = 
',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters)),'.  JoinFactor held constant at 
',num2str(JoinTimeSetter)];['Time Steps: ',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites: 
',num2str(numSats),', Clusters: ',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving: 
',num2str(numMoving),', numWait: ',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed: 
',num2str(numSpeed)];['IterFactor: ',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps: 
',num2str(numSets),' RunVersion = ',RunVersion,' 
',num2str(TimeStamp)]},'FontWeight','bold') 
%  
% figure,bar(AvgKeySummaryPlot3) 
% title({['Average Number of Times Each User Type is Rekeyed for the Hubenko 
Architecture'];['Last Iteration Average Users per Cluster = 
',num2str(numUsers/(numSats*numClusters)),'.  JoinFactor held constant at 
',num2str(JoinTimeSetter)];['Time Steps: ',num2str(numTimeSteps),', Satellites: 
',num2str(numSats),', Clusters: ',num2str(numClusters),', numMoving: 
',num2str(numMoving),', numWait: ',num2str(numWait),', numSpeed: 
',num2str(numSpeed)];['IterFactor: ',num2str(numDataPoints),', IterSteps: 
',num2str(numSets),' RunVersion = ',RunVersion,' 
',num2str(TimeStamp)]},'FontWeight','bold') 
 
%***************************** 
%NOW WRITE ALL ARRAYS TO Excel TO SAVE THE RAW DATA 
XLFileName=strcat(DateStamp,VersionName,'.xls'); 
% % % CONFIDENCE INTERVALS: 
% % % %  [+ B - + C - + H - ...] Where B, C, H are the means for the SampleSize, 
% % % %  + is the Top of the confidence interval, - is the Bottom of the 
% % % %  Confidence Interval;   "half" = control group 
 
InfoRow1={'Each Row is an Iteration'}; 
HeaderRow1={'Baseline + CI','Baseline','Baseline - CI','Cluster + CI','Cluster','Cluster 
- CI','Hubenko + CI','Hubenko','Hubenko - CI'}; 
HeaderRow2={'Baseline','Cluster','Hubenko'}; 
 
xlswrite(XLFileName, InfoRow1,'TotalKeysDistribCountPlot','C4'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow1,'TotalKeysDistribCountPlot','C5'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, TotalKeysDistribCountPlot, 'TotalKeysDistribCountPlot','C6'); 
 
xlswrite(XLFileName, {'Coeff of Variance'},'TotalKeysDistribStats','C4'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow2,'TotalKeysDistribStats','C5'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, COVTKD, 'TotalKeysDistribStats','C6'); 
 
xlswrite(XLFileName, {'Sample Standard Dev'},'TotalKeysDistribStats','I4'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow2,'TotalKeysDistribStats','I5'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, TKDSampleSDArray, 'TotalKeysDistribStats','I6'); 
 
xlswrite(XLFileName, {'Mean'},'TotalKeysDistribStats','O4'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow2,'TotalKeysDistribStats','O5'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, TKDMeanArray, 'TotalKeysDistribStats','O6'); 
 
xlswrite(XLFileName, InfoRow1,'TotalHalfKeysDistribCountPlot','C4'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow1,'TotalHalfKeysDistribCountPlot','C5'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, TotalHalfKeysDistribCountPlot, 
'TotalHalfKeysDistribCountPlot','C6'); 
 
xlswrite(XLFileName, {'Coeff of Variance'},'TotalHalfKeysDistribStats','C4'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow2,'TotalHalfKeysDistribStats','C5'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, COVTHKD, 'TotalHalfKeysDistribStats','C6'); 
 
xlswrite(XLFileName, {'Sample Standard Dev'},'TotalHalfKeysDistribStats','I4'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow2,'TotalHalfKeysDistribStats','I5'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, THKDSampleSDArray, 'TotalHalfKeysDistribStats','I6'); 
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xlswrite(XLFileName, {'Mean'},'TotalHalfKeysDistribStats','O4'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow2,'TotalHalfKeysDistribStats','O5'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, THKDMeanArray, 'TotalHalfKeysDistribStats','O6'); 
 
xlswrite(XLFileName, InfoRow1,'DensityVsRekeysPlot','C4'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow1,'DensityVsRekeysPlot','C5'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, DensityVsRekeysPlot, 'DensityVsRekeysPlot','C6'); 
 
xlswrite(XLFileName, {'Coeff of Variance'},'DensityVsRekeysStats','C4'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow2,'DensityVsRekeysStats','C5'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, COVDVR, 'DensityVsRekeysStats','C6'); 
 
xlswrite(XLFileName, {'Sample Standard Dev'},'DensityVsRekeysStats','I4'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow2,'DensityVsRekeysStats','I5'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, DVRSampleSDArray, 'DensityVsRekeysStats','I6'); 
 
xlswrite(XLFileName, {'Mean'},'DensityVsRekeysStats','O4'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow2,'DensityVsRekeysStats','O5'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, DVRMeanArray, 'DensityVsRekeysStats','O6'); 
 
 
xlswrite(XLFileName, InfoRow1,'DensityVsHalfRekeysPlot','C4'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow1,'DensityVsHalfRekeysPlot','C5'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, DensityVsHalfRekeysPlot, 'DensityVsHalfRekeysPlot','C6'); 
 
xlswrite(XLFileName, {'Coeff of Variance'},'DensityVsHalfRekeysStats','C4'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow2,'DensityVsHalfRekeysStats','C5'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, COVDVHR, 'DensityVsHalfRekeysStats','C6'); 
 
xlswrite(XLFileName, {'Sample Standard Dev'},'DensityVsHalfRekeysStats','I4'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow2,'DensityVsHalfRekeysStats','I5'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, DVHRSampleSDArray, 'DensityVsHalfRekeysStats','I6'); 
 
xlswrite(XLFileName, {'Mean'},'DensityVsHalfRekeysStats','O4'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow2,'DensityVsHalfRekeysStats','O5'); 
xlswrite(XLFileName, DVHRMeanArray, 'DensityVsHalfRekeysStats','O6'); 
pause(0); 
  
% The rawest of the raw data.  Multidimensional arrays with depth "SampleSize" 
for XL=1:SampleSize 
    NameOfSheet=strcat('TotalKeysDistribCount',num2str(XL)); 
    xlswrite(XLFileName, InfoRow1,NameOfSheet,'C4'); 
    xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow2,NameOfSheet,'C5'); 
    xlswrite(XLFileName, TotalKeysDistribCount(:,:,XL), NameOfSheet,'C6'); 
    NameOfSheet1=strcat('TotalHalfKeysDistribCount',num2str(XL)); 
    xlswrite(XLFileName, InfoRow1,NameOfSheet1,'C4'); 
    xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow2,NameOfSheet1,'C5'); 
    xlswrite(XLFileName, TotalHalfKeysDistribCount(:,:,XL), NameOfSheet1,'C6'); 
    NameOfSheet2=strcat('DensityVsRekeysCount',num2str(XL)); 
    xlswrite(XLFileName, InfoRow1,NameOfSheet2,'C4'); 
    xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow2,NameOfSheet2,'C5'); 
    xlswrite(XLFileName, DensityVsRekeys(:,:,XL), NameOfSheet2,'C6'); 
    NameOfSheet3=strcat('DensityVsHalfRekeysCount',num2str(XL)); 
    xlswrite(XLFileName, InfoRow1,NameOfSheet3,'C4'); 
    xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow2,NameOfSheet3,'C5'); 
    xlswrite(XLFileName, DensityVsHalfRekeys(:,:,XL), NameOfSheet3,'C6'); 
    pause(0); 
end% for XL=1:SampleSize 
xlswrite(XLFileName, HeaderRow, DateStamp,'A4') 
xlswrite(XLFileName, ResultsTable, DateStamp,'A8') 
toc 
system('cmd /c "net send /domain:enxp401x "Finished!""'); 
FinishedNote=strcat('cmd /c "net send /domain:enxp401x "Finished ',RunVersion,'! TS-
',num2str(numTimeSteps),' , IF-',num2str(numDataPoints),'.""'); 
system(FinishedNote); 
 
 196 
VII. Bibliography 
[AdN05] Protocol Independent Multicast - Dense Mode (PIM-DM): Protocol 
Specification (Revised) (RFC 3973), http://tools.ietf.org/wg/pim/draft-ietf-
pim-dm-new-v2/rfc3973.txt, Accessed: May 15, 2006. 
[AgC01] Agarwal, D. A., O. Chevassut, M. R. Thompson, and G. Tsudik, "An 
integrated solution for secure group communication in wide-area networks," 
Proceedings of the Sixth IEEE Symposium on Computers and 
Communications, 2001, Hammamet, 2001. 
[AkE02] Akyildiz, I. F., E. Ekici, and M. D. Bender, "MLSR: a novel routing algorithm 
for multilayered satellite IP networks," Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions 
on, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 411-424, 2002. 
[AkH04] Akkor, Gun, Michael Hadjitheodosiou, and John S. Baras, "Transport 
protocols in multicast via satellite," International Journal of Satellite 
Communications and Networking, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 611-627, 2004. 
[AlH03] Alberts, David S. and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge: Command and 
Control in the Information Age. Washington, DC: DoD Command and Control 
Research Project, 2003. 
[Alm00] Almeroth, Kevin C., "The evolution of multicast: from the MBone to 
interdomain multicast to Internet2 deployment," IEEE Network, vol. 14, no. 1, 
pp. 10-20, 2000. 
[AmN05] Amir, Yair, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, Jonathan Stanton, and Gene Tsudik, "Secure 
Spread: An Integrated Architecture for Secure Group Communication " IEEE 
TDSC, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 248-261, 2005. 
[BaB02] Banerjee, Suman and Bobby Bhattacharjee, "Scalable secure group 
communication over IP multicast," IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in 
Communications, vol. 20, no. 8, pp. 1511-1527, 2002. 
[BaL03] Barnett, C. A. and K. J. R. Liu, "Resource efficient multicast for 3G UMTS 
wireless networks," Proceedings of the VTC, 2003. 
[Bal97] Core Based Trees (CBT version 2) Multicast Routing (RFC 2189), 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2189.txt?number=2189, Accessed: May 15, 2006. 
[Bar04] Barani, Bernard, "Satellite communications: the contribution of the 5th 
framework programme and future perspectives," International Journal of 
Satellite Communications and Networking, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 5-18, 2004. 
[BeF99] Bever, Mark, Joseph Freitag, Stuart Linsky, James M. Myers, Raymond M. 
Nuber, Jaime L. Prieto Jr, and Eric R. Wiswell, "Fast-packet vs circuit switch 
 197 
and bent pipe satellite network architectures," International Journal of 
Satellite Communications, vol. 17, no. 2-3, pp. 83-105, 1999. 
[BhH02] Bhasin, Kul and Jeffrey L. Hayden, "Space Internet architectures and 
technologies for NASA enterprises," International Journal of Satellite 
Communications, vol. 20, no. 5, pp. 311-332, 2002. 
[BrR02] Bruschi, Danilo and Emilia Rosti, "Secure multicast in wireless networks of 
mobile hosts: protocols and issues," Mobile Networks and Applications, vol. 7, 
no. 6, pp. 503-511, 2002. 
[CaD02] IETF, RFC 3376:  Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 3, 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3376.txt, Accessed: May 22, 2006. 
[CaL99] Carducci, F. and G. Losquadro, "The EuroSkyWay worldwide system 
providing broadband service to fixed and mobile end-users," International 
Journal of Satellite Communications, vol. 17, no. 2-3, pp. 143-154, 1999. 
[ChB04] Challal, Yacine, Hatem Bettahar, and Abdelmadjid Bouabdallah, "SAKM: a 
scalable and adaptive key management approach for multicast 
communications," ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, vol. 
34, no. 2 (April 2004), pp. 55-70, 2004. 
[ChE02] Chao, Chen, Ekici Eylem, and F. Akyildiz Ian, "Satellite grouping and routing 
protocol for LEO/MEO satellite IP networks," Proceedings of the 5th ACM 
international workshop on Wireless mobile multimedia, Atlanta, Georgia, 
USA, 2002. 
[CIS07] Cisco Systems, Inc., Cisco Internetwork Operating System (Cisco IOS), San 
Jose, CA, http://www.cisco.com, Accessed: August 30, 2007. 
[CoP02] 53rd IETF, Statistics of One-Way Internet Packet Delays, Minneapolis, MN 
[CrS01] Cruickshank, H., Z. Sun, F. Carducci, and A. Sanchez, "Analysis of IP voice 
conferencing over EuroSkyWay satellite system," IEEE Communications, vol. 
148, no. 4, pp. 202-206, 2001. 
[DeC90] Deering, Stephen and D. Cheriton, "Multicast Routing in Datagram 
Internetworks and Extended LANs," ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, 
pp. 85-111, 1990. 
[Dee91] Deering, Stephen, "Multicast Routing in a Datagram Internetwork," Ph.D., 
Stanford University, 1991. 
[DeE96] Deering, S., D. L. Estrin, D. Farinacci, V. Jacobson, Liu Ching-Gung, and Wei 
Liming, "The PIM architecture for wide-area multicast routing," Networking, 
IEEE/ACM Transactions on, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 153-162, 1996. 
 198 
[DeF99] IETF, Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6, 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/2710, Accessed: May 22, 2006. 
[DiC05] Di Pietro, Roberto, Stefano Chessa, and Piero Maestrini, "Computation, 
Memory and Bandwidth Efficient Distillation Codes to Mitigate DoS in 
Multicast," Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and 
Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks 
(SECURECOMM’05), Athens, Greece, 2005. 
[DiD03] Di Pietro, Roberto, Antonio Durante, and Luigi V. Mancini, "A reliable key 
authentication schema for secure multicast communications," Proceedings of 
the 22nd International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems 
(SRDS’03), Florence, Italy, 2003. 
[Dij59] Dijkstra, E. W., "A Note on Two Problems in Connexion with Graphs," 
Numerische Mathematik, vol. 1, pp. 269-271, 1959. 
[DoD02] Department of Defense, Global Information Grid (GIG) Overarching Policy, 
DoD Directive 8100.1, (Arlington, VA). 
[DTI05] Transformational SATCOM (TSAT) - PE NUMBER: 0603845F, 
http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2006/AirForce/0603845F.pdf, 
Washington, DC, Accessed: April 17, 2006. 
[EkA02] Ekici, E., I. F. Akyildiz, and M. D. Bender, "A multicast routing algorithm for 
LEO satellite IP networks," Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on, vol. 10, 
no. 2, pp. 183-192, 2002. 
[Ela05] Elangovan, A., "Efficient multicasting and broadcasting in layer 2 provider 
backbone networks," IEEE Comm, vol. 43, no. 11, pp. 166-170, 2005. 
[ElR03] El-Sayed, A., V. Roca, and L. Mathy, "A survey of proposals for an alternative 
group communication service," IEEE Network, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 46-51, 2003. 
[FeH04] IETF, IGMP/MLD-based Multicast Forwarding ("IGMP/MLD Proxying"), 
http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/draft-ietf-magma-igmp-proxy-06.pdf, Accessed: 2006. 
[FeH06] Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM): Protocol 
Specification (Revised), http://tools.ietf.org/wg/pim/draft-ietf-pim-sm-v2-
new/draft-ietf-pim-sm-v2-new-12.txt, Accessed: May 15, 2006. 
[Fen02] IETF, RFC 3228: IANA Considerations for IPv4 Internet Group Management 
Protocol (IGMP), http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc3228.pdf, Accessed: 2006. 
[FiD01] Filali, F. and W. Dabbous, "Issues on the IP multicast service behaviour over 
the next-generation satellite-terrestrial hybrid networks," Proceedings of the 
Sixth IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications, 2001. 
 199 
[FoR98] Fossa Jr., C. E., R. A. Raines, G. H. Gunsch, and M. A. Temple, "An overview 
of the IRIDIUM (R) low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite system," Proceedings of 
the IEEE 1998 National Aerospace and Electronics Conference, Dayton, OH, 
USA, 1998. 
[Fos98] Fossa Jr, Carl E., "A Performance Analysis of the IRIDIUM Low Earth Orbit 
Satellite System," Master's thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 1998, 
AFIT/GE/ENG/98J-01. 
[FrH99] Freitag, Joe, Peter Hadinger, Hau Ho, and Eric Wiswell, "Global EHF satellite 
network for delivering fibre optic capacity world wide," International Journal 
of Satellite Communications, vol. 17, no. 2-3, pp. 73-81, 1999. 
[GAO04] United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: the 
Global Information Grid and challenges facing its implementation, GAO-04-
858, (Washington, DC: July 28, 2004). 
[GhS99] Ghedia, Lalji, Keith Smith, and Gary Titzer, "Satellite PCN - the ICO system," 
Intl Journal of Satellite Communications, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 273-289, 1999. 
[HaB01] Hardjono, T., M. Baugher, and H. Harney, "Group Key Management for IP 
Multicast: Model & Architecture," Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International 
Workshops on Enabling Technologies, 2001. 
[Hab03] IETF, RFC 3590:  Source Address Selection for the Multicast Listener 
Discovery (MLD) Protocol, http://tools.ietf.org/html/3590, Accessed: 2006. 
[HaC00] Hardjono, T. and B. Cain, "Key establishment for IGMP authentication in IP 
multicast," Proceedings of the ECUMN 2000, 2000. 
[HaM03] IETF, IGMPv3/MLDv2 and Multicast Routing Protocol Interaction, 
http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/draft-ietf-magma-igmpv3-and-routing-05.pdf, 
Accessed: May 22, 2006. 
[HeS05] Heeyoul, Kim, Hong Seong-min, H. Yoon, and J. W. Cho, "Secure group 
communication with multiplicative one-way functions," Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Information Technology, 2005. 
[HoC04] IETF, IGMPv3/MLDv2 for SSM, http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/draft-holbrook-idmr-
igmpv3-ssm-08.pdf, Accessed: May 22, 2006. 
[HoI04] Howarth, M. P., S. Iyengar, Z. Sun, and H. Cruickshank, "Dynamics of key 
management in secure satellite multicast," Selected Areas in Communications, 
IEEE Journal on, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 308-319, 2004. 
[Hub97] Hubbel, Y. C., "A comparison of the IRIDIUM and AMPS systems," IEEE 
Network, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 52-59, 1997. 
 200 
[HuM03] Huang, J. H. and S. Mishra, "Mykil: a highly scalable key distribution protocol 
for large group multicast," Proceedings of the GLOBECOM 2003, 2003. 
[HuR06a] Hubenko Jr., Victor P., Richard A. Raines, Michael A. Temple, Robert F. 
Mills, and Mark D. Saeger, "Adaptation, Modeling, and Analysis of PIM-DM 
in a LEO Satellite Network Environment," Proceedings of the IEEE 
Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, Montana, 2006. 
[HuR06b] Hubenko Jr., Victor P., Richard A. Raines, Robert F. Mills, Rusty O. Baldwin, 
Barry E. Mullins, and Michael R. Grimaila, "Improving the Global 
Information Grid’s Performance Through Satellite Communications Layer 
Enhancements," IEEE Communications, vol. 44, no. 11, pp. 66-72, 2006. 
[HuR07a] Hubenko Jr., Victor P., Richard A. Raines, Rusty O. Baldwin, Barry E. 
Mullins, Robert F. Mills, and Michael R. Grimaila, "Improving Satellite 
Multicast Security Scalability by Reducing Re-keying Requirements," IEEE 
Network, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 51-56, 2007. 
[HuR07b] Hubenko Jr., Victor P., Richard A. Raines, Rusty O. Baldwin, Barry E. 
Mullins, Robert F. Mills, and Michael R. Grimaila, "Applying a Secure and 
Efficient Low Earth Orbit Satellite-Based Multicast Architecture in a 
Deployed Environment," Proceedings of the MILCOM 2007, Orlando, Florida, 
2007. 
[HuR08] Hubenko Jr., Victor P., Richard A. Raines, Rusty O. Baldwin, Barry E. 
Mullins, Robert F. Mills, and Michael R. Grimaila, "A Secure and Efficient 
Satellite-based Multicast Architecture," Proceedings of the IEEE Radio and 
Wireless Symposium, Orlando, Florida, 2008. 
[Jai91] Jain, Raj, The Art of Computer Systems Performance Analysis. New York, 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1991. 
[JaK99] Jancso, James D. and Bruce Kraselsky, "The Constellation LEO satellite 
system: a wide-area solution to telecom needs in underserved areas 
worldwide," International Journal of Satellite Communications, vol. 17, no. 4, 
pp. 257-271, 1999. 
[JuA02] Judge, Paul and Mostafa Ammar, "Gothic: a group access control architecture 
for secure multicast and anycast," Proceedings of the IEEE INFOCOM, New 
York City, NY, USA, 2002. 
[JuA03] Judge, Paul and Mostafa Ammar, "Security issues and solutions in multicast 
content distribution: a survey," IEEE Network, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 30-36, 2003. 
 201 
[JuL06] Jung, Eunjin, Alex X. Liu, and Mohamed G. Gouda, "Key bundles and 
parcels: Secure communication in many groups," Computer Networks, vol. 50, 
no. 11, pp. 1781-1798, 2006. 
[JuY06] Jun, Zhang, Zhou Yu, Ma Fanyuan, Gu Dawu, and Bai Yingcai, "An extension 
of secure group communication using key graph," Information Sciences, vol. 
176, no. 20, pp. 3060-3078, 2006. 
[KaH04] Karaliopoulos, M., P. Henrio, K. Narenthiran, E. Angelou, and B. G. Evans, 
"Packet scheduling for the delivery of multicast and broadcast services over S-
UMTS," International Journal of Satellite Communications and Networking, 
vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 503-532, 2004. 
[KaK01] Kamata, Minoru, Tetsuya Kawase, Akira Watanabe, and Iwao Sasase, 
"Proposal and analysis of multicast communication method in a department 
VPN," Electronics and Communications in Japan (Part I: Communications), 
vol. 84, no. 7, pp. 45-56, 2001. 
[Kru98] Kruus, Peter S., "A Survey of Multicast Security Issues and Architectures," 
Proceedings of the 21st National Information Systems Security Conference, 
Arlington, Virginia, USA, 1998. 
[LaD98] Lai, Yuan-Cheng, Ying-Dar Lin, and Wei-Che Yu, "GMNF-DVMRP: an 
enhanced version of distance vector multicast routing protocol," International 
Journal of Communication Systems, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 93-101, 1998. 
[LeK00] Lee, Jaeook and Sun Kang, "Satellite over satellite (SOS) network: a novel 
architecture for satellite network," Proceedings of the IEEE INFOCOM 2000; 
Nineteenth Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and 
Communications Societies, Tel Aviv, Israel, 2000. 
[LeL00] Lee, Jae-Wook, Jun-Woo Lee, Tae-Wan Kim, and Dae-Ung Kim, "Satellite 
over satellite (SOS) network: a novel concept of hierarchical architecture and 
routing in satellite network," Proceedings of the 25th Annual IEEE Conference 
on Local Computer Networks, 2000 (LCN 2000), Tampa, FL, 2000. 
[LoL04] Loreti, P., M. Luglio, R. Kapoor, J. Stepanek, M. Gerla, F. Vatalaro, and M. 
A. Vazquez-Castro, "Mobile internet access using satellite networks," 
International Journal of Satellite Communications and Networking, vol. 22, 
no. 6, pp. 587-610, 2004. 
[MaG04] Macq, Jean-François and Michel X. Goemans, "Trade-offs on the location of 
the core node in a network," Networks, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 179-186, 2004. 
[MAT07] The MathWorks, Inc.®, MatLab, Natick, Massachusetts, 
http://www.mathworks.com, Accessed: July 30, 2007. 
 202 
[Mit97] Mittra, Suvo, "Iolus: a framework for scalable secure multicasting," 
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM '97, Cannes, France, 1997. 
[MoS02] Mohorcic, Mihael, Ales Svigelj, Gorazd Kandus, and Markus Werner, 
"Performance evaluation of adaptive routing algorithms in packet-switched 
intersatellite link networks," International Journal of Satellite 
Communications, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 97-120, 2002. 
[Moy94] Multicast Extensions to OSPF, http://tools.ietf.org/html/1584, Accessed: May 
15, 2006. 
[NaK04] Narenthiran, K., M. Karaliopoulos, B. G. Evans, W. De-Win, M. Dieudonne, 
P. Henrio, M. Mazzella, E. Angelou, I. Andrikopoulos, P. I. Philippopoulos, 
D. I. Axiotis, N. Dimitriou, A. Polydoros, G. E. Corazza, and A. Vanelli-
Coralli, "S-UMTS access network for broadcast and multicast service 
delivery: the SATIN approach," International Journal of Satellite 
Communications and Networking, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 87-111, 2004. 
[NgZ05] Ng, W. H. D. and Sun Zhili, "Multi-layers balanced LKH," Proceedings of the 
IEEE International Conference on Communications, 2005. 
[NOR05] http://www.nortel.com/corporate/pressroom/feature_article/2005a/03_07 
_05_realtime.html, Accessed: 2005. 
[OPN06] OPNET Technologies, Inc.®, OPNET®, Bethesda, MD, http://www.opnet.com, 
Accessed: May 17, 2006. 
[PaO06] Park, Mirang, Naonobu Okazaki, and Shoichiro Seno, "A proposal and its 
evaluations of a re-keying system for dynamic secure group communications," 
Systems and Computers in Japan, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 11-24, 2006. 
[PrR99] Pratt, Stephen R., Richard A. Raines, Carl E. Fossa Jr., and Michael A. 
Temple, "An operational and performance overview of the IRIDIUM low 
earth orbit satellite system," in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 
vol. 2, 1999, pp. 2-10. 
[Pus04] Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol Internet Draft, 
http://tools.ietf.org/wg/idmr/draft-ietf-idmr-dvmrp-v3/draft-ietf-idmr-dvmrp-
v3-11.txt, Accessed: May 15, 2006. 
[RaD99] Raines, Richard A. and Nathaniel J. Davis I. V., "The simulation modelling 
and performance analysis of low earth orbit satellite communication networks 
for personal communications," International Journal of Communication 
Systems, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 197-215, 1999. 
 203 
[RaH03] Rafaeli, Sandro and David Hutchison, "A survey of key management for 
secure group communication," ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 
309-329, 2003. 
[RaJ97] Raines, R. A., R. F. Janoso, D. M. Gallagher, and D. L. Coulliette, "Simulation 
of two routing protocols operating in a low Earth orbit satellite network 
environment," Proceedings of the IEEE MILCOM, Monterey, California, 
1997. 
[RoB01] Rodeh, Ohad, Kenneth P. Birman, and Danny Dolev, "The Architecture and 
Performance of Security Protocols in the Ensemble Group Communication 
System: Using Diamonds to Guard the Castle," ACM Transactions on 
Information and System Security (TISSEC), vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 289-319, 2001. 
[Rod01] Roddy, Dennis, Satellite Communications, Third ed. New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill, 2001. 
[RoP00] Multicast Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (MAODV) Routing Internet 
Draft, http://tools.ietf.org/wg/manet/draft-ietf-manet-maodv/draft-ietf-manet-
maodv-00.txt, Accessed: May 15, 2006. 
[Sae03] Saeger, Mark D., "Performance Analysis of Protocol Independent Multicasting 
- Dense Mode in Low Earth Orbit Satellite Networks," Master's thesis, Air 
Force Institute of Technology, 2003, AFIT/GCE/ENG/03-03. 
[SaM00] Sahasrabuddhe, L. H. and B. Mukherjee, "Multicast routing algorithms and 
protocols: a tutorial," IEEE Network, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 90-102, 2000. 
[Sav06] Internet Engineering Task Force, Overview of the Internet Multicast Routing 
Architecture (draft-ietf-mboned-routingarch-03.txt), Accessed: May 26, 2006. 
[ScL02] Scheikl, O., J. Lane, R. Boyer, and M. Eltoweissy, "Multi-level secure 
multicast: the rethinking of secure locks," Proceedings of the IPPW, 2002. 
[ShG99] Shields, Clay and J. J. Garcia-Luna-Aceves, "KHIP—a scalable protocol for 
secure multicast routing," Proceedings of the Conference on Applications, 
technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States, 1999. 
[SMC06a] MILSATCOM Joint Program Office, http://www.losangeles.af.mil/SMC/MC/, 
Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA, Accessed: April 17, 2006. 
[SMC06b] Space and Missile Systems Center, 
http://www.losangeles.af.mil/SMC/PA/Fact_Sheets/, Los Angeles Air Force 
Base, CA, Accessed: April 17, 2006. 
 204 
[SPA06] Space & Naval Warfare Systems Command, 
http://enterprise.spawar.navy.mil/UploadedFiles/next_gen_muos.pdf, San 
Diego, CA, Accessed: April 17, 2006. 
[Ste03] John P. Stenbit, DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy, (Washington, DC: May 9, 
2003). 
[Sti95] Stinson, Douglas R., Cryptography: Theory and Practice. Boca Raton, 
Florida: CRC Press, Inc., 1995. 
[SuE02] Sumanasena, M. A. K., B. G. Evans, A. Vanelli-Coralli, and G. E. Corazza, 
"SATIN approach in W-CDMA adaptation for broadcast and multicast based 
S-UMTS," Proceedings of the Vehicular Technology Conference, 2002. 
[SuH03] Sun, Z., M. P. Howarth, H. Cruickshank, S. Iyengar, and L. Claverotte, 
"Networking issues in IP multicast over satellite," International Journal of 
Satellite Communications and Networking, vol. 21, no. 4-5, pp. 489-507, 2003. 
[Tho01] Thomas, Ryan W., "Multicast Algorithms for Mobile Satellite Communication 
Networks," Master's thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2001, 
AFIT/GCE/ENG/01M-04. 
[ThR01] Thomas, R. W., R. A. Raines, R. O. Baldwin, and M. A. Temple, "Simulation, 
modeling, and evaluation of satellite-based multicasting protocols," 
Proceedings of the Fall 2001 IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, 
Atlantic City, NJ, 2001. 
[ThR02] Thomas, Ryan W., Richard A. Raines, Rusty O. Baldwin, and Michael A. 
Temple, "Performance analysis of multicast algorithms for mobile satellite 
communication networks," Computer Communications Journal, Special Issue 
on Advances in Performance Evaluation of Computer and 
Telecommunications Networking, vol. 25, no. 11-12, pp. 1085-1093, 2002. 
[Tom05] Tomme, Edward B., "The Paradigm Shift to Effects-Based Space: Near-Space 
as a Combat Space Effects Enabler," Airpower Research Institute, Maxwell 
AFB, AL, 2005. 
[ViC04] IETF, RFC 3810: Multicast Listener Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6, 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/3810, Accessed: May 22, 2006. 
[Wal70] Walker, J.G., "Circular Orbit Patterns Providing Whole Earth Coverage," 
Technical Report 70211, November 1970, 1970. 
[Wal71] Walker, J.G., "Some circular orbit patterns providing continuous whole earth 
coverage," Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, vol. 24, pp. 369-384, 
1971. 
 205 
[WeF01] Werner, Markus, Jochen Frings, Frédéric Wauquiez, and Gérard Maral, 
"Topological design, routing and capacity dimensioning for ISL networks in 
broadband LEO satellite systems," International Journal of Satellite 
Communications, vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 499-527, 2001. 
[WeS03] Wei-Chi, Ku and Chen Shuai-Min, "An improved key management scheme 
for large dynamic groups using one-way function trees," Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Parallel Processing Workshops, 2003. 
[WoC01] Wood, L., A. Clerget, I. Andrikopoulos, G. Pavlou, and W. Dabbous, "IP 
routing issues in satellite constellation networks," International Journal of 
Satellite Communications, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 69-92, 2001. 
[WuS05] Wu, Feng-Ge, Fu-Chun Sun, Ke Yu, and Chang-Wen Zheng, "Performance 
evaluation on a double-layered satellite network," International Journal of 
Satellite Communications and Networking, vol. 23, no. 6, pp. 359-371, 2005. 
[XiP05] Xin, Li, Zhang Peng, and Ye Chengqing, "GAC/GKM: a group access control 
architecture for secure multicast," Proceedings of the International Conference 
on Communications, Circuits and Systems, China, 2005. 
[Yam97] Yamashita, Tomoyoshi, "The low-/medium-earth orbit constellations for 
global satellite systems," Electronics and Communications in Japan (Part I: 
Communications), vol. 80, no. 4, pp. 106-114, 1997. 
[YaS01] Yang, Wen-Her and Shiuh-Pyng Shieh, "Secure key agreement for group 
communications," International Journal of Network Management, vol. 11, no. 
6, pp. 365-374, 2001. 
[YiS03] On-Demand Multicast Routing Protocol (ODMRP) for Ad Hoc Networks 
Internet Draft, http://tools.ietf.org/wg/manet/draft-ietf-manet-odmrp/draft-ietf-
manet-odmrp-04.txt, Accessed: May 15, 2006. 
[YuE02] Yue, Gaofeng, E. Ekici, and I. F. Akyildiz, "A new multicast routing algorithm 
in hierarchical satellite networks," Proceedings of the IEEE Global 
Telecommunications Conference 2002 (GLOBECOM '02), 2002. 
[Yuh03] Yuh-Min, Tseng, "A scalable key-management scheme with minimizing key 
storage for secure group communications," International Journal of Network 
Management, vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 419-425, 2003. 
 
 
 206 
VIII. Vita 
Major Victor P. Hubenko, Jr. graduated Valedictorian from Brentwood High 
School in Brentwood, New York.  He entered undergraduate studies at Cornell University 
in Ithaca, New York where he graduated with a Bachelors of Science degree in Electrical 
Engineering and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant, United States Air Force, in 
December 1996. 
His first assignment was at Maxwell Air Force Base (Gunter Annex), Alabama, 
where he was a network engineer for Air Force Systems Networking.  He designed, 
installed, configured, and maintained classified networks for Air Force, Air Force 
Reserve, and Air National Guard units throughout the continental United States and 
Alaska.  He also managed the classified network connectivity deployment for the Air 
Force Defense Messaging System.  In December 1999, he was assigned to the tri-agency 
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) 
Integrated Program Office, Silver Spring, Maryland.  There he served as the Command, 
Control, and Communications Segment Integrated Product Team lead, managing all 
aspects of communications for NPOESS to include terrestrial and satellite 
telecommunications, network security, network operations, antenna and ground station 
development, Mission Management Center development, and software development.  
While assigned to NPOESS, he completed his Master of Science degree in Electrical 
Engineering at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.  In August 2004, he 
entered the Graduate School of Engineering and Management, Air Force Institute of 
Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. 
 
  
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data 
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other 
aspect of the collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
19-06-2008 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Doctoral Dissertation  
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
August 2004 – June 2008 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
A Secure and Efficient Communications Architecture For 
Global Information Grid Users Via Cooperating Space Assets 5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
6.  AUTHOR(S) 
 
Hubenko, Victor, P. Jr., Major, USAF 
 
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
  Air Force Institute of Technology 
 Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN) 
 2950 Hobson Way, Building 640 
 WPAFB OH 45433-7765 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
    REPORT NUMBER 
 
   AFIT/DCE/ENG/08-02 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S 
ACRONYM(S) 
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
  
11.  SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 
NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
       
        APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
14. ABSTRACT  
    With the Information Age in full and rapid development, users expect to have global, seamless, ubiquitous, secure, and efficient 
communications capable of providing access to real-time applications and collaboration.  The United States Department of Defense’s 
(DoD) Network-Centric Enterprise Services initiative, along with the notion of pushing the “power to the edge,” aims to provide end-
users with maximum situational awareness, a comprehensive view of the battlespace, all within a secure networking environment. 
    Building from previous AFIT research efforts, this research developed a novel security framework architecture to address the lack 
of efficient and scalable secure multicasting in the low earth orbit satellite network environment.  This security framework architecture 
combines several key aspects of different secure group communications architectures in a new way that increases efficiency and 
scalability, while maintaining the overall system security level.  By implementing this security architecture in a deployed environment 
with heterogeneous communications users, reduced re-keying frequency will result.  Less frequent re-keying means more resources 
are available for throughput as compared to security overhead.  This translates to more transparency to the end user; it will seem as 
if they have a “larger pipe” for their network links. 
    As a proof of concept, this research developed and analyzed multiple mobile communication environment scenarios to 
demonstrate the superior re-keying advantage offered by the novel “Hubenko Security Framework Architecture” over traditional and 
clustered multicast security architectures.  For example, in the scenario containing a heterogeneous mix of user types (Stationary, 
Ground, Sea, and Air), the Hubenko Architecture achieved a minimum ten-fold reduction in total keys distributed as compared to 
other known architectures.  Another experiment demonstrated the Hubenko Architecture operated at 6% capacity while the other 
architectures operated at 98% capacity.  In the 80% overall mobility experiment with 40% Air users, the other architectures re-keying 
increased 900% over the Stationary case, whereas the Hubenko Architecture only increased 65%. 
    This new architecture is extensible to numerous secure group communications environments beyond the low earth orbit satellite 
network environment, including unmanned aerial vehicle swarms, wireless sensor networks, and mobile ad hoc networks. 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
     Secure Multicast Architecture, Low Earth Orbit Satellite, Satellite Communications 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF: 
19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
Dr. Richard A. Raines (ENG) 
a. 
REPORT 
 
U 
b. 
ABSTRACT 
 
U 
c. THIS 
PAGE 
 
U 
17. LIMITATION 
OF  
     ABSTRACT 
 
 
UU 
18. 
NUMBER  
      OF 
      PAGES 
 
226 
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 
(937) 255-6565, ext 4278 
e-mail: Richard.Raines@afit.edu 
   Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 
 
